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ABSTRACT 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate 
started an irreversible train of events leading inevitably to Partition.  
Starting first with a critical analysis of the Balfour Declaration and its incorporation into the British 
Mandate, the thesis explores the reasoning behind Britain’s readiness to issue the Declaration at the height of 
WWI. It throws fresh light on arguments for and against Partition offered by a range of Commissions, 
Committees and Governments. The thesis examines the years during which the conflicted parties were 
increasingly at odds until, on the eve of WWII, Britain reversed its former pro-Zionist policy in favour of 
Palestinian Arabs. Now the work concentrates on the post-war years when a war-weary Britain acknowledged 
that the UN should decide. In turn, the UN established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) hence later chapters consist of a close examination of UNSCOP’s role, its extensive investigations 
in the Middle East and Europe and interviews with key players from both sides of the divide. The final chapter 
centres around UNGA members’ political manoeuvrings, temporary realignment, disparate views and the last 
unavoidable step to Partition.  
There are two main versions of Arab-Jewish history. First, there is a version claiming that Jews were 
the primary victims of Arab violence. This traditional version is supported by a number of Zionist historians. 
The second version claims that Arabs were the hapless victims of a deliberately orchestrated Jewish takeover 
of Palestine. This version is supported by pro-Palestinian and revisionist Zionist historians. Although previous 
researchers have explored some of the above events either tangentially in a related area or as part of a broader 
study, this thesis draws many of its conclusions from a large body of verbatim evidence that had informed 
Commission and Committee Reports.  
It should be emphasised that this thesis is a critical, but non-judgmental, analysis of Partition. It 
concludes that when, in 1947, the UNGA formally approved Partition, it was a legal acknowledgement that 
Partition was already a near-accomplished fact.
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late-1800s, after centuries of pogroms and persecution, many Jews came to believe that they, 
their faith and traditions could only flourish in a Jewish homeland. It was this understanding that 
galvanised a proportion of Jews from across the world to unite into one of a number of organisations 
that had formed specifically to secure a permanent Jewish homeland in Palestine. Ultimately, Zionism 
emerged to become the most important movement of the time.1 The first major step towards satisfying 
Zionist objectives came about when, on the 2nd of November 1917, Britain’s WWI Cabinet pledged 
to support Zionist ambitions and issued the Balfour Declaration. This was a guarantee that Britain 
would assist in the establishment of a permanent Jewish homeland in Palestine on condition that the 
existing rights of the indigenous non-Jewish population were guaranteed.  
This thesis argues that from the Declaration in 1917 onwards, and with its formal ratification 
by the League of Nations, the journey to partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states 
was unstoppable. It takes into account that the pledge was made without consultation with the non-
Jewish population of Palestine, unquestionably putting them at an immediate disadvantage.  
Others, too, contend that Partition was inevitable, however this contention is frequently based 
on research that is either tangential to or forms part of a related study. Schneer, for example, maintains 
Partition was inevitable because Balfour issued his Declaration.2 However, as Schneer’s seminal 
work concentrates exclusively on the period before and during the WWI period and the issuance of 
the Declaration, his research did not extend into the unpredictable path of the next thirty years. A 
century after Balfour, Corbin records that, years later, her ancestor Leo Amery (joint author of the 
Declaration) maintained that issuance of the Declaration made Partition inevitable3 but again, Amery 
did not have the benefit of research conducted after the event. In 1937, a Royal Commission (Peel) 
 
1 Zion was an early biblical name for Jerusalem 
2 Schneer, J. (2010, 365): The Balfour Declaration – the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
3 Corbin, J. (2017) ‘The Balfour Declaration: My ancestor's hand in history. BBC News, 31st October 2017. 
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reported that Partition offered the one chance of peace. It went further by implying that a de facto 
Jewish state had become a reality. 4  In 1947, a UN Special Committee (UNSCOP) returned from 
Palestine to report that Partition was the only viable option5 whereas Garcia-Granados argues that 
Palestine was already effectively partitioned before UN involvement.6  
Almost from the first, the Balfour Declaration has come under concentrated academic 
scrutiny. Schneer,7 Said,8 Louis,9 Monroe10 and many others have puzzled over its precise ‘meaning’ 
and most, if not all, accept that, however it is interpreted, it changed the course of Palestine’s history. 
Putting that aside, this thesis adopts a somewhat different approach from others. Specifically, by way 
of minutes of WWI Cabinet meetings, the thesis focuses on Ministers’ controversial viewpoints and 
concerns over the likely ramifications of staking a claim to Zionist ambitions and whether or not a 
Declaration issued at the height of war served Britain’s interests. Nevertheless, once publication was 
announced, there was no turning back. In the first of five drafts of the Declaration, Britain envisioned 
that Palestine would be “reconstituted” as a Jewish National Home.11 Before concluding with the 
emergence of the Declaration, Schneer’s book concentrates extensively on the pre-WWI political 
background that persuaded the wartime cabinet to issue the Declaration in the first instance. This 
present thesis continues Schneer’s theme by close study of the British Mandate which, in 1922, 
enshrined the Balfour Declaration into international law. Schneer maintains that in drafting the 
Declaration the British Cabinet, while confirming the Jewish historic connection to Palestine,12 had 
knowingly intended its ambiguity.13 Similarly, Bickerton and Klausner also contend that the wording 
of the Document is imprecise.14 Moreover, Edward Said argues that Britain’s intention to establish a 
 
4 Palestine Royal Committee Report July 1937, Page 376 
5 A/364 Add 1, 3d September 1947 
6 Garcia-Granados, J. (1948, Pages 272-273): The Birth of Israel – The Drama as I saw it 
7 Schneer, J. (2010): The Balfour Declaration – The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
8 Said, Edward, W. (1992) ‘The Question of Palestine 
9 William Roger Louis (2005) ‘Yet More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain 
10 Monroe, E (1981), Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–71 
11 The importance of the Balfour Declaration is evidenced by the fact that this first hand-written jotting on a scrap of paper was sold at auction in 
2015 for an astonishing $884,000 (Schneer, 2010, 335) 
12 Schneer, J. (2010, 335): The Balfour Declaration – The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
13 (Ibid, 11) 
14 Bickerton, I.J and Klausner, C. L. (2007, 39) ‘History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ (7th Edition) 
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Jewish state was clouded by its own sense of superiority.15 Ze'ev Jabotinsky went further.16 He 
recalled that in 1917, Chaim Weizmann17 and Harry Sacher18 had spoken openly about the creation 
of a Jewish state in Palestine. They reasoned that, from the beginning, according to British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George and Lord Balfour, the Balfour Declaration implied the establishment 
of a Jewish state, not, in Jabotinsky’s words, “the creation of a new ghetto”.19 In 1929, Sir Walter 
Shaw20 confirmed that the then dispute between Arabs and Jews was part created by Britain’s failure 
to spell out its intentions more clearly.21 For his part, Louis claims that the Declaration was a betrayal 
of similar promises made to Arabs.22 Monroe argues that issuance of the Declaration was a grave 
mistake and failed to serve Britain’s long-term interests.23  
While undoubtably the drafters of the Declaration either intentionally or unwittingly produced 
a document that is inherently ambiguous, this thesis argues that from the clear intentions expressed 
in the first draft to the ambiguous language of the final Declaration, Britain’s pledge to Zionists was 
destined to end with Partition. This thesis argues, like Schneer, that the Declaration itself started the 
irreversible process of Partition.24 The die was finally cast when the League of Nations awarded the 
Mandate to Britain in July 1922.   
Palestine in its broadest sense and later written into the British Mandate, included a region 
East of the River Jordan. The dynamics changed when the League of Nations ratified Britain’s 
intention to partition off the East Bank region. Thus, in 1923, around 70% of former Palestine was 
awarded to the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (later Jordan). After a promising start, previously 
optimistic Zionists censured their leaders for allowing this situation to develop.25 From then on Jews 
 
15 Said, Edward, W. (1992, 15, 20) ‘The Question of Palestine 
16 Ze'ev Jabotinsky was an important right-wing Zionist nationalist, but with some libertarian views, He was a soldier (having founded the Jewish 
Legion during WWI) and an influential writer and orator.  
17 Before becoming the first president of the State of Israel in 1949, Chaim Weizmann served as president of the World Zionist Organisation 
18 Harry Sacher was a barrister and prominent Zionist. He is credited with having been one of the authors of an early version of the Balfour 
Declaration (Palestine: Information with Provenance (PIWP database)).    
19 Schindler, Colin (2006, 111): ‘The Triumph of Military Zionism – Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right’ 
20 Sir Walter Shaw chaired the Shaw Commission in 1929 and delivered his report on the Palestine problem in 1930 
21 Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929 Page 112 
22 William Roger Louis (2005, 252): ‘Yet More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain 
23 Monroe, E (1981, 43), Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–71 
24 Schneer, J. (2010, 365): The Balfour Declaration – the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict  
25 Bickerton, I.J and Klausner, C. L. (2007, 44) ‘History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ (7th Edition) 
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and Arabs were left contending over a much-reduced Palestine but where neither the Balfour 
Declaration nor the British Mandate had imposed limits to Jewish immigration. Interestingly, Mark 
Tessler questions whether there were earlier alternatives; whether, the Jewish-Arab conflict might 
have been avoided. He accepts that while there are no definitive answers, the question is deserving 
of academic interest. In an intriguing sub-chapter (Alternatives to Conflict), Tessler speculates that 
had Britain honoured its WWI pledges to Arabs and given equal weight to the economic and political 
rights of the indigenous population, then a specifically Jewish region might have been attainable 
without the ensuing bloodshed. “… had Palestine been incorporated into an Arab Kingdom roughly 
coterminous with Greater Syria [then] both the political rights and the cultural aspirations of the 
state’s Arab inhabitants would have been secure”.26    
Between WWI and WWII Arab-Jewish tensions grew although both Klein and Karsh contend 
that Jews and Arabs commonly cooperated on everyday issues.27 28 Before long, these early periods 
of comfortable coexistence became increasingly marred by spells of violence. Beset with security 
preoccupations, Hahn maintains, Britain felt it was politically expedient to suspend expressions of 
Jewish ‘statehood’.29 In 1936 Weizmann sensed the mood and agreed with Nuri Said (Iraq’s Foreign 
Minister) that in the long term there was much to be gained by a temporary suspension of 
immigration.30 Ben-Gurion (major Zionist leader), Karsh explains, would have none of it. For him, 
Jewish immigration was the “elixir of life” and the lifeblood of the Jewish national revival.31 
Weizmann’s (another influential Zionist leader) unguarded acceptance of Said’s proposal created a 
degree of confusion within British Government circles and discomfiture to Weizmann.32 
Despite Arab resistance, Zionists were determined to press ahead either by way of a Jewish 
state encompassing all of Palestine west of the River Jordan, or a partitioned Palestine. In 1936, 
 
26 Tessler, M (1994, 165-170): The History of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict. 
27 Klein, Menachem (2014, 19) Lives in Common, Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron 
28 Karsh, Efraim (2011, 14-15): Palestine Betrayed 
29 Hahn, P. L. (2004, 13): ‘Caught in the Middle East: US Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945 – 1961’ 
30 Karsh, Efraim (2011, 44): Palestine Betrayed 
31 (Ibid, 50) 
32 Karsh, Efraim (2011, 50-51): Palestine Betrayed 
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simmering discontent erupted into a full-scale revolt when Arabs vented their frustration on the new 
arrivals and on beleaguered British forces.  
With neither side prepared to give way and British forces powerless to contain the violence, 
in 1937 Britain despatched a Royal Commission (Peel) into the region to determine the underlying 
causes of the conflict and to recommend preventative measures.33 After reviewing the limited number 
of options available, Peel discarded the notion of separate Arab and Jewish Cantons (provinces)34 
deciding that nothing less than a two-state solution had any chance of success. Peel’s Commission 
recommended limiting levels of immigration but maintained that that Partition was the only way 
forward.  “Partition [wrote the Royal Commissioners] seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate 
peace. We can see none in any other plan”.35 
Peel’s acceptance of the need for Partition gained some traction within British official circles. 
However, his recommendation for a total exchange of Jewish and Arab populations to their respective 
regions condemned the report in its entirely. Nevertheless, Peel’s plan had signposted Partition.36 
Galnoor argues that Arab failure to accept this as a practical compromise ignored the political reality 
and ultimately cost them Palestine.37  
After Peel’s verdict, Zionists began to reconsider their all or nothing approach. Either they 
accept proportional representation in a majority Arab state or adapt their strategy towards garnering 
additional support for Partition.38 When, in 1937 Prime Minister Chamberlain convened a conference 
in London, Zionist leaders moved to persuade unconvinced British delegates that Jews, unlike Arabs, 
were prepared to join Britain in any likely military venture. Their veiled threats of retaliation if Britain 
 
33 Palestine Royal Committee Report July 1937 
34 Palestine Royal Committee Report July 1937, Pages, 377-379 
35 (Ibid, 376) 
36 Ben-Dror, E. (2014, 21): The success of the Zionist strategy vis-a- vis UNSCOP 
37 Galnoor, Itzhak (essay, Page 7), included in Gavison, R (Editor). (2013): ‘The Two-State Solution 
38 Zionist Congress: Congresses During the British Mandate (1923-1946) 
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restricted immigration were dismissed with a warning that, without British protection, Jews would be 
left to the mercy of the Arab majority.39 
Zionists met again in August of that year. Galnoor maintains that Ben-Gurion and Weizmann 
convinced a majority that, above all, Jewish immigrants must have free access to Palestine.40 Gavison 
argues that although Peel’s proposed partitioned state was too small for large-scale immigration at 
least the door was open for future negotiations.41 Karsh describes an instance when Weizmann went 
beyond his brief by telling British politicians that Partition was acceptable provided the allocated state 
was sufficiently large. Churchill retorted that, whatever Weizmann believed, Zionists must wait until 
fascism was defeated.42  
In a further attempt to solve the crisis, Britain established a second Commission with 
instructions to review the work of the Royal Commission. In 1938, the Palestine Partition 
Commission (Woodhead Commission) rejected Peel’s population and land transfer elements. The 
Commission surmised that as neither Arabs nor Jews could be separated fully, unrestricted 
immigration would lead to permanent Jewish political control and inflame the situation.43 
In 1938, US President Roosevelt wished he “could do more [to help Jews escape fascist 
Germany]”,44 but was loath to upset his British ally.45 He persuaded reluctant world representatives 
to convene in Evian-les-Bain with a view to solving the plight of millions of persecuted European 
Jews.  It came to nothing. At the worst imaginable time, country after country voiced platitudes, but 
almost universally declined to accept Jewish escapees.46 47 
With other avenues barred, tens of thousands flooded into the supposed safely of Palestine. 
Martin Kolinsky explains that Nazi persecution and worsening economic conditions (particularly in 
 
39 Laqueur, W (2003, 525) A History of Zionism 
40 Galnoor, Itzhak (essay) (2013, 8): See Gavison, R (Editor): The Two-State Solution (translated from Hebrew) 
41 Gavison, R (Editor) (2013, 87-92): ‘The Two-State Solution’ (translated from Hebrew) 
42 Karsh, Efraim (2011, 56): Palestine Betrayed,  
43 Palestine Partition Commission, 1938, 53, 235 
44 Berenbaum, M. (2000, 49) The World Must Know 
45 (Ibid, 49) 
46 (Ibid, 50) 
47 Wells, A (2009, 2) Tropical Zion 
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Poland and Romania) accelerated levels of Jewish immigration, threatening, as Arabs saw it, their 
majority status. Although, the Arab revolt ended in 1939, its “backlash”, Kolinsky continues, 
“attracted attention far beyond the narrow borders of Palestine … [and] became an important 
element in Pan-Arab and pan-Islamic fervour”.48 Sachar argues that ordinary Palestinian-Arabs 
suffered long-term economic, political and military consequences. While the Arab economy 
imploded, the Yishuv49 filled the vacuum and developed their own trading position. When the revolt 
was finally crushed by the British (with the support of the Hagenah which, from the lessons learned 
during the revolt, was now an effective fighting force), the Palestinian-Arab military capability was 
in tatters.50 Christopher Sykes argues that after the majority of Arab leaders were exiled or having 
escaped their British pursuers, Arab nationalists were left without strong leadership.51 Like Sachar 
and Sykes, Lockman too confirms that the Arab community was left “demoralised, disorganised and 
without effective leadership”. For their part, Jewish settlers had strengthened their ability to protect 
themselves without necessarily having to rely on British support.52 However, they were about to 
suffer a temporary setback.   
Before WWII, Britain was still the principal power in the Middle East and Zionists could take 
some comfort in expecting Britain to honour Balfour’s pledge – a view, writes Yaacov Shavit, largely 
shared by Jabotinsky and other Zionist revisionists.53 Nonetheless, on the build-up to an apparently 
unavoidable war, Britain changed its policy in favour of Arabs. Ovendale argues that, whereas in the 
early years before WWII oil took second place to the Middle East’s “strategic importance as a link 
between securing the communications of the British Empire”, by 1939 the situation had markedly 
changed. Now, a reliable supply of Middle East oil, safe passage through Suez and access to British 
 
48 Kolinsky, M. (1999, 2): Britain’s War in the Middle East, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1936-42  
49 Yishuv refers to the Jewish community in Palestine before the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948. 
50 Sachar, Howard M. (2007, 211-213) A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time   
51 Sykes, Christopher (1973, 264-266): Crossroads to Israel 
52 Lockman, Zachary (1996, 261) Comrades and Enemies, Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948  
53 See, Shavit, Yaacov (2005) Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948  
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naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean assumed priority over Zionist ambitions. Arab support 
became paramount.54  
In May 1939, both houses of the UK Parliament debated Britain’s position.  Chamberlain 
regretted previous misunderstandings and asserted that rather than agree to the establishment of a 
separate Jewish state, Britain had agreed only to “found [a Jewish] home in Palestine” (own 
emphasis).55 After vigorous debate and strong opposition in both Houses, Chamberlain’s Government 
finally won the day ruling that Jewish immigration should be severely restricted with land sales 
virtually prohibited.56 The UK Government had “washed [its] hands of [Jewish immigration and] 
clos[ed] the door”.57 Laqueur and Rubin argue that Britain’s policy shift was a breach of faith and 
tantamount to providing for a European Ghetto.58 Nevertheless, means of escape were barred when 
war was declared in September 1939. For the next five years Jewish legal immigration rates 
plummeted as, Laqueur argues, the world turned its back on Zionism.59  
During the war immigration had ground to a near standstill and Partition was on hold. Now, 
Zionism needed a kick-start to get the project back on track. This came about in May 1942 when the 
weakened Zionist movement met at the Biltmore Hotel in New York to decide on the next step.60 
Brady, Goldmann, Stein, Bickerton and Klausner argue that this landmark meeting exposed the 
different approaches adopted by the participants. Brady describes the rift that was opening in 
Zionism.61 Goldmann writes that Rabbi Stephan Wise and others argued that pressing for a Jewish 
state was futile until the war was won. He explains that, while some supported Weizmann’s readiness 
to accept that Britain would honour its pledge, the majority were drawn to Ben-Gurion’s certainly 
that only the US could deliver.62 Stein delivers a positive note. Conference, he writes, resolved that it 
 
54 Ovendale, Ritchie (2004, 69-71): The Origins of the Arab Israeli Wars 
55 UK Parliament White Paper, 1939) 
56 (Ibid, Hansard, Vol. 248) 
57 Winston Churchill’s response in (HC Deb 23 May 1939 Volume 347, 2174)  
58 Laqueur, W. & Rubin, B. (2001, 50) ‘The Israel-Arab Reader’ 
59 Laqueur, W (2003, 509-511) A History of Zionism 
60 Stein, K (2011): The Biltmore Program, David Ben-Gurion 
61 Brady, Colleen (2010, 17) American Zionism and the Biltmore Conference: Readings on the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Professor R. Hudson.  
62 Goldmann, Nahum (1969, 291) The autobiography of Nahum Goldmann, translated by Helen Sebba. 
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was in Jewish interests to emphasise that Arabs too would reap the benefits of a Jewish-majority 
Palestine. While the more elderly Weizmann dismissed the conference as inconsequential,63 
Bickerton and Klausner stress that it was the younger Ben-Gurion who finally stamped his authority 
on the Zionist movement and took the helm. Still, for both leaders, it was not a question of if a Jewish 
state should exist, rather one of how and when it could be achieved.64 
During his 1944 political campaign, US President Roosevelt hinted that although he had not 
yet given his official blessing to a future Jewish state, this omission must not imply that he was 
unsupportive 65 although now, in light of the Holocaust, Zionists, under Ben-Gurion’s pro-American 
leadership, were in no mood for conciliation. The Jewish Agency which had already rejected the 1939 
White Paper now demanded German reparations and insisted that any number of survivors should be 
given free passage to Palestine.66 By formalising its demands,67 the Jewish Agency had set in train a 
series of events that would lead to Partition.   
The end of WWII signalled a sea-change in the political landscape.  The US, under FDR’s 
successor President Harry S. Truman,68 had by that time replaced Britain, now under Labour’s new 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, as the undisputed world superpower. For Zionists, it represented, as 
Brady confirms, a “drift away from Great Britain”.69 In Palestine, the British Administration came 
under sustained attack from Jewish militants. Accordingly, in January 1946, an Anglo-American 
Committee arrived in “the cemetery of European Jewry”.70 The Committee rejected the concept that 
Palestine should be classed as a Jewish state, or, for that matter an Arab state, and, given that the 
majority of countries had refused entry to all but a few, the Committee saw no alternative other than 
to recommend that 100,000 survivors should be allowed immediate access to Palestine. Morris argues 
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that Attlee refused to agree until the Yishuv disarmed, knowing very well that this was highly 
unlikely.71 Hoffman too maintains that Attlee’s was a cynical ploy knowing that Jews would refuse.72 
Nonetheless, Truman supported the Committee’s recommendation and favoured rescinding Britain’s 
White Paper.73 This discord between the two leaders led to a somewhat frosty relationship although 
they agreed that Britain’s Herbert Morrison should collaborate with US Ambassador, Henry Grady, 
to look again. In due course, the statesmen recommended issuing 100,000 immigration certificates 
and rescinding Britain’s land sale restrictions. Accepting that neither would result in a secure peace, 
Morrison and Grady proposed a form of fragmented partition. They recommended partitioning 
Palestine into four provinces - one Jewish and one Arab and two under the authority of the British.74 
The thesis argues that this four-province Plan reinforced the need for Partition on a grander scale.  
Meanwhile, Jewish attacks against the British Administration increased. Hoffman describes 
the chaos following from the bombing of the King David Hotel in July 1946 leaving ninety-one 
dead.75 It was a turning point. Although Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, contemplated a 
future role for the United Nations,76 he had not made his final decision. Bercuson sets the scene:77 
against a background in Britain of bombed-out cities, coal shortages and food rationing, Bevin 
reconsidered the Palestine question. He proposed partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab 
Cantons (provinces) each with the trappings of independence and evolving over five years into an 
elected Constitutional Assembly. Distancing himself from the White Paper, Bevin proposed an 
immigration quota of 96,000 spread over two years.78 Bevin’s plan came to nothing and given that 
Jewish immigration was “the [unresolvable] core of the problem”79 he was left with little choice but 
 
71 Morris, Benny (2008, 34) 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war 
72 Hoffman, Bruce (2015, 261) Anonymous Soldiers. The struggle for Israel 
73 Gurock, J. S. (1998) American Jewish History: An Eight-volume Series 
74 Economic Cooperation Foundation Database: ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
75 Hoffman, Bruce (1999, 48-52) ‘Inside Terrorism 
76 Mornington Bulletin, 18th September 1946, National Library of Australia 
77 Bercuson, David, J., 1985: ‘Canada and the birth of Israel – a study in Canadian foreign policy 
78 UN Special Committee Report: Official Records of the General Assembly, (Chapter IV, Para 7) United Nations Special Committee on Palestine; Report 
to the General Assembly: 3rd Sept. 1947. 
79 UN General Assembly (UNGA, A/2/PV.79, p7), Seventy-Ninth Plenary Meeting, 15 May 1947 
 
11 
 
to refer the matter to the United Nations.80 Thus, in April 1947 the UK Government admitted to 
“having failed”81 and proposed that the General Assembly approve the establishment of a special 
committee to consider the Palestine question and report back.82 After unsuccessful efforts to delay, 
amend or scupper the proposal, on the grounds that Palestine was a non-negotiable Arab-indivisible 
entity, Britain’s proposal passed through its procedural stages.83 Thus, on the 15th May 1947 the GA 
approved a resolution for the establishment of an eleven-member Special Committee (UNSCOP) with 
a remit to investigate the situation in Palestine, neighbouring Middle-East countries and European 
displacement camps. Arab states and the Permanent-Five members were barred from membership 
freeing the Special Committee “from the pressure [of] the Great Powers”.84 
Immediately after their arrival in Palestine on the 15th June 1947, UNSCOP members learned 
that the Arab Higher Committee had boycotted proceedings.85 As they travelled the region, members 
were struck by the high levels of military security with hundreds of Jews imprisoned. The 
Administration explained this was a necessary part of police strategy against unlawful Jewish 
violence.86 UNSCOP was inundated with pleas for intervention including one involving three young 
Jewish men facing the death penalty.87 When, despite pleas, the men were executed, Jewish dissenters 
immediately retaliated by hanging two British soldiers. The resulting outcry in Britain, Paul Bagon 
argues, offers “irrefutable evidence” that the Jewish underground had a profound impact on 
Jewish/British relations.88  
Other than land that had been tentatively earmarked, Zionists also had designs on the under-
populated region of the Negev Desert.89 Britain had repeatedly argued that Jewish immigration must 
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be limited by a state’s size and its potential to absorb an increasing population – its ‘absorptive 
capacity’. Although the Negev looked unpromising, with irrigation and modern agricultural 
techniques it was a useful addition.90 In his evidence to UNSCOP, Jewish Agency representative, 
David Horowitz, refuted Britain’s statement that immigration levels should not exceed Palestine’s 
absorptive capacity. Horowitz argued that there were natural and human factors involved in building 
a successful economy, all of which were increasingly abundant.91 The thesis argues that the term, 
‘absorptive capacity’, is essentially an elastic concept but used by Britain merely to mollify Arab 
resistance.92 For his part, Ben-Gurion envisaged a Jewish majority living on equal terms with a non-
Jewish minority and, providing that the Jewish was of an “adequate area”, the immediate 
immigration of some 1,000,000 additional Jewish settlers.93 
Although the Arab Higher Committee had boycotted the proceedings, this was partially offset 
by meetings held in Beirut between UNSCOP and neighbouring Arab state leaders. One Arab 
statesman after another argued that immigration rates had reached beyond saturation levels and that 
while ‘legal’ immigrants could remain in an all-Arab Palestinian state, ‘illegal’ immigrants faced the 
prospect of expulsion. Arab states accused Zionists of exploiting the post-Holocaust refugee crisis 
which, they maintained, was an international responsibility. In any event, Arab governments 
remained opposed to the Zionist programme, fearing that it was part of a Zionist conspiracy with 
wider territorial ambitions. They objected to any “so-called solution” other than one involving a 
proportionally representative independent state guaranteeing equality for all.94 Avi Shlaim argues that 
portraying the “conflict as a symmetrical one between two monolithic political groups” is a distortion 
of facts and fails to take account of the divisions that existed within the Arab world.95 Nevertheless, 
 
90 UNGA (A/364/Add.2 PV.16, p36) 4 July 1947. Although the Negev is not specifically referred to here, Horowitz’s argument applies. 
91 (Ibid, 36) 
92 ‘Absorptive Capacity’ (demographic, social, religious and economic) demands further research. 
93 UNGA (A/364/Add.2 PV.19, 5) 7 July 1047 
94 UNGA (AC.13/PV.38) and UNGA (AC.13/PV.39) 
95 Shlaim, Avi (1990, 2) The politics of Partition: King Abdullah, The Zionists, and Palestine 1921-1951 
 
13 
 
research shows that at least on the substantive issue of Jewish immigration, all Arab countries spoke 
as one and were equally determined to prevent it.96   
While aspects of UNSCOP’s report have been studied, notably by Bagon,97 Pappé,98 Karsh,99 
Ben-Dror100 and Bickerton and Klausner,101 this thesis adopts a markedly different approach: it delves 
deeper into under-researched background work that informed the reports themselves. UNSCOP’s 
substantial report, for example, is just a distillation of dozens of publicly and privately conducted 
verbatim interviews involving British, Arab and Zionist officials. After completing their 
investigations in August 1947, the Special Committee presented the United Nations with its 
recommendations. While the majority agreed on Palestine’s right to self-determination and 
termination of the British Mandate, they failed to agree on the nature of independence. An UNSCOP 
minority had proposed the establishment of a federation of independent Arab and Jewish regions with 
a federal government having supreme authority over mutually beneficial matters and retaining 
authority over immigration. By contrast, UNSCOP’s majority recommended partitioning Palestine 
into two economically united but otherwise wholly independent Arab and Jewish States.102 
Undeniably, UNSCOP played a significant role in the General Assembly’s decision to 
Partition. Committee members were impressed by the Zionists’ diplomatic skills; their willingness to 
co-operate and their preparedness to compromise. Ben-Dror recounts a clandestine meeting held on 
the 14th July 1947 between a handful of UNSCOP members and leaders of the Jewish Agency. This 
was a meeting of such cardinal importance – one “so sensitive [and] ignored by historical 
scholarship” – that it helped put the seal on UNSCOP’s majority decision,103 but was a “far cry from 
British hopes and expectations”.104 Although Britain had failed to implement its Mandate and passed 
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the problem on to the UN, it refused to acknowledge the inevitability of Partition. Later, an 
exasperated UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie, criticised Britain’s cynical use of the GA.105  
The debate at the General Assembly opened in November 1947. In the early years of WWII, 
Roosevelt had resisted Zionist demands for an independent state and when House Representatives 
threatened to cosponsor a bipartisan Bill for a Jewish state, Roosevelt, fearing a backlash from Arab 
states, persuaded the House Speaker to kill it. Nevertheless, he refused to rule out the prospect of a 
future Jewish state. After Roosevelt’s death on 12th April 1945, his successor took the reins from his 
“crafty predecessor, who walked so skilfully on the Palestinian tightrope”.106 Cohen maintains that 
Truman, although sympathetic to Zionist ambitions was slow to show his hand but eventually yielded 
under Zionist pressure.107 Hahn writes that this seeming betrayal “cast a pall over Arab-US 
relations”.108 Weir goes further arguing that the State of Israel owes its very existence to a powerful 
and pervasive Jewish lobby and the near-irresistible force it exerted on Truman.109 She argues that 
Zionist leaders were engaged in secret manoeuvrings with influential US power brokers. Quoting 
Robert Nathan,110 she writes, Zionists “used every tool at hand” and left nothing to chance;111 that 
Zionist lobbying, according to US Ambassador Henry F. Grady, “started where those of my 
experience had ended”.112 Hahn delves into an absorbing account of Truman’s leaning towards a 
Jewish state. While resolution of the Palestine ‘problem’ was a US policy aim, its overriding strategic 
focus was on Soviet containment. Fearing that Partition could provoke a backlash in the Middle East, 
especially at time when Western/Soviet relations were breaking down, Hahn explains that Truman 
supported Partition despite considerable pressure to reject it emanating from his State Department.113  
 
105 (Ibid, 85) Karsh quoting from the first UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie’s memoirs. 
106 Ganin, Zvi. (1979, 19): Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948 
107 Cohen, Naomi (2003, 162): Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948 
108 Hahn, P. L. (2004, 41): ‘Caught in the Middle East: US Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945 – 1961 
109 Weir, Alison (2014, 1): Against our better judgement   
110 Zionist, Robert Nathan was an active member of the Jewish Agency and had worked for the US Government (Weir, A. (2017) If American knew:  
The Real Story of How Israel was Created 
111 Weir, Alison (2014, 54): Against our better judgement                                                                                      
112 (Ibid, 46) 
113 Hahn, P. L. (2004): ‘Caught in the Middle East: US Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945 – 1961 
 
15 
 
As the debate entered its final stages, UN representatives became increasingly agitated with 
some accused of cynical manoeuvring.114 Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko retorted that Britain 
had no intention of co-operating with the UN.115 While his country would have preferred a unitary 
state, now this was proven to be unworkable, Gromyko would cast the Soviet vote in favour of 
Partition.116 Cohen confirms that the General Assembly was rife with rumours that wavering states 
had been cajoled, bribed or threatened to cast their votes one way or the other.117 Given that two major 
Powers which carried considerable political and military sway had pledged their support, and given 
also that Britain (and China) intended to abstain, Partition became increasingly inevitable. Edward 
Said maintains that just eight days before the vote, Reinhold Niebuhr118 and other supporters of 
Partition wrote to the New York Times implying that somehow they assumed they had the right to 
speak on behalf of millions of dissenting people.119 Chomsky argues  that settler-colonialism was 
innately present in the Imperial Power mentality; “Look, we did it, [therefore] it must be right”.120 
Ben-Dror contends that UNSCOP’s description of despairing Holocaust survivors had a profound 
effect on UN Members and that it was not incidental that sanctioning a Jewish state helped solve the 
Jewish refugee crisis.121 This, and that most countries operated a closed-door policy, put the final seal 
on Partition. Edward Said argues that Arabs were always in an uphill struggle against a colonial power 
that legitimised the building of “a [Jewish state] in the ruins of Arab Palestine”.122 Arabs were 
engaged in a losing battle with Zionists. It is rare, Shalom Wald contends, that in just two generations, 
“so many outstanding individuals” like Theodore Herzl, David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, Ze'ev 
Jabotinsky and other noteworthy individuals appeared during “a unique chapter in history”.123  
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From the late 1920’s British forces were under siege and no longer prepared to bear the 
financial burden and loss of British lives. Although the UN acknowledged the strength of the Arab 
case,124 Morris confirms that Arab states made no secret of their opposition, openly threatening war 
in the event of Partition.125 Despite this, in November 1947, Resolution 181 (III)126 was approved. It 
was, in Buehrig’s words “the most ambitious attempt in the history of international organisation to 
change the status quo by formal enactment”.127 Although Yoav Alon’s 2005 book focuses on 
Transjordan, his observation that “a state should be understood as a framework in which a political 
struggle for influence and resources takes place”128 is equally true in the case of Palestine. Given that 
virtually all modern states are “manmade creations” and are “in fact, historically formed”, Halliday 
proposes that Partition offers a “standard solution” in the face of opposing nationalistic forces. “There 
did not exist a distinct Palestinian nation one hundred years ago, or [for that matter] a distinct Iraqi 
or Libyan one”.129 Former UNSCOP, member, Garcia-Granados, maintains that even before the UN 
Partition debate, “Partition already existed”; that Partition had an irresistible “force and direction of 
its own”.130  
Methodology  
By way of interpretative qualitative research this thesis seeks to explain how and why the partition of 
Palestine was the one viable option. Accepting that both Jews and Arabs have legitimate historical, 
religious and cultural entitlements to the Holy Land, this researcher neither demonises nor 
delegitimises either party as to the justice of their individual claims. The goal, as Tessler writes, is to 
argue in a manner “that may be described as objectivity without detachment”131 or, as Shavit proposes, 
“to portray things exactly as they are”.132  The thesis centres on a specific period of history starting 
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with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and ends with Partition thirty years later. It 
argues that during the period, neither Zionists nor Arabs would concede their positions on Jewish 
immigration such that partition was unavoidable; that Partition and immigration are two sides of the 
same coin. Analysis of the latter dual relationship is the theme that runs throughout this thesis. 
Although the seeds of a Jewish state were planted before WWI, this thesis argues that the Balfour 
Declaration was Britain’s first official statement of intent - later endorsed in Britain’s Mandate for 
Palestine. Both the Declaration and the Mandate have been subject to intensive scrutiny – in most 
cases, specifically, or, more generally, part of a wider study. Again, this thesis examines both the 
Declaration and the British Mandate and concludes that from Balfour onwards there was no turning 
back; arguing the latter, through a series of steps, each exploring key events over the thirty-year 
journey to Partition.  
 Unquestionably, the Zionist/Arab case for and against Partition divides scholars. Commonly, 
the latter argue from either the traditional pro-Zionist or pro-Palestinian revisionist perspectives. 
However, it is emphasised that the methodology adopted here is not whether Partition was illegal, 
immoral or that it laid the ground for the Arab/Israeli conflict, but rather that the General Assembly 
reached the view that the Arab/Jewish divide was unbridgeable such that Partition was the GA’s least-
worst option. Research will show that between Balfour and Partition, a de facto Jewish state was 
emerging. Jewish settlers were fast building an infrastructure; homes, schools, synagogues and 
medical centres were established to cater for the growing population. Land was cultivated. Banking, 
commerce, manufacturing enterprises and the service sector were all expanding. Internal and export 
markets were exploited. Hebrew was widely becoming the official language. As the thesis develops 
it emerges that, to all intents and purposes, the dividing line between Jewish and Arabs communities 
became an incontrovertible fact on the ground. UNSCOP member, Garcia Granados writes that 
“Partition … already existed” before the General Assembly made its decision.133  
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As will be evident throughout, during preparation of this thesis, a wealth of relevant primary 
and secondary sources was selected. Where applicable, numerical data is scrutinised so as to 
substantiate or refute an argument. The research required a meticulous trawl through an array of 
Committee reports, face-to-face interviews, minutes of UK and UN debates and more. At important 
points, evidence is gathered via primary source documents devoted to (for example) minutes of 
cabinet meetings, British Parliamentary debates in both Houses of Parliament, question and answer 
sessions directed at key players conducted by various committees and commissions and the crucial 
debate at the UN General Assembly in 1947. It should be noted that, due to the sheer volume of 
available primary source documentation, every effort was made to select material so as to convey a 
balanced appraisal. On the latter point, future researchers should be aware that the enormous volume 
of primary source material presents a logistical challenge. A case in point is the mass of material 
collected during UNSCOP’s months of investigation in Palestine and beyond. At each stage, having 
scrutinised primary sources, a wide range of secondary sources was carefully selected. Sources were 
selected so as to reflect a range of opinion reaching from across the traditional and revisionist divide. 
While the Zionist case ‘for’ and the Arab case ‘against’ Partition are thoroughly analysed, at one-
point Palestinian-Arabs boycotted an important investigative committee. This presented Zionists with 
an unexpected opportunity to present their case without conflicting Palestinian Arab evidence. While 
potentially limiting the research, the absence of the latter was partly mitigated by neighbouring Arab 
statesmen stepping into the breach. 
Throughout, the thesis examines Instrumental values, vis-à-vis Jewish immigration, state 
borders and defence arrangements, alongside the Intrinsic value of peaceful Arab/Jewish coexistence 
while addressing the demographic and political challenges. 
Chapter 1 begins with the genesis of the Balfour Declaration. By close examination of 
Wartime Cabinet debates in 1917, the chapter charts the evolution of the Balfour Declaration from 
19 
 
one where “Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home for Jews”134 until the 5th and final 
version where the Cabinet conceded that the overwhelming majority Arab population had a voice too. 
Research will show that Britain’s early commitment to Zionists was made at the expense of the Arab 
majority and that it was this failure to enter into proper negotiations that pointed the way to Partition 
in 1947. Questions arise as to why, at the height of WW1, Britain’s leaders thought it strategically 
advantageous to support Zionists. The chapter considers Britain’s Mandate and argues that the 
Declaration’s inclusion implied that the League of Nations foresaw Palestine as a permanent Jewish 
homeland. Later, when it dawned that the latter had sown the seeds of the Arab/Zionist conflict, 
Britain attempted to retrieve the situation by contentiously restricting levels of Jewish immigration. 
Chapter 2 examines the growing rift between Arabs and the swelling numbers of Jewish immigrants. 
Sporadic attacks during the 1920s and early to mid-30s quickly erupted into extreme violence in 1936. 
In response, Britain dispatched a Royal Commission (Peel) to recommend a solution. Research 
continues with a close examination of Peel’s 1937 Commission Report. Peel recommended not only 
Partition but also a complete population exchange into separate Jewish and Arab-only states. By close 
dissection of Peel’s milestone recommendations, this thesis argues that, although Partition was a 
foregone conclusion, Peel’s validation was a major breakthrough despite some Zionists being 
unconvinced, others hostile and others still insisting on an all-Jewish-Palestine approach. It examines 
the processes whereby farsighted Zionists conceded that there was nothing to be gained and perhaps 
all to be lost if they rejected Partition. So, although the writing was on the wall since Balfour, the 
Royal Commissioners were the first to officially acknowledge the inevitability of Partition and that a 
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de facto Jewish state already existed.135 Nevertheless, after a promising start, Peel’s recommendations 
were finally rejected.  
Considering Gurock’s speculative exploration of what-ifs - “Alternative scenarios of 
events”,136 this thesis too speculates that had it not been for the prospect of a second world war, 
Britain’s 1917 pledge to Zionists may (from Britain’s perspective) have possessed a moral imperative 
over and above Arab claims. Moreover, in the context of the near uncontainable 1936-1939 Arab 
Revolt, it is probable that Britain would have accepted Peel’s Partition recommendation; that the 
Mandate was unworkable and that it was now time for Britain to bow out. However, in the real world, 
with war just months away, Britain abandoned the Jews deciding instead to placate the Arab world. 
The chapter closes with research into days of debate during sittings of both Houses of Parliament 
culminating, in May 1939, with majority approval of a Government White Paper effectively putting 
Partition on hold. Scholars have studied the 1939 White Paper, but this thesis goes beyond previous 
academic examination. It focusses specifically on the arguments that raged across both Houses of 
Parliament. Here ministers and members from all sides - from the supportive to the deeply opposed 
– debated a law that, in the months and years to come, would contribute to the cost of millions of 
Jewish lives. The thesis argues that although the Bill was passed into law, rather than scuttling the 
Zionist project, Britain’s rebuttal stimulated the Zionist leadership to turn to the US and reinforce 
American support. The thesis addresses the mismatches between US and UK policies for Palestine 
and considers US President Truman’s determination to progress the Zionist project despite US State 
Department opposition.  
Chapter 3 begins and ends with WWII; at a time when Zionists were setting out their post-war 
strategy. In the Palestine arena, both Zionists and Arabs were entrenched in their uncompromising 
positions. Amongst a number of related issues, the research next concentrates on primary source 
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evidence showing that, whatever the obstacles, Holocaust survivors determinedly struggled to reach 
Palestine137 despite Arab protests that Palestine was not a sanctuary, and that Jewish immigrants 
posed a “danger” to the Arab Middle East.138 The thesis argues that, after failed last-ditch efforts, a 
war-weary Britain felt compelled to surrender its Mandate. With options blocked and the US now the 
supreme power, the newly created UN was left to pick up the pieces. The thesis examines the UN’s 
role and its establishment of the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).  
Chapter 4 explores UNSCOP’s role in Palestine. The thesis enters into a scrutiny of 
UNSCOP’s membership, its private deliberations and its many verbatim question and answer 
meetings with involved parties. The thesis offers a critique of a large raft of prima facie evidence 
presented to UNSCOP by interested parties during its months of public and private sessions. It 
addresses Arab fears and analyses the demographic impact of Jewish immigration. It challenges the 
concept that immigration levels necessarily correlate with a state’s economic ‘absorptive capacity’. 
While previous historians have generally based their work on final reports, this thesis draws 
extensively on the background work that informed these reports. There is little evidence that these 
informative documents have been adequately scrutinised. It is also argued that Palestinian-Arabs’ 
refusal to meet UNSCOP was a serious mistake and adversely affected UNSCOP’s investigation. 
This missed opportunity was only partially offset by question and answer sessions with Arab statemen 
from neighbouring Arab states. Again, the thesis confirms that Arab leaders, like Zionists, were 
uncompromising on the issue of immigration. The chapter addresses Arab fears.  
Chapter 5 is an appraisal of UNSCOP’s report to the GA. The thesis argues that the years 1922 to 
1946 highlight the vital interconnection between a prospective Jewish state and levels of immigration. 
It argues that, from the Zionist perspective, only increased immigration could correct a growing 
imbalance between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine. Conversely, unregulated Jewish 
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immigration could lead to a predominance of Jews in a unitary state and confirm Arab fears. 
Predictably, UNSCOP recommended a two-state solution with a combined system of economic unity.  
Chapter 6 examines the Partition debate at the General Assembly. Representatives came under 
pressure to vote for or against the resolution to Partition. Again, by way of in-depth engagement with 
UN primary source documentation the thesis considers the pros and cons expressed within the 
General Assembly Chamber. It argues that, because US President, Truman and the Soviet leader, 
Stalin, undoubtably instructed their representatives to support Partition, others followed suit such that 
the outcome was predictable.  
Conclusion This gathers together the threads of the preceding six chapters. One by one, the 
thesis explores the feasibility of the other possible options before concluding that the two-state 
solution was quite unavoidable.  
Again, the thesis adopts a notably different approach to others in the field by offering a 
rigorous scrutiny of British Cabinet, Parliamentary and UN debates together with a close analysis of 
UK Commission, UN Committee reports and more besides. It delves into the background work that 
informed the latter frequently by way of verbatim minutes of meetings and debates that took place 
during the crucial thirty years between the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and Partition in 1947. While 
historians accept that Balfour started the ball rolling, this thesis argues that Partition was the 
predictable outcome of thirty years of a blank refusal by both parties to give way over the immigration 
issue. It argues that Partition was not the result of one giant leap but rather by a series of smaller 
irreversible steps that followed on from the Balfour Declaration. A two-state solution, Halliday 
asserts, was “undoubtedly the best way out”.139 This thesis contends that ultimately, the UN had no 
choice other than to transform a decades-old de facto Jewish homeland into an internationally 
recognised state. Uniquely, it asks and ultimately answers the key question of why Partition was the 
only workable solution to the Palestine question.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In the second half of the 19th century, particularly in Eastern Europe, anti-Semitism became 
increasingly virulent. Any attempt at Jewish emancipation in Europe was futile. In 1896, Theodore 
Herzl wrote: “We have honestly endeavoured everywhere to merge ourselves in the social life of 
surrounding communities, and to preserve only the faith of our fathers. It has not been permitted to 
us”.140 Particularly in Russia and Eastern Europe, discriminatory laws and violent pogroms threatened 
Jewish people until their lives became intolerable. Many made their way to Western Europe and the 
New World. Others, for whom an orthodox Jewish faith and cultural identity were paramount, set 
their sights on the ‘Promised Land’. In 1882, in that one year alone, 7,000 Jews eager to live and 
work without fear of persecution arrived in Palestine to join growing Jewish communities. 
The beginnings of Zionism grew out of a widely held belief that true assimilation into the 
fabric non-Jewish society was unattainable. Zionism itself developed into a full-scale Zionist 
movement during the Basle Congress of 1897. Here it was accepted that it had gone beyond the time 
for a Jewish national revival of Judaism with its unique culture, religion and Hebrew language. 
Schneer contends that while the Zionists at Basle may have intended that Palestine would be the focus 
for a Jewish ‘state’, they left the term “ambiguous, perhaps to avoid exciting antagonism or perhaps 
because that goal seemed too ambitious even to them”.141 Now Zionist leaders focused on two inter-
related issues. The first was the establishment of a permanent and independent Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. The second was that the Jewish diaspora should be free to immigrate into what they 
considered to be their ancestral home and to purchase land from willing Palestinian land owners.  
Towards the end of the 19th Century and into the 20th, the rate of Jewish immigration gradually 
increased. Meanwhile, Palestinian Arabs refused to concede their own demands for a freeze on Jewish 
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immigration and for full independence in a sovereign Palestinian Arab state in the belief that 
relinquishing these threatened to expunge their Arab national identity. They rejected expanding 
Jewish settlements, claiming that these laid the foundations for a Jewish state encroaching further 
into the Arab Middle East.142 
Nevertheless, Jewish immigration continued. In 1904, for example, thousands of immigrants 
arrived in Palestine most of whom gravitated towards existing Jewish communities. By the beginning 
of WWI, the Jewish population of Palestine was around 85,000 – approximately one-ninth of the total 
population. Meanwhile, Arabs became increasing frustrated at their own lack of progress when 
measured against philanthropically funded Jewish development. Palestinian Arabs gradually became 
part of a wider and progressively erudite Arab nationalist movement. Generally, they were accepting 
of the small minority of Jews in their midst but were determined to prevent a further and unwelcome 
incursion into Arab lands. A few months before WWI, one young Arab diarist expressed the core of 
the Palestine predicament: “If this country is ‘cradle of the Jews’ spirituality and the birthplace of 
their history, then the Arabs have an undeniable right which is that they propagated their language 
and culture in it [while Jewish] rights had died with the passage of time; our right is alive and 
unshakable”.143   
In August 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. On the opposing side, the 
Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia were soon embroiled in full-scale war. At first, the two 
sides were fairly evenly matched until, in 1917, US involvement shifted the balance in the Allies 
favour.144 By the end of hostilities, the US had asserted its position as an unchallengeable hegemon. 
The conditions of war provided opportunities for Weizmann and other Zionist leaders to persuade 
sympathetic members of the UK Government to support their cause and convert elite members of the 
Jewish establishment to Zionism.145 
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1917 was a critical point in the war. With millions dead, wounded or caught up in the Western 
Front, Britain considered that it was strategically important to engage closely with Zionism. During 
a series of closed meetings, Lloyd George’s War Cabinet met to plan Britain’s response. Given that 
Jews and Arabs laid claim to the same land, the Cabinet decided that it was in Britain’s wartime 
interests to favour Jews over the Arab majority. After several revisions, a one-page typewritten letter 
of sixty-seven deeply contentious words, signed by Lord Balfour on the 2nd of November 1917, was 
delivered to Lord Rothschild; “the result of a process that some consider practically inevitable”.146 
By way of an exploration of British Wartime Cabinet papers, the thesis proper starts with the 
genesis of the Balfour Declaration’s dual obligation: a commitment to Zionists, with minimal cost to 
the civil and religious rights enjoyed by non-Jews. This pledge was reaffirmed in a convivial 
exchange of letters in January 1919 between King Hussein of Hejaz’s third son, Emir Faisal, and 
Chaim Weizmann the outcome of which was the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement. The Agreement was 
a pledge to put into effect the Balfour Declaration. Tessler questions Faisal’s and Weizmann’s 
motives: Faisal, who presupposed that he was speaking on behalf of the Arab world, agreed to support 
Zionist ambitions, partly because, as a pan-Arab statesman, he had his eye fixed on a Greater Syria 
and partly because Zionist influence might help secure international support for the latter.147 For 
Weizmann, the Agreement was a way of “exchanging support of Arab aspirations outside Palestine 
for an endorsement of Zionist goals inside the country”.148 However, when finding himself under 
pressure to restrain his over-enthusiasm, Faisal added an important addendum: that under the Faisal-
Weizmann Agreement, while Jews were to be encouraged to immigrate into Palestine, the Agreement 
was not valid until Arabs gained their independence. Later, the Arab world repudiated Faisal’s 
agreement and condemned the Balfour Declaration. This was on the grounds that firstly, Arabs had 
not been consulted and secondly, that Jewish immigration would change the demographic and 
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political balance of Arab Palestine. In any event, the agreement became irrelevant after former King 
Faisal was expelled by the French from Greater Syria, before becoming constitutional monarch of 
Iraq on the 23rd August 1921. Britain’s attitude to Faisal is summed up by Christopher Sykes, “If 
Faisal had been a Palestinian Arab of Jerusalem his treaty with Zionists might have had some feeble 
hope of acceptance, but since he was who he was, it had none at all”.149  
Two months after the end of WWI, the victors gathered in Versailles to negotiate peace terms. 
Britain and France occupied large regions of the Middle East, but now that Arabs were claiming their 
right to independence, it remained for the Allies to decide how best to proceed.  
The chapter continues the theme with an exploration of the King-Crane Commission’s report 
on the Middle East question, which was appointed by US President Woodrow Wilson. King-Crane’s 
Commission questioned the ‘dual obligation’ quandary which was intrinsic to Britain’s commitment 
to the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people [given that nothing] must 
be done that may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine”150 (own emphasis). The American Commissioners concluded that Arab opinion was so 
deeply opposed to Zionist plans that a severe cut-back of immigration was necessary. They reasoned 
that Palestine should be included in a wider, united Syrian state under the temporary guardianship of 
a mandated authority. Ultimately, the League of Nations awarded the Palestine Mandate to Britain.  
The Balfour Declaration was largely written into the Palestine Mandate, and included an 
obligation to establish a Jewish National ‘home’. However, given Zionist and Arab intransigence, 
particularly over the question of Jewish immigration, it slowly emerges that the newly formed 
Palestine Administration faced a near impossible task. The thesis raises questions over the legitimacy 
of the ‘dual obligation’, centring (in part) on the vexed problem of Jewish immigration into an 
overwhelmingly Arab domain.  
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The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of the inter-war years. Between periods of 
relative calm, dissident Arab groups mounted sporadic attacks on the Mandatory Authority accused 
of reneging on its earlier promise of an independent Arab state.  
Genesis: The Balfour Declaration 
In the summer of 1917 Lord Balfour requested that the Zionist Organisation offer “suggestions which 
[the latter] may desire to lay before [the British Cabinet]”. Zionists collaborated and drafted a reply; 
passed on to Lord Rothschild who in turn forwarded it to Balfour, noting that he was now “able to 
send you a formula you asked me for...”.151 
The first sentence of the first Draft reads (Annex 1): “[HM] Government accepts the principle 
that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home for Jewish people”. Schneer argues that 
the word “reconstituted”, implies “an unbroken link between Jews and Palestine”.152 The phrasing 
“the national home” suggests that, certainly in the early days, a number of Zionists claimed the right 
to all of Palestine. Notice the use of ‘home’ rather than the more contentious ‘state’. The Balfour 
reply (Annex 2) reflected this terminology “reconstituted as the national home for Jewish people” 
and committed that the UK Government would use “their best endeavours” to see it through to 
fruition. The Milner Draft (Annex 3) shifts the Cabinet into more guarded territory. A “Jewish 
national home” has been replaced by the wording, “a home for Jewish people”; on this occasion not 
covering all Palestine, but rather “a home for Jewish people in Palestine” (own emphasis).  
Having rejected the previous versions, the UK War Cabinet gathered for another of its regular 
meetings on the 3rd September 1917. Ministers were reminded of a previous exchange of 
correspondence between Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour and Lord Rothschild.153 British wartime 
interests were at stake, not least because British troops were heavily engaged against the Axis Powers 
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in the Middle East. Edwin Montagu (soon to be Secretary of State for India) had tabled a 
memorandum entitled ‘The Anti-Semitism of the present [British] Government’. He cautiously 
avoided accusing his Cabinet colleagues of anti-Semitism rather, he argued, it was their Policy on 
Zionism that was anti-Semitic; acting as a “rallying ground for anti-Semites in every corner of the 
world”. Montagu, the one Jewish Member of Lloyd George’s war-time Cabinet was vehemently anti-
Zionist. “Zionism”, he wrote is “a mischievous political creed, untenable to any patriotic citizen of 
the United Kingdom”.154 Montagu objected to the inference contained in the draft declaration that 
Palestine, not Britain for example, was the “national home” for all Jews. He regarded Jews as a 
religious community and himself as a “Jewish Englishman” and argued that the phrase “the home of 
Jewish people” presupposed that Jews belonged elsewhere. Other colleagues contested his line of 
argument. They reminded Montagu that, unlike Britain, there were countries in the world where Jews 
were oppressed, not least in Germany. It followed that the establishment of a “Jewish State or 
autonomous community” was in Jewish peoples’ best interests. On the other hand, Jews in countries 
where equality was guaranteed need not be affected by the existence of a permanent Jewish Home 
elsewhere. The Cabinet conceded that though some influential Jewish leaders were opposed to 
Zionism, conversely, “large numbers were sympathetic”.155 Several Cabinet Members proposed that 
the matter should be postponed to a later date. However, Lord Robert Cecil (under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs) responded that his Office was being pressurised to reach a decision as quickly as 
possible. The Zionist movement was a potent force particularly in the United States. Therefore, it was 
clearly in Allied interests to harness Zionists’ “earnestness and enthusiasm”. Unless Zionist demands 
were properly resolved, Cecil warned, to do otherwise could jeopardise some important international 
relationships.156 
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Close political relations with Allies were critical. Just five months before, a formally reluctant 
America had entered the war. US troops had already arrived in France with many more military 
divisions to follow.157 Britain was treading a delicate line. Before closing the meeting, the majority 
agreed that Cecil should inform President Wilson that Britain was prepared to issue a sympathetic 
declaration to Zionists, acceptable, minsters anticipated, to the President. Meanwhile, the matter 
would be held in abeyance pending US approval.158 
When, on the 4th of October 1917, the Cabinet reconvened, Edwin Montagu expanded on his 
previous concerns. Pre-empting Montagu’s speech, Foreign Secretary Balfour forewarned that 
Britain’s interests were at stake unless the Palestine issue was satisfactorily resolved. He cautioned 
that the German Government had designs on capturing Zionist sympathy and claimed that the French 
authorities were preparing to forestall Britain’s by issuing their own Declaration.  Balfour accepted 
that Zionism was opposed by several prominent Jews, but also reasoned that it enjoyed broad support, 
particularly in the United States. He argued that a sympathetic declaration would be welcomed by 
Zionists and “knew [that President Woodrow Wilson was] extremely favourable”. Balfour then turned 
his attention to Montagu’s earlier argument. Unlike Montagu, Balfour saw no inconsistency between 
the establishment of a Jewish national “focus” and full assimilation into the lifeblood of other 
countries. It was clear to Balfour that many Jews regarded themselves as part of an historic race of 
people with roots in Palestine, who harboured a desire to return. Conversely, he acknowledged that 
others were fully integrated and were comfortable in their present surroundings.159 At this point 
Montagu reiterated his previous objections to the proposed declaration. He maintained that most 
English-born Jews were opposed to Zionism and that in the main, Zionists were foreign-born 
(Russian-born Chaim Weizmann typified the latter).  Montagu protested that President Wilson was 
“opposed to a declaration now”. Whether Montagu meant that Wilson was opposed to the Declaration 
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per se or opposed to making a declaration at that time is unclear. Earl George Curzon (Lord President 
of the Council) argued against making a commitment to Zionists. His objections were based on what 
he considered to be practical matters.  Palestine, he recollected from his own experience, was “barren 
and desolate”. He could not imagine a less inviting place for a Jewish homeland. How, he asked, was 
it proposed to replace the indigenous inhabitants with Jews? Curzon argued that rather than repatriate 
Jews on a large scale (“sentimental idealism”) a guarantee of equal civil and religious rights should 
be extended to the existing Jewish population.  
Subsequently, to appease Montagu, pro-Zionist Viscount Alfred Milner who, in April of the 
following year, became Secretary of State for War, tabled an amendment to the Declaration. The 
wording that nothing must prejudice the rights of non-Jews in Palestine or those “enjoyed [by Jews] 
in any other country” should, he proposed, be extended to read “enjoyed in any other country by such 
Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship”. Again, the War Cabinet 
decided to elicit the opinions of President Wilson and Zionist Leaders.160  
The dispute over the proposed Declaration was raised again during a Cabinet meeting held on 
31st October 1917.  Edwin Montagu had taken up a new post as Secretary of State for India and was 
absent.  Balfour stated that it was generally agreed that a formal declaration would serve as a useful 
wartime propaganda tool. Again, Earl Curzon recalled that Palestine was desolate and therefore 
unsuitable as a homeland. Balfour accepted that colleagues held differing opinions, but in his view, 
if Palestine was scientifically developed it could sustain a much larger population, certainly larger 
than while under “Turkish misrule”.  
Overall, the Cabinet was prepared to accept that Palestine should be considered as a suitable 
place for a “Jewish national home”, but what exactly did “national home” mean to the British 
Cabinet? Balfour and supporters saw it as a “home” where Jews could “work out their own salvation” 
by their own education and industry, as well as a centre of national culture and a focus of national 
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life. Balfour maintained that while development should be gradual, an “independent Jewish State” 
lay somewhere in the future.161 Montagu had argued that a separate Jewish national homeland would 
prejudice the rights of Jews living elsewhere – England in his case. Balfour disagreed. He drew a 
parallel between an English national moving to the US (for example) and an English Jew doing 
likewise. The former would experience little difficulty in settling and becoming a full national, 
whereas in the present uncertain climate the latter might find full assimilation “incomplete”. It 
followed, he argued, that a “national home” outside of one’s present domicile to which a Jew may or 
may not choose to claim allegiance, countered accusations of non-nationality. Curzon agreed, though 
he remained unconvinced by Balfour’s claim that Palestine was ripe for development. After noting 
the arguments from both sides, Curzon finally accepted the diplomatic argument. He was in favour 
of Britain issuing an expression of sympathy to the Zionist cause since it seemed that most Jews 
favoured Zionism. He cautioned against using unguarded language but agreed that a written 
undertaking would serve as a valuable addition to Britain’s propaganda arsenal.162 
Finally, having formally rejected Viscount Milner’s amendment, the War Cabinet moved that 
the Foreign Secretary should declare Britain’s sympathy with “Zionist aspirations”. All that remained 
was for US President Wilson to give his blessing. However, President Wilson was preoccupied with 
other wartime concerns. Already involved in the European arena, he was anxious to avoid his country 
being drawn into war elsewhere. He needed reassurance that US support for the Declaration would 
not involve the US in war in the Middle East. When, ultimately, he accepted that the Declaration was 
less a statement of policy and more an expression of broad principle, he replied to HM Government 
that he “concurred with the formula suggested from the other side”.163 
On the 2nd November 1917, two days after the War cabinet’s decision, UK Foreign Secretary 
and former Prime Minister A J Balfour wrote a short letter to Lord Rothschild. He expressed his 
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Government’s “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations” and requested that the contents of the letter 
should be conveyed to the Zionist Federation. The final version reads: “His Majesty’s Government 
view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use 
their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”.  
A Milner-Amery Draft164 (Annex 4) had formed a basis for this final version.165 HM 
Government “views with favour the establishment...”. Recognising the anti-Zionist position, the 
language tends away from enshrining a unilateral commitment towards the more passive form; again, 
the UK “favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race”. Interestingly, 
in this version Jews are viewed as members of a defined racial group. The Milner-Amery version 
continues: “nothing shall be done [to prejudice the] rights and political status enjoyed in any other 
country by such Jews who are fully content with their existing nationality (and citizenship)”. The 
addition was intended to assuage Lord Montagu’s apprehension that because he was an Englishman 
who also happened to be Jewish by religion, it should not be presupposed that Jewish people somehow 
belonged somewhere other than their birthplace.  
Appearing almost as an afterthought, the fourth version acknowledged that Palestine was 
overwhelmingly peopled by Arabs – “that nothing should be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of non-Jewish communities ...” (see Annexes 4 and 5). The final version contains 
several textual changes. Here, Jews are more appropriately regarded as a “people” rather than a 
“race”. Indeed, Lord Montagu had raised an important and unresolved question on the matter of racial 
origin; the term ‘race’ embraces several contentious religious and ethical issues. 
Leopold Amery became political secretary to the War cabinet in 1916 under Viscount Milner 
and exerted a profound influence on the text of the Declaration. While openly sympathetic to Zionism, 
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to the end of his life, this future “immensely influential” politician declined to acknowledge his Jewish 
ancestry. Rubinstein writes that Amery’s “secret” is “probably the most remarkable example of 
concealment of identity in twentieth-century British political history”.166 The fact that the Milner-
Amery draft acts as a precursor to the Declaration itself underlines the significance of Amery’s role.167 
His descendent, Jane Corbin, contends that “Leo, [later accepted] the inevitability of partition”.168  
Consequently, Britain had constructed an associative connection between the Jewish Diaspora 
and a Jewish ‘national home’; a British commitment to “use [its] best endeavours to facilitate this 
object” and an implied requirement that Jews should be free to immigrate into Palestine, since without 
immigration the object itself was baseless.  
Thus, on the 1st of November 1917, somewhat creatively, the British Government 
“favour[ed]” a Jewish national home in Palestine though not at the expense of non-Jews. Although 
its language is imprecise, the Declaration was a major milestone towards Partition. Unlike Zionists, 
Arab Nationalists had not been consulted at any point in the process,169 moreover, there is no evidence 
that the Britain’s Cabinet had any intention of doing so. If Arab Nationalists had been included in the 
discussions, it is arguable whether the Declaration in its present form would have come to fruition. 
Nonetheless, the journey to Partition took a major step forward when President Woodrow Wilson 
gave his seal of approval.  
The final version had evolved through several revisions, primarily due to Sir Edwin 
Montagu’s intervention. Also, while the non-Jewish population were granted civil and religious 
rights, the Declaration did not grant ‘political’ rights. When on the 24th April 1920 during the San 
Remo conference, Monsieur Berthelot one of the French representatives raised the issue, Lord Curzon 
replied that the question raised “an infinite field of discussion [but it was] most unwise, and … quite 
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unnecessary, to raise the question now”. Berthelot seemed satisfied with Curzon’s response and the 
opportunity was lost.170  
Bickerton and Klausner propose that Montagu’s involvement resulted in an “attenuated and 
ambiguous” document. Phrased in terms of “national home” and “in Palestine” it left the proposed 
entity vague.171 
Reaction to the Declaration 
Why then, at the height of a war that had already cost millions of lives, did the British Cabinet spend 
precious time on an issue of relatively minor importance?  
Prominent Jewish leaders had previously gained some degree of influence within Russian 
political circles. The British wartime Cabinet reasoned that if Britain pledged to assist Zionists in 
establishing a homeland in Palestine, then this might incentivise Zionists to encourage an increasingly 
despairing Russia to stay on the Allies side until Germany was defeated.172 173 174 Schneer argues that 
Cabinet members viewed a written Declaration as a signal of support for the Zionist cause. Without 
this support, there was a possibility that Russian Jews would withdraw their backing for the moderate 
Kerensky Government,175 fearing that Bolsheviks were poised to seize control and make a separate 
peace deal with the enemy. Then there was the risk that Germany would force Turkey to lend support 
to Jewish autonomy, turning Jewish public opinion towards the Central Powers. Robert Cecil176 noted 
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“I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the international power of the Jews”. Schneer however, 
argues that implicit here is the “wildly unrealistic estimate of the power and unity of world Jewry”177 
He argues that Zionists exploited this stereotypical thinking and used it to their advantage”.178 Twenty 
years later, in June 1937, the former British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, reported to Parliament 
that the Balfour Declaration was issued during “one of the darkest periods of the war”. He recalled 
that during this period, French forces had mutinied; the Italian Army was crumbling, and the United 
States was still in a state of preparedness. It followed that as Britain confronted potentially 
overwhelming forces it was essential to shore up supportive allies. Lloyd George insisted that while 
its deployment of massive forces against the Ottoman Empire demonstrated Britain’s commitment to 
Arab emancipation, it was also strategically vital “to secure the sympathy and co-operation of this 
most remarkable community, the Jews throughout the world ... “.179 W. R. Louis questions the 
issuance of the Declaration and Britain’s motives.  He writes that the Declaration “was an 
extraordinary tale of double-dealing and betrayal” and one that was to haunt Britain for the next 
thirty years. Quoting Arthur Koestler, he suggests that it was “one nation promising another nation 
the land of a third nation”. He proposes that the influential C. P Scott, pro-Zionist editor of the 
Manchester Guardian, was instrumental in swaying Lloyd George’s Government. After the 
announcement of the Declaration on 9th November, Scott greeted it as “the fulfilment of aspiration, 
the signpost of destiny”.180 Conversely, Elizabeth Monroe argues that “[m]easured by British 
interests alone it is one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial history”.181 More directly, Edward 
Said writes that the Balfour Declaration was simply one among “many examples of [Britain’s] 
expressed and demonstrated superiority”. The task was to “convert Palestine into a Jewish state” 
(own emphasis).182  Arab protests would have meant little to British imperialists at the time. As Doerr 
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explains: British Imperialism was based on the claim (and the self-belief) that colonies under British 
rule benefited not only economically but had the added advantage of “being educated and 
‘civilised’”.183 Noam Chomsky argues that Zionism was a settler-colonial movement that was in tune 
with Britain’s Imperial-Power mentality; “Look, we did it, [therefore Zionism] must be right”.184 
Directing a question to Ilan Pappé, questioner, Frank Barat,185 suggested that Lord Balfour and other 
decision-makers at the time were anti-Semitic: “they wanted the Jews to live in Palestine because 
they did not want the Jews in England or anywhere else in Europe”.186 Bickerton et al also question 
Britain’s’ motives. Given that several powerful Cabinet Ministers were opposed to Zionism, the 
authors propose cogent reasons which may have persuaded a majority to support the Declaration. 
First, the Declaration might encourage pro-Zionists in Lenin’s Revolutionary Guard to convince 
Russia to remain militarily engaged. Second, the Declaration could help persuade previously 
unconvinced American-Jews to put additional pressure on President Wilson to intensify America’s 
war effort. Lastly, there was the possibility that if Britain hesitated over Balfour, it could open the 
way for Germany or the Ottoman Empire to exploit a rift in British-Zionist relations and announce a 
Balfour-like declaration of their own.187 Therefore, Britain’s motives for issuing the Balfour 
Declaration at the height of war appears to be nothing less than a war-time propaganda tool.  
It was several years after 1917 before many Arabs grasped the full significance of what had 
transpired. Before long, the name ‘Balfour’ became synonymous with British power, Jewish money 
and, for some enterprising Arabs, financial opportunity. Karsh records the story of a Sheik from near 
Gaza asking Balfour to tell Jews that “we in the South would sell land much cheaper than found in 
the North”.188 
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In the short term, Britain’s wartime strategic interests in the Middle East took priority over 
Zionist goals. Bickerton and Klausner propose that, looking into the future, it was also vital that 
Britain should maintain a reliable flow of Middle East oil. In addition, air, sea and land routes within 
and through the Middle East provided channels to valuable commercial markets, including India. 
There was also the probability that after the war, a strong Western-style democracy would best serve 
British interests within the Arab remnants of a defeated Ottoman Empire. To augment the latter, 
Bickerton and Klausner argue that many Jews were used strategically, as part of a combined Allied 
war effort.189 Chaim Weizmann was counting on British support. Weizmann was Russian-born and a 
committed Zionist. He was president of the World Zionist Organisation which at the time, served as 
an emissary between staunch Zionists and would-be pro-Zionist sympathisers. Soon after the Balfour 
Declaration was published, Weizmann claimed that “[the British understood that] Jews alone were 
capable of rebuilding Palestine and of giving it a place in the modern family of nations”.190 Said 
argues that “rebuilding” explicitly implies a replacement of the existing order with “[what was 
intended] to appear [as] a new Jewish State”.191 By his persuasive personal charm, “brilliant mind, 
dignified bearing [and] charisma”,192 Weismann had convinced key British politicians to back his 
cause. Prime Minister Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Lord Balfour and other prominent figures, 
including influential newspaper editors, all gave their approval. Others viewed a home in Palestine 
as a way of discouraging Jewish immigrants from entering less-welcoming Britain.193 
Britain was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, through Balfour, Britain was committed 
to the Zionist ideal. On the other, (undoubtedly to secure strategic wartime advantage) it had made 
similar commitments to Arabs. For example, between 24th October and 13th December 1915, notes 
were exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon (British High Commissioner in Egypt) and Sharif 
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Hussein of Mecca (seen as the most prestigious Arab Leader). McMahon wrote that he was authorised 
by his Government to announce that it “was prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of 
Arabs in all regions lying within specific frontiers”. Hussein replied with “great gratification” and 
pledged that Arabs would join in the battle against the Turks194 although, Bickerton and Klausner 
contend, that while Arabs played a significant role in the Arab Revolt, the majority remained loyal to 
the Ottoman Empire. However, the central question is whether Palestine was included as part of the 
arrangement? Britain claimed that Palestine was rightly excluded but, the authors maintain, most 
observers support the Arab assertion that Palestine was indeed included.195 Nevertheless, by 
separating out Palestine from the majority Mandated region and later assisting that region towards 
autonomy, Britain could later reallocate all (or at least part of) Palestine to Jews while claiming to 
having fulfilled its obligation to both parties. Therefore, in British terms, after issuance of the Balfour 
Declaration (with its written ‘dual obligation’) and an internationally recognised British Mandate, the 
way was clear for a future Jewish State in Palestine. 
Faisal-Weizmann Agreement – Possible Compromise 
Britain’s next move was to arrange for the highly regarded Weizmann to meet with Hussein’s son, 
Faisal. Before their first meeting in June 1918, Weizmann assured Faisal that Jews did not intend to 
establish a Jewish government, but instead wished to “work under British protection, to colonise and 
develop Palestine without encroaching of any legitimate interests”.196 The two men met in London 
and signed a mutual pact on the 3rd January 1919. It was a convivial exchange emphasising “the most 
cordial goodwill and understanding”.197 198 The Agreement was a firm commitment to implement the 
Balfour Declaration. This meant taking all necessary measures to stimulate and encourage Jewish 
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immigrants to settle and cultivate the land on a “large scale” and assisting and protecting Arab rights 
on their way to economic fulfilment.199 There was no specific reference to a separate ‘Jewish state’, 
but separation of Arabs and Jews into “respective territories” was presumed.200 Zionists were also 
expected to assist in the creation of an independent “Arab State”.201 In his opening statement Faisal 
claimed to be acting on behalf of his own short-lived Kingdom of Hejaz though, by inference, he had 
his sights sets on a larger picture. Tessler argues that Faisal’s orientation was truly pan-Arab and was 
“capable of flexibility with respect to Palestine precisely because his interest was in the larger arena 
of the eastern Arab world – namely, Greater Syria, Iraq and the Hejaz”. In a letter to his wife in 1918, 
Weizmann wrote that “[Faisal] is not interested in Palestine but on the other hand he wants 
Damascus and the whole of northern Syria”.202 Faisal supported an alliance with Zionists believing 
that Jewish finance and political influence would help secure international support for Arab self-
determination. For his part, Weizmann reasoned that if Zionists supported Faisal’s wider ambitions 
then the quid pro quo was Arab endorsement for Zionist goals. Bickerton et al contend that Faisal 
viewed himself as the principal voice of authority - well able to deliver for others. However, he had 
misjudged the mood, as opposition to the Balfour Declaration was gaining momentum, underpinned 
by the “fear of unlimited Jewish immigration with its probable economic, cultural and political 
consequences”.203 Faisal described himself as representative of “educated” Arabs who “wish the 
Jews a most hearty welcome home”.204 Despite this, his welcoming embraces were not shared by the 
Arab majority. Later, Faisal had second thoughts and appended an important proviso to the 
Agreement: He (Faisal) would stand by the wording of the Agreement only on the understanding that 
there should “[not be the] slightest modification or departure” from its contents and that the 
Agreement would be null and void if Arabs did not “obtain their independence”.205 Faisal’s dealings 
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with Weizmann were later repudiated by an Arab Congress in Damascus, reflecting a groundswell of 
Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration and associated qualms over Jewish immigration. 
Bickerton and Klausner contend that the latter reflected growing local opposition to the Balfour 
Declaration and Jewish immigration.206 Karsh provides an opposing interpretation. He claims that 
Arab Leaders refused to accept the reality of the situation and neglected the view of the majority. 
Indeed, it was some years before ordinary Arabs became aware of the Balfour Declaration and when 
they did, Balfour and consequently, Britain, became associated with “an idea – power, money to 
promote Jewish settlement [perhaps even] an opportunity for self-enrichment”. It is arguable whether 
the influx of Jews and money had coincided with raised Palestinian-Arab living standards beyond 
that of neighbouring Arab countries. Karsh produces evidence to substantiate his argument that it was 
not just the upper classes and landowners who benefitted from inflated pre to post-war land sales 
when selling to the incomers, but that the gains also extended to the rural population. Arab lives had 
improved on several levels: Industry, agriculture, crop yields, health provision and mortality rates – 
all improved beyond that in other British-ruled countries, “not to mention [British-ruled] India”. 
Karsh reinforces the above assertion by referring to Sir Herbert Samuel’s valedictory report at the 
end of his 1920-1925 term as High Commissioner for Palestine. Samuel reported that the predicted 
attacks by “well armed Jewish colonist [did not occur. Nor, as agitators predicted, had] a hundred 
thousand Jews [invaded Palestine] to occupy [Arab] lands … no man had his land taken from him 
… far from the mosques … turned into synagogues, a new, purely Moslem elected body was created 
[to control] all Moslem religious buildings …. It is difficult, under such conditions, to maintain 
indefinitely an attitude of alarm; people cannot be induced to remain constantly mobilised against a 
danger which never eventuates”.207 208 
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No Sign of Compromise 
By mid-1920, Lord Balfour was becoming increasingly impatient. After diplomatic niceties in his 
memorandum of the 12th July in which he described Arabs as “a great, an interesting and an attractive 
race”, Balfour reminded Arab states that Britain had freed them from the “tyranny of their brutal 
conqueror” and that thanks to Britain’s wartime efforts, Arab states were rapidly gaining self-
government. In return, Balfour continued, Arabs might not begrudge “one small notch ... for it is no 
more geographically, whatever it may be historically ...  that small notch ... now in Arab territories 
being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it”.209 
Balfour’s personal pro-Zionist, anti-Arab sentiments permeate the Memorandum: “Right or 
wrong” he maintained, Zionist hopes pre-empt “the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 
Palestinian Arabs”. While Palestinian independence was nowhere in sight, he insisted, Palestine’s 
doors should be opened wide to Jewish immigrants.210 In the event, Lord Balfour’s “small notch” 
became temporarily unavailable when, in the following month, Emir Faisal, although widely backed 
by the Syrian majority, was expelled from Syria-Palestine by French occupying forces.211 212 Anglo-
French relations were strained when French Authorities accused British officers of 
undermining the French Mandate. Balfour refuted the accusation and predicted that “Each 
confusedly adumbrate [Mandate] can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs 
when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final 
arrangement about the Middle East”.213 
Again, the Balfour Declaration was a commitment (though with a significant caveat) that 
Britain supported the Zionist call for a Jewish ‘homeland’ in Palestine. Britain was a principal 
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international player in the Middle East and having captured Baghdad in March 1917 and Jerusalem 
in December of the same year, Britain was “in a position to demand post-war control of Iraq and 
Palestine”.214  
Having issued irreconcilable statements to both sides, Britain had boxed itself into a corner. 
Nevertheless, immediately post-Balfour, the sun was in the ascendency for Zionists. British Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, had met with Chaim Weizmann and expressed his sympathy with Zionist 
aims while Zionists gained another powerful ally. In August 1918, US President Wilson had offered 
his support for a Jewish homeland by way of an open letter to Rabbi Steven Wise who himself had 
allies in the White House. By the time Wilson and Lloyd George met at Versailles to negotiate “a 
peace to end all peace”, peacemakers were under pressure to “proceed with extreme caution”.215 
Before finalising his support, Wilson needed reassurance. Thus, in June 1919, he dispatched Dr Henry 
King216 and Charles Crane217 into the region to advise him on how best to proceed.  
King-Crane Commission 
The American Commissioners arrived in Jaffa on the 10th of June 1919. Whenever they arrived at a 
new location, they issued a reassuring press statement: “The American people have no political 
ambitions in Europe or the Near East ... [however, the United States recognises] ... that [it] cannot 
altogether avoid responsibility for just settlements among the nations following the war”. They made 
it known that former communities, which had previously been under the control of the Ottoman 
Empire, had reached a stage of development where their independence could be “provisionally 
recognised”, provided they were assisted by a Mandatory Power. In a press statement, the 
Commission affirmed that respecting the wishes of the communities regarding the nomination of the 
Mandatory Power was a “principal consideration”. The Commissioners reported that some 
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interviewees were suspected of having been subjected to “considerable propaganda” and that their 
evidence was either unreliable or absent. Nevertheless, the Commissioners wrote somewhat self-
importantly that the process involved was a “kind of political education for the people”.218  
To gauge whether a Jewish state in Palestine was viable, a representative sample of people 
was selected from across the social, religious and political spectrums. Opinion among Jews in 
Palestine was unequivocal. Jews, the report reads, sought a “fairly large ... national home” to be 
organised sooner or later into a “Jewish Commonwealth”.219 A Commonwealth open to Jews from 
any quarter, with individuals given the right to buy land from willing Arab sellers. Jewish opinion 
generally favoured a British Mandatory Authority because Britain had declared its support for the 
establishment of a Jewish national home.220 However, King and Crane viewed the latter as an 
“extreme Zionist program” that required “serious modification”.   
Having gathered sufficient evidence to make an informed judgement, King and Crane felt that 
previous support for Zionist plans was misplaced. The American Commissioners claimed that the 
Balfour Declaration had given Zionists “definite encouragement”. Moreover, they argued, the pledge 
to “promote the establishment of a Jewish national home” and Balfour’s codicil that “nothing should 
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights [of non-Jews]” were incompatible. Jewish 
representatives, the Commissioners noted, were anticipating the time when the dispossession of non-
Jews from their land became a practical reality. It was enough to persuade the Commissioners to 
rebuff the Zionists’ “extreme” ambitions.221 
In his presidential address of 4th July 1918, President Wilson had advised that decisions on 
questions of territory, sovereignty and political arrangements should not be self-seeking in order to 
gain material advantage or to impose “exterior influence or mastery”. He argued that countries were 
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obliged to take account of the wishes of the people most affected. This could be interpreted as a 
cautionary note to Mandatory Powers. Reflecting on the latter, King-Crane argued that Wilson’s 
Principle would be violated if Jews inflicted “unlimited” Jewish immigration and excessive land 
purchase on unwilling Arabs. It was acknowledged that both Jews and Arabs had an ancient historic 
connection to Palestine. However, considering the 72% strong Arab opposition, an estimated 50,000 
military personnel would be required to impose the Zionist claim. Anti-Zionist feelings over the 
perceived threat to the Holy Land were particularly strong, as it was sacred to Jews, Christians and 
Moslems alike. It was doubtful, even allowing for the Zionists best intentions, that non-Jews would 
accept Jews as the Holy Land’s primary guardians.222 With “deep sympathy for the Jewish cause” the 
Commissioners recommended that the Paris Peace Conference (which was on-going at the time) 
should reject Zionist calls for a Jewish Commonwealth and proposed instead that Jewish immigration 
should be severely curtailed. Furthermore, they recommended that Palestine should be included as 
part of a wide united Syrian state with the proviso that the Holy Places should be maintained under 
international guardianship. 
Now that King-Crane had ruled out Palestine as a separate entity, the question arose as to 
which country should be awarded the Mandate. At the time, the region under consideration was 
referred to as Greater Syria, United Syria, or simply Syria. The territorial limits of ‘United Syria’ (in 
King-Crane terms) were defined as broadly in line with what today is considered to include the 
separate countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq.223  Available data suggested 
that the Arab majority favoured a Mandate exercised under the authority of the United States, while 
the first preference of the Jews was that Britain should remain in temporary control. Arab respondents 
sensed that, unlike Britain or France, both of which were suspected of having colonial ambitions, the 
United States would remain in the Middle East only until Syria achieved independence. What 
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America lacked in experience was mitigated by an understanding that its involvement would create 
less friction than if either Britain or France (France was particularly unpopular) took on the role. 
Unlike Britain and France, America had no imperialistic interests and the former two countries were 
less likely to yield their claims to each other and more likely to accede to America’s. The 
Commissioners reasoned that British and French interests would be best served by America’s 
presence as a “welcome neighbour”. King and Crane were effectively pressing a reluctant Wilson, 
although even if the United States accepted the role, it was by no means certain that Britain and France 
would willingly step aside. Even if they would, Wilson still had to convince a war-weary American 
public that it was the right approach. In any event, accepting the Mandate on what could be perceived 
as King-Crane’s anti-Zionist terms, heightened the risk of upsetting America’s large and influential 
Jewish constituency. It could also prove embarrassing to Wilson, particularly as Washington had 
made vague but encouraging noises to American Zionists.224 After Britain had pledged its support 
and especially since the US appeared ready to do likewise, Zionists could feel reasonably confident 
that, whatever the obstacles, a Jewish state was just a matter of time.   
Again, popular opinion suggested that Britain had come in a poor second choice after 
America. France had had a long and often close relationship with Syria. Moreover, with loss of life 
on an unprecedented scale among the French forces during WWI, France was poised to demand its 
reward. Though the Commissioners were not prepared to back down from proposing that the US 
should take on the role, they reasoned that France was a somewhat plausible option. However, Arabs 
had reacted fiercely against any French involvement and the imposition of France risked a French-
Arab impasse. Therefore, it was evident that France as a Mandatory Authority should be discounted. 
With France out and the United States likely to rule itself out, Britain was the one remaining 
contender. Public opinion taken from across Greater Syria indicated that most had an “honest fear 
that in British hands the mandatary power would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; 
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that Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in the case of a 
people thought inferior … that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for 
Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real 
independence”.225  
Grossi et al reveal that, alarmed by growing hostility in the region, Crane telegraphed 
President Wilson advising him that the “situation in Turkey is so serious [that he have] decided to 
return to report as soon as [we have] covered essentials” and impelling them to leave Constantinople 
on the 21st July 1919. Had King-Crane’s recommendations been publicly aired and accepted at the 
Paris Peace Conference, the results for Zionists would have been catastrophic. Events though, 
favoured Zionists. King-Crane’s report was intended to inform US policy, but by the time the report 
was delivered privately to the President on the 28th August 1919, many of the major decisions had 
already been taken. Grossi et al confirm that the Commissioners were too late; that King and Crane 
had wanted the report to be made public but were reluctant to publish it without the authority of the 
President or the State Department. They were wise to hesitate because, almost immediately, the State 
Department imposed a blanket ban on publication on the grounds “that [publication] would not be 
compatible with the public interest”. The contents were so sensitive that other US Government 
officials were denied access.226 Little suggests another reason behind the documents suppression: US 
foreign policy, he writes, was thrown into a state of suspension because of Wilson’s near-fatal 
stroke.227 Saul argues that the report was buried because it was a repudiation of a secret pact between 
Britain and France that the region should be divided up between them.228 Saul explains that the US 
had entered a period of isolationism. The Administration was distancing itself from aspects of the 
post-war peace process and was unwilling to assume authority over the Mandate. Also, although he 
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was probably aware of the Report, Wilson’s steadily deteriorating health meant that it was unlikely 
that he read the full contents or was aware of its full significance. Saul maintains that a Jewish 
delegation, including Chaim Weizmann, Justice Louis D. Brandeis229, Professor Felix Frankfurter230 
and other prominent Jewish leaders, followed closely behind the King-Crane Commissioners. 
Ultimately, this American Jewish delegation overshadowed the King Crane Commissioners and 
received wide publicity along the way.231 Weir contends that Zionists were in the driving seat and 
“dominated the situation” such that publication was supressed and the potential obstacle to Zionist 
ambitions cleared. 232    
During the final years of President Wilson’s term in office the King-Crane report was hidden 
and remained so until well after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres on the 10th August 1920.233 It was 
not until the magazine ‘Editor and Publisher’ printed the report on the 2nd November 1922, that its 
contents were open to public scrutiny. Almost immediately, the former Secretary to the Commission 
purchased multiple copies and sent them to scholars across Europe and the US. Now, with King-
Crane a distant threat and United States policy moving steadily in their direction, Zionists could afford 
to breathe a sigh of relief. Saul emphasises the importance of the academic controversy that was 
unleashed by the King-Crane Report. Historians contest an apparent anti-French bias in the report 
and, importantly, they also dispute the reasoning behind King-Crane’s blank refusal to accept the 
right for Jews to determine their own destiny. It is questionable whether there was a danger of 
indigenous Arabs being displaced from their homes because of large scale Jewish immigration, thus 
upsetting the “existing equilibrium in the area”. The controversy centres on whether it was the latter 
that heralded “the birth of the Arab-Israeli conflict”.234 
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Notwithstanding the report’s recommendation that the United States should accept the 
Mandate for Syria, the League of Nations chose to divide it into two separate administrations. France 
was awarded the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon and Britain granted the Mandate for Palestine on 
the 24th July 1922.235 
Britain’s Palestine Mandate 
Ultimately, with the US having ruled itself out and France a highly unpopular option, a marginally 
less unpopular Britain was awarded the Palestine Mandate.  However, in choosing Britain as the 
Mandatory Authority, the League of Nations was bound by its own Covenant: “The wishes of these 
[Palestinian] communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”.236 It 
is important to note that, as it was suppressed until after the event, League of Nations members could 
be excused for missing a key finding in King Crane’s report. This finding was that according to 
overwhelming public opinion, not only was Britain an unwelcome presence in Palestine, but the 
Balfour Declaration was out of step with the “wishes of these communities”. It follows that by 
selecting Britain as the Mandatory Power, the League had effectively breached Article 22 of its own 
Covenant.  The Mandate itself was formally approved by the League of Nations on the 24th July 1922 
and soon supplemented on the 16th September by the Transjordan Memorandum. This was a 
development that would have repercussions on Article 25 of the Mandate.237 Article 25 specified that 
as the Mandatory Power, Britain was entitled to treat eastern Palestine – Transjordan – as a special 
case, even though it remained, technically, part of the wider Palestine Mandate. Unlike the mandated 
territory west of the River Jordan, Jews were barred from immigrating into or purchasing land for 
permanent settlements in Transjordan. The Transjordan Memorandum was ratified at the Treaty of 
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Lausanne on the 29th September 1923. This confined a future Jewish national home, at its broadest 
(and most optimistic) to between the western boundary of Transjordan (the River Jordan) and the 
Mediterranean.238 As a result of Article 25, some extreme Zionist ambitions for an all-encompassing 
East/West-Bank State were shattered. Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who had founded the Revisionist Zionist 
Alliance, refused to accept the partitioning-off of Transjordan. Revisionists demanded not merely a 
homeland within Palestine, or a partitioned State alongside Palestine, but an independent Jewish State 
across the entire region of Palestine-Transjordan. Later, as the situation in Nazi-dominated Europe 
worsened, the latter, while accepting of the inconsistency between their own and Arab claims to 
Palestine, believed their claim had the greater moral justification. Though Transjordan was on its 
journey to statehood,239 committed Revisionists refused to agree and viewed the Jewish Agency as 
“weak willed and cowardly”.240 
Scrutiny of the Palestine Mandate leaves little doubt that the Allied Powers intended that 
Britain’s primary role was to “[put into] effect the [Balfour Declaration] in favour of the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. The League of Nations observed 
that the historical connection between Jews and Palestine was adequate “grounds for reconstituting 
their national home in [Palestine]”241 The Mandate states that given the legal and administrative 
powers, Britain was to “secure the establishment of the Jewish national home”;242 to co-operate with 
the Zionist Organisation in matters intended to effect a “Jewish National home and in the interests of 
the Jewish population in Palestine”; to work towards “the establishment of the Jewish national 
home”243 and to “facilitate Jewish immigration [so as to encourage] close settlement on the land 
including State lands and waste lands”.244 Julius Isaac maintains that “Palestine held a unique 
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position [as the] only existing country whose Government was bound by … the Mandate and to pursue 
an active migration policy”.245  Palestinian national law, the Mandate continues, would be framed in 
such a way that Jews would acquire Palestinian citizenship.246 At the same time, Jewish rights would 
be reinforced; the right to immigrate, to settle in and to build a permanent homeland.  The document 
also imposed responsibilities on Jewish citizens, who would be expected to assist in the overall 
development of the country. As the Mandate holder, Britain was required to “encourage local 
autonomy”.247 While the Mandate makes no direct reference to a separate Jewish state, this was 
clearly inferred. In his speech to the House of Lords on the 27th July 1937, the Marquess of Reading 
stated that he had “never been confronted with anything more confused, ambiguous, ill-drafted or 
obscure” than the Palestine Mandate.248 Later still, in 1947, the United Nations Special Committee 
for Palestine (UNSCOP) noted that Partition was not precluded, despite the wording of the Palestine 
Mandate being inconclusive on this point. 
Shaw, Hope-Simpson and Passfield Have Concerns 
Throughout the 1920’s, the rift between Arabs and Jews widened. In 1929, Britain decided to appoint 
Sir Walter Shaw to head a Commission charged to determine the primary causes of more recent 
disturbances between the two disputing parties and to recommend a way forward. In March 1930 his 
Commission (the Shaw Commission) reported that the violence was the result of “racial animosity 
on the part of Arabs” who feared for their “economic future” given that, in their view, Jews had access 
to unlimited finance. Shaw acknowledged that conflicting promises given to Arabs and Jews was one 
root cause of the unrest and that Britain should more clearly spell out its intentions. He recommended 
that Britain should review its immigration policy “with the object of preventing a repetition of the 
excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926”.249 Shaw considered that other than years when Jewish 
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immigration had exceeded Palestine’s “economic absorbing power”, Arabs too had shared the 
material benefits of immigration.250 HM Government responded by imposing a temporary ban on 
Jewish immigration and the curtailment of land purchases.251 Ze'ev Jabotinsky was scathing of the 
Zionist Executive’s passivity. He compared the evidence it presented to Shaw as mere discussions 
similar to some “society [established] to combat anti-Semitism” when in reality, “[t]he Jew was 
obliged to justify his existence by proving that he was of use to others, that he had no intention to 
govern, but only requested the right to breathe”.252 To Jabotinsky, the former’s passivity did nothing 
to further the Zionist cause.  
Following on from the Shaw Commission, Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald appointed Sir 
John Hope-Simpson to conduct a committee of enquiry into land settlement, immigration and 
development. On 1st October 1930, the Hope-Simpson Report gave details of the way in which Jewish 
land purchases were affecting both Arabs and Jews. For their part, Jewish settlers, the report 
continues, had the advantages of capital, science and organisation. This together with the “energy of 
the settlers themselves [accounts for] their remarkable progress”. On the other hand, “the Arab has 
had none of these advantages and received practically no help to improve [his or her life 
circumstances]”.253 Even if the remaining land was distributed evenly among Arabs, each holding 
would fall short of what was needed to sustain a rural family although this problem could be part-
addressed by improved farming methods and the development of irrigation schemes. Even in the arid 
Beersheba Region, given “the possibility of irrigation there is practically an inexhaustible supply of 
cultivatable land”; if investigations showed that an abundance of ground water existed, then the 
problem of scarcity of cultivatable land for Arabs and “indeed for a large number of immigrant 
settlers, will be easy of solution”.254 
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As far back as 1922, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill had already 
articulated the crux of the problem: “[T]he future progress and prosperity of the Holy land” must be 
“built up in the spirit of co-operation”.255 Churchill’s sentiment was echoed in 1930, when Hope-
Simpson reported that no solution was possible unless “by joint endeavour of the two great sections 
of [Palestine’s] population”.256 Again, in 1930, the Shaw Commission had reported that “there is 
little prospect either of the success of Jewish colonization in Palestine or of the peaceful and 
progressive development … [for without] co-operation … there is little hope that the aspirations of 
either people can be realized”.257 In October 1930, Britain’s Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, 
whose formal statement made in the aftermath of the 1929 disturbances, maintained Britain’s 
commitment to the establishment of a Jewish Nation Home but that “any decision in regard to more 
unrestricted immigration should be strongly deprecated”.258 Passfield’s main concern was that “no 
policy, however enlightened or however vigorously prosecuted, can hope for success, unless it is 
supported not merely by the acceptance, but by the willing co-operation of the communities for whose 
benefit it is designed”.259 Unwittingly, Shaw, Hope-Simpson and Passfield reinforced the fact that, 
without Zionist/Palestinian-Arab “willing co-operation” on the principle obstacle of immigration, 
other than Partition, no workable alternative existed.  
Towards the Weizmann/Said Exchange 
During the interwar years, phases of uneasy calm were punctuated by violent outbursts. Whenever 
they occurred, whether Arab on Jew, Jew on Arab, or violence directed at the Administrative 
authorities, characteristically Britain responded militarily followed by a Government White Paper, 
none of which achieved the intended objective. During periods of unrest, Hahn confirms, Britain’s 
preferred policy option was to sustain rudimentary stability through the “exercise of political, police, 
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and administrative powers”. He explains that in 1922, although Jews had the right to immigrate and 
settle, this right was heavily curtailed, and expressions of Jewish ‘rule’ or Jewish ‘state’ began to fall 
out of favour. Between 1919 and 1921 and again in 1929 and 1933, Hahn writes, Palestine was 
plagued with violence with hundreds killed on both sides.260 Hahn argues that the seeds of “Zionist 
and Arab nationalism were planted before WWI” and contends that in 1914, with the relationship 
between the sides gradually deteriorating, many of Palestine’s 66,000 Jews and 570,000 Arabs 
predicted future conflict.261 The picture was confused. Paradoxically, Karsh recounts instances where, 
for example, had ordinary Palestinian Arabs been left to their own devices; they could have “[taken] 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the growing Jewish presence”. Periods of calm, he argues, 
outweighed those of unrest. Arabs and Jews frequently interacted and cooperated on a range of issues. 
Before the clash of opposing national aspirations, the two communities commonly interacted daily, 
even aligning “their political ambitions and intellectual outlooks … in relation to European 
imperialism”. By 1923, it was not unusual to find children mixing in one another’s schools. British 
officials cited commonplace examples of animated Jewish-Arab discussion groups compelling 
officials to question their earlier preconceptions. Menachem Klein describes a world where, before 
1948, Arabs and Jews lived alongside and respected each other’s institutional and religious traditions. 
He writes, “[W]hen Jewish and Arab nationalism reached Palestine, it did not encounter people who 
lacked identities but rather a local community where everyday life created connections among its 
members and between them and the place in which they live”.262 Klein continues: “Before 
nationalism brutally separated the two words ‘Arab’ and ‘Jew’ and regarded the inhabitants of 
Palestine to count themselves one or the other … Arab Jewish identity was a fact of life”.263 However, 
throughout the 1930’s, Arab Nationalism was taking firm hold so that the divide over Jewish 
immigration was growing.  
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On the 9th June 1936, Weizmann had met with Nuri Said (Iraq’s Foreign Minister) in London. 
Said, Weizmann reported, envisaged a vast pan-Arab federation in which Jews would enjoy 
considerable autonomy, though this would fall short of national self-determination. Nuri Said also 
predicted that the Arab world would be encouraged if Jews agreed to a voluntary suspension of 
immigration. Weizmann accepted Said’s challenge. He agreed to approach UK Government officials 
and offer a twelve-month suspension of Jewish immigration. Karsh emphasises the importance of this 
turn of events. The Jewish National revival depended on immigration; the “elixir of life”. It was a 
careless lapse on Weizmann’s part, given that Ben-Gurion had warned against “heretical ideas”.264 
Two days after the critical meeting, Ben-Gurion cautioned Weizmann that any suspension of 
immigration was tantamount to national suicide and that the matter was closed. However, it transpired 
that the idea was not dispensed with. On the 15th June 1936, Weizmann’s pledge was relayed to the 
British Ambassador in Iraq (Sir Archibald Clark-Kent) then to William Ormsby-Gore (Colonial 
Secretary) and back to Weizmann for clarification. At a meeting with colleagues, an uncomfortable 
Weizmann denied making promises to Said despite the latter’s insistence that he had. The issue went 
back and forth between Ben-Gurion (he found it “difficult to work with [Weizmann]”), colleagues, 
and high-ranking officials. Weizmann wrote to Ormsby-Gore protesting that he “never suggested that 
[the suspension of immigration] should be done ‘for a year’ [that] to the best of my recollection, I 
did not agree to this suggestion [although] possibly I did not oppose it as vehemently as I might have 
done”.265  
Eventually, the Weizmann/Said incident died a death though it serves as an illustration that 
Jewish immigration was at the epicentre of the Palestine problem. The flow of new immigrants 
occasionally slowed, but generally it was relentless. Something had to give. Before long, background 
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hostility erupted into the 1936 Arab Revolt.266 The UK Government reacted by dispatching an 
investigative team (the Palestine Royal Commission [Peel Commission]) into the region.   
In November 1937 the immigration issue was raised again, this time by Emir Abdullah of 
Transjordan. Abdullah informed Moshe Sharett267 (Zionist Foreign Minister) that cutting back on 
immigration might soothe Arab concerns, but he warned that Arabs would never accept the 
transformation of Palestine into a Jewish National Home. Instead, Abdullah proposed, Jews could 
remain or resettle in Transjordan as loyal subjects, provided that their number did not exceed 35% of 
the population.268 
Summary 
The fifth and final version of the Balfour Declaration emerged following a series of WWI British 
Cabinet meetings. It was a written pledge to the Zionist movement that Britain would help “facilitate” 
a “national home for Jewish people” “in” Palestine. The terminology used is calculatingly unclear 
(“attenuated and ambiguous” write Bickerton and Klausner 269) and has encouraged a near tidal-wave 
of scholarship. What is clear is that while the debate raged, whatever preventative measures were 
adopted, whichever way the politicians interpreted and reinterpreted Britain’s intent, legally or 
illegally, streams of immigrants were determinedly establishing a largely independent de facto Jewish 
state. However, what is also clear is that Britain had made similar, less formal, promises to Palestinian 
Arabs and they were not consulted during the process and their presence in the Declaration as “non-
Jewish communities” appears only in the final two versions almost as an afterthought. Balfour himself 
had no such concerns. In a memorandum written in the mid-1920’s Balfour wrote that Zionist wishes 
took precedence over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs.  
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In June 1919, US President Wilson had yet to pass his final judgement. He appointed 
Commissioners, King and Crane who, after returning from the Middle East, reported that, in their 
view, the Zionist programme required serious modification. In 1930, Shaw, Hope-Simpson and 
Passfield had intimated that Balfour’s ‘dual obligation’ commitment was unsustainable. By this time 
Britain was already politically bound to honour its pledge to Jews while at the same time finding 
some means of safeguarding Arab rights. Satisfying the ‘dual obligation’ would require separating 
the two conflicted parties into two independent states.  Still, British policy-makers persistently stuck 
to their flawed and increasingly unrealistic policy of enforced Jewish and Arab reconciliation refusing 
to acknowledge that only Partition could satisfy the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine 
Mandate.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Introduction 
The chapter opens four years after Adolph Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany (30th January 
1933) at a time when he had turned his venom on Jews. Although there was a sense of foreboding on 
what was to come, the full extent was yet to be revealed. Of those Jews that might have escaped, a 
comparatively small number actually left the danger zone. Meanwhile in Palestine, earlier tensions 
between Arabs and Jews came to a head in 1936, when Arab groups targeted Jewish communities 
and organs of the British Administration. In August of that year, a Royal Commission (the Peel 
Commission) was dispatched to Palestine to investigate the circumstances behind the ongoing 
conflict; whether the terms of the Mandate had aggravated “legitimate grievances” and to make 
recommendations as to how peace could be restored.270 In the event, this would prove to be one more 
unstoppable step towards Partition. On the 30th June 1936, shortly before the Commission’s arrival, 
high level Arab civil servants with close links between the Administration and the Arab population 
wrote to the High Commissioner for Palestine. The underlying cause of the recent disturbance was, 
they maintained, due to Arabs of all classes and creeds feeling “a profound sense of injustice [and 
that] the present unrest is no more than an expression of … despair … [and that] the deadlock … 
turns exclusively on the issue of immigration”.271 The letter was passed to the Peel’s Commissioners, 
who were soon to become preoccupied with the issue.  
Sporadic violence throughout the early nineteen-twenties and late thirties, left little doubt that 
Arabs were prepared to go to extreme measures to thwart Zionist ambitions. Peel cautioned that the 
added “pressure of Jews from Europe” into the region dashed hopes of reconciliation. Arab qualms 
centred on Jewish ambitions for “national independence” and their “hatred and fear of the 
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establishment of the Jewish National Home”. In response, Peel reasoned that the benefits of a vibrant 
Jewish economy merging into an underdeveloped Arab one would eventually moderate Arab 
hostility.272 
Zionist reaction to the Royal Commission’s Report was yet to be finalised. At the twentieth 
Zionist Conference held in Zürich from the 3rd to the 16th of August 1937, opinion was divided. There 
were those who claimed that the allocated Jewish state, which was not to include Jerusalem, was 
insufficient to accommodate large numbers of immigrants and that the proposed Jewish state would 
be difficult to defend. Others, like Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann believed that with war looming, 
Britain would be unlikely to go further. They felt that the crisis among European Jewry demanded an 
immediate solution and that Peel’s proposals offered an opportunity for further discussions. 
Moreover, if the fledgling state was attacked, then the Zionist movement would defend itself and 
claim the right to readjusted borders. Conference rejected Peel’s border proposal but empowered its 
executive to renegotiate more favourable terms.273 While Zionists viewed Peel’s proposals as an 
opportunity to continue negotiations, the increasing probability of war in Europe meant that their 
hopes for a Jewish state would soon take second place to Britain’s more immediate strategic concerns 
and entail a reorientation in its Middle East policy.  
In the wake of Peel’s report, in February 1938, Britain’s Woodhead Commission was 
instructed to look again at Partition and formalise the necessary boundaries. Expressing its 
preliminary opinion on the Royal Commission’s report, the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(Woodhead) reported to the League of Nations that “the present mandate [is] almost unworkable”. 
Woodhead’s Commissioners rejected Peel’s population exchange element and were divided on the 
question of Partition.  
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In June 1937, with no end to the impasse in sight, Britain announced that the “irreconcilable 
conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and those of the Jews in Palestine … cannot be satisfied 
under the terms of the present Mandate”.274 
Just before the outbreak of WWII, the British Government published its now infamous White 
Paper. This passed into law two important restrictions. Firstly, the level of Jewish immigration was 
restricted to 1500 per month to achieve a maximum of 75,000 and secondly, there would be an 
immediate cap on Arab land sales to prospective Jewish purchasers.275 Winston Churchill and other 
Parliamentarians were bitterly opposed to this. To Lloyd George, the White Paper was “an act of 
perfidy”.276 This about-turn in British policy incensed Zionists so that by the end of the war, 
antagonism towards Britain had erupted into outright violence. Determined to see the creation of an 
independent state, Zionists insisted that Britain’s latest policy reversal contravened Articles ascribed 
in the Mandate. Strict adherence to the ruling by military means created a non-negotiable divide 
between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish community. Now the “Zionist movement was at 
its lowest ebb”.277 
The Palestine Royal Commission 
The Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission) was appointed on the 7th August 1936. 
However, due to continued instability in the region, their departure to the Middle East was delayed 
until the 11th November. Initially, the Arab Higher Committee boycotted the proceedings, but finally 
conceded in January 1937. Pre-empting the Commission’s arrival in Palestine, Arab officers of the 
Civil Service employees of the Administration had sent a joint letter, on the 30th June 1936, to their 
employers with a request that its contents be relayed to the British Foreign Office. The Arab officers 
had forged close ties with Palestinian Arabs and acted as a communication channel between them and 
the Administrative Authority. One passage reads that “the deadlock in the present phase turns 
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exclusively on the issue of immigration”. The contents of the letter were expressions of discontent, 
despair and disillusionment in the British Government and its Mandate. These sentiments, according 
to its collaborating authors, were shared across a wide range of Arab society. It appears as a carefully 
crafted appeal to conscience. Rather than demanding an immediate end to immigration, the letter was 
couched in terms of reason: unless immigration was halted then the officers could see no end to the 
bloodshed. As public servants, they felt obliged to raise Arabs concerns and to “protest against the 
present policy of repression”;278 a thinly veiled warning of the serious consequences of inaction and 
a clarion call for pre-emptive action.  
Lord Peel’s Commission was charged with determining the “underlying causes of the 
disturbances” and whether the Mandatory Authority was fulfilling its obligations under the terms of 
the Mandate. If lacking, then the Commissioners were to recommend a way forward.279 They 
commenced their task by first familiarising themselves with the region. Next, they met with Emir 
Abdullah in Transjordan280 and collected samples of written and verbal evidence from a cross-section 
of witnesses. Both Arabs and Jews, the Commission acknowledged, had deep historical connections 
with the land. But the Palestine problem was not confined to the antipathy felt by one side against the 
other. It was a predicament that revolved around fear, a trepidation that uncontrolled Jewish 
immigration would lead to Arab subjugation. As the Royal Commission was mandated to consider 
the question of Palestine, justice could only be served by considering the matter of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine and within its wider European context.281 
Over centuries, Jewish communities in the Middle East had flourished and become “a 
prosperous and influential body”.282 Until the current outbreaks of hostility, Palestinian Arabs had 
been generally accepting of their Jewish neighbours and frequently benefitted from their presence. 
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Conversely, the “era of persecution”283 began whenever Jewish Communities lived alongside 
Christians. European Jews, particularly those in Eastern Europe, were especially vulnerable, indeed 
it was “astonishing... that Jews survived”.284 
By 1937 when the Report was published, there were four and a half million Jews in the US 
and another twelve million elsewhere. Ten of the twelve million were in Europe with an estimated 
nine million of those in Central or Eastern Europe.285 In 1920 and 1921 when the Jewish National 
Home was little more than an experiment, 16,000 Jews had emigrated to Palestine.286 By 1922 the 
total number of Jews in the country was estimated at 83,000 compared with 589,000 Muslims and 
71,000 Christians.287 At the time Jews represented a little over 11% of the total (just over 1 Jew to 9 
others). Compared with the combined total of Jews in the rest of the world (approximately 
16,500,000), the annual rate of Jewish immigration at the time barely dented the population of 
Palestine.288  
Peel’s Commission turned its attention to the years 1920 to 1925 during Sir Hebert Samuel’s 
term in office as High Commissioner.289 Kedourie maintains that Lloyd George appointed the latter 
trusting that, as a Zionist sympathiser, he was best placed to implement Balfour’s Declaration. Since 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Samuel viewed Palestine as a permanent Jewish haven. Years 
before, he had argued for a Jewish centre in Palestine to “achieve some measure of spiritual greatness 
[to shake off past] sordid associations [such that] the value of Jews as an element [in Europe] is 
enhanced”.290 
For Zionists, Samuel’s appointment was fortuitous. The Mandatory Authority (under Samuel) 
was required to protect “the well-being and development” of all people under its authority. According 
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to the Mandate, Britain was also obliged to facilitate the conditions essential to a Jewish National 
Home; one set within the context of a hierarchical “quasi-feudal” Arab society. Peel observed that at 
the top of Palestinian Arab society was a ruling class (often fractured by traditional rivalry) with the 
next level down featuring an educated, sometimes wealthy, urban professional class. Then there were 
the small landowners. Below this level were labourers and peasant farmers who were barely making 
a living. At the bottom of the economic hierarchy there were around 100,000 desert nomads (the 
Bedouin); whose lifestyle was largely pastoral, adopting primeval farming methods.291  
During Samuel’s term, despite poor sanitation and inadequate public health systems, there 
were optimistic signs of progress. Arab mortality rates declined, and the overall population was 
steadily increasing. Money was still scarce, so to compensate for the shortfall, Arab farmers were 
granted small improvement loans. Nearly two-hundred primary schools were established. Child 
welfare centres and health clinics were opened. Infrastructure improvements were made, with new 
roads, faster bus services and an improved railway network - all demonstrating the “vigorous 
beginning” of modernity. Projects were usually conducted by internal and external agencies, with 
Christian and philanthropic bodies helping to shoulder the financial burden. Usually, funding was 
channelled towards the Arab population rather than to more self-sufficient Jews.292 
During this period, stimulated by the Balfour Declaration and in accordance with the 
Mandate’s obligation that Jewish immigration should be facilitated under suitable conditions the pace 
of Jewish immigration gathered momentum.  Samuel had the task of regulating the inflow and, 
looking back, Peel noted that from 1918 until the end of his term in office, Samuel had accorded with 
the terms of the Mandate and paved the way for an increase of the Jewish population to an estimated 
108,000, many of whom were young and skilled. Money poured in through Zionist organisations in 
Europe and America, helping to build schools or establish social services. The Hebrew language was 
revived, and crops were planted in reclaimed former swampland. The momentum with which 
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resources were dedicated was meant to benefit Jews, but Palestinian Arabs also reaped the rewards. 
Peel reported that although matters were steadily improving, greater resources and more effective 
measures were essential to bridge the gap between “educated, resourceful, Western-minded 
[incomers] and [Arabs who] were still living in an atmosphere of the past”.  Jews and Arabs were 
separated by centuries of discord and for so long as separation persisted there was little prospect of 
rapprochement.293 
At this point it is important to emphasise Peel’s deliberations on Jewish ‘separateness’. He 
described the uniqueness of the Jewish experiment in terms of immigrant settlements built by and run 
by Jews. Internally, the Jewish Agency carried considerable influence and often cooperated 
successfully with the Palestine Administration. The Jewish community represented an entire society 
in miniature. It had influential international Jewish support and enjoyed significant financial backing 
from powerful American organisations. Nevertheless, each step on the way was matched by Arab 
resistance. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Arabs insisted that the Balfour Declaration was a 
repudiation of their right to self-determination. The problem was compounded by sporadic Arab 
attacks on Jews. Arabs constantly feared that Jewish immigration would lead to their political and 
economic demise under the authority of a Jewish National entity. These fears were constantly fuelled 
by Pan-Arab and Pan-Muslim propaganda from outside Palestine. Palestinian Arabs refused to co-
operate with any mix of government other than one that gave them ultimate control.294  
Between the years 1920-1936: (see Table below)295, levels of authorised immigration were 
recorded. The figures did not include a considerable, and wildly speculative, number of unauthorised 
Jewish and Arab immigrants.296 The below (again authorised) immigration figures should be balanced 
against the rates of emigration.  The years 1925 to 1928 are particularly noteworthy. Peel reported 
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that in 1925, while over 33,000 Jews arrived, only 2,151 departed. By contrast, in 1926, the number 
of new arrivals had dropped to around 13,000, while over half that number decided to leave. For 
Zionists, matters worsened when in the following year, nearly twice as many Jews left than arrived. 
This is partially explained by the collapse of the Polish Zloty and the subsequent internal currency 
restrictions. Given that around half of incomers to Palestine were Polish, many would have remained 
just as impoverished as they had been in Poland. In the two years until 1927, revenue per head dropped 
in Palestine as unemployment rose from 400 to 5,000.297 The Zionist project faced a doubtful future. 
However, by 1928 the economy was improving. Unemployment dropped and although immigration 
rates were slow to respond, the inward flow far exceeded the outward drift so that by late 1928 “the 
National Home had survived [its] worst crisis”.298 
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Figures indicate that from 1929 to 1932, the improving 
economy encouraged Jews and non-Jews into the region. 
Thenceforth, coinciding with the rapidly deteriorating 
political situation in Germany and beyond, Jews poured into 
Palestine. Using Peel’s data, the average299 rate of 
immigration in the years 1933 to 1936 (inclusive) was a little 
over 41,000. At that rate (not taking into account the impact 
of WWII – unknown at the time) by around 1952 the Jewish 
population would have overtaken the Palestinian-Arab 
population which was, itself, according to the statistics, 
increasing at a steady rate of some 24,000 per year.300 
Palestinian Arabs “watch[ed] the immigration figures with 
close and anxious concern”.301 Undoubtedly, Jewish 
immigration posed a challenge. Within a unitary Palestinian 
state, it was not beyond the bounds of credibility that if the 
latter situation continued Arabs would be in a minority in a 
majority Jewish state. Unsurprisingly, Arab concern turned 
to anger at the prospect of Jewish domination. It was 
becoming increasingly clear that neither Jews nor Arabs 
would accept large-scale assimilation in a unitary Palestine 
so that, ultimately, the one long-term solution lay in a partitioned Palestine.  
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Year Jewish 
Immigration 
Non-Jewish 
Immigration 
1920 5514 202 
1921 9149 190 
1922 7844 284 
1923 7421 570 
1924 12856 697 
1925 33801 840 
1926 13081 829 
1927 2713 882 
1928 2178 908 
1929 5249 1317 
1930 4944 1489 
1931 4075 1458 
1932 9553 1736 
1933 30327 1650 
1934 42359 1784 
1935 61854 2293 
1936 29729 1944* 
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In 1936, sporadic clashes between the sides quickly intensified into outright hostility when 
Palestinian Arab militias escalated the frequency of their attacks on Jewish communities. The Royal 
Commission reported that for so long as the Mandate was in force, the “stronger and more bitter Arab 
antagonism to it became”. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who became High Commissioner in 1931, had stated 
that while he would make every effort to reconcile the “two races”, it should be understood that if he 
failed, the “Government must, regardless of criticism, carry out whatever policy it considers best in 
the interests of the entire population and in accordance with the Mandate”.302 Peel pointed to the 
importance of the wording of Wauchope’s words. The problem with the Mandate lay in Britain’s 
commitment to the dual obligation. The task of reconciliation, Peel wrote, was not merely “supremely 
difficult [but] impossible”.303 
Wauchope had attempted to reassure the Arab Executive that Jewish immigration was within 
Palestine’s absorptive capacity and that his policy had helped increase agricultural productivity as 
well as protecting the rights of Arab farmers. Further, Wauchope had negotiated a concession from a 
Jewish group involved in the construction of a drainage scheme that excess land would be reserved 
specifically for Arab settlement. However, Wauchope failed to reconcile the disputing parties. As a 
gesture of goodwill, he agreed to the release of several convicted Arab prisoners and commuted two 
death sentences to life imprisonment. His efforts came to nothing and were made worse by the 
discovery of a cache of concealed weapons, especially since Jews were the prime suspects. The find 
was hailed in a hostile Arab press as evidence that Jews were embarking on a secret large-scale 
armaments programme. Tensions that were building now rapidly escalated.304 
When, on the 15th April 1936, Arab paramilitaries murdered two Jews, Zionist militias swiftly 
retaliated by murdering two Arabs. The funeral of one of the Jews on the 17th April prompted further 
violence against Arabs in Tel Aviv. Two days later, rumours of Jewish atrocities incited Arab 
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insurgents who attacked and murdered three Jews in Jaffa. The Administration mobilised police and 
troops to quell rioters. Tel Aviv and Jaffa were placed under curfew and a state of emergency was 
declared across the entire country.  On the 20th April an Arab National Committee was constituted at 
Nablus. The new Committee declared a general strike intended to continue until Arab demands were 
met. Outside Tel Aviv, smaller towns and villages soon joined the call for strike action. The impetus 
for collective action grew. On the 25th Arab parties established the Arab Higher Committee led by 
Haj Amin El Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem.305 306 The Mufti threatened to wreak the “revenge of God 
Almighty” unless Jewish immigration was terminated forthwith. Enforced by his strong-arm men, his 
call for action widened. Soon, Arab agriculture, businesses, Government and public transport services 
ground to a standstill. Rather than taking punitive action against the instigators, High Commissioner 
Wauchope’s policy of constructive engagement was swiftly rejected. Now, local irregulars were 
joined by hundreds of volunteers from Syria and Iraq and the ferocity of attacks on Jews increased. 
Finally, after months of the crippling effects of armed rebellion on local Arabs, and aware that 20,000 
British troops, soon to be reinforced by 10,000 more, were already stationed in Palestine the Mufti 
was persuaded by neighbouring Arab statesmen to call off the immediate battle. Now, “Severely 
mauled by the British Army”, guerrilla bands returned to their homes leaving behind a toll of some 
1,300 deaths and injuries.307  
Still determined and speaking with one voice (for there was no effective opposition) the Arab 
Higher Committee restated Arab claims. They demanded the complete stoppage of Jewish 
immigration; the prohibition of land transfer to Jews and the establishment of a representative 
Palestine National Government.308 Conversely, the Jewish Agency insisted that the viability of a 
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Jewish state depended on achieving a critical mass of Jewish settlers. Thus, the Royal Commission 
had arrived at a stalemate. It became clear that the Commissioners should focus attention on 
immigration, as this was now viewed as the principal obstacle to a solution.309 
On the 3rd June 1921, Sir Herbert Samuel had defined the term ‘Jewish National Home’ to 
mean that, “within the limits fixed by numbers and the interests of the present population” the Jewish 
Diaspora should be enabled to “found their home”.310 Britain’s June 1922 White Paper referred to “a 
Jewish National Home in Palestine” (own emphasis); a centre for Jewish people assisted by Jews in 
the Diaspora. Samuel’s wording implies that the entire landmass of Palestine could be viewed as a 
Jewish Homeland, albeit also for the benefit of non-Jews. Against that, far from a wholly Jewish 
Palestine, the 1922 White paper stated that Jews were “in Palestine as of right” provided that the 
‘centre’ comprised some as yet undetermined fraction of Palestine. Peel noted the statements, though 
his focus was less on the apparent inconsistency and more on the fact that neither interpretation gave 
“any Jew at any time ... the right to enter the country”.311 
From 1932 onwards, the annual rate of Jewish immigration increased to levels far beyond 
previous years. In 1933 Jews were increasingly marginalised in Nazi Germany, while Polish Jews 
came under intense economic pressure. With the situation rapidly deteriorating and other means of 
escape increasingly rare, Zionists responded to the crisis by stepping up the pace of legal (and illegal) 
immigration.312 
The Royal Commissioners’ acknowledged that Palestine offered Jews an avenue of refuge but 
believed that ameliorative action was constrained by the terms of the British Mandate. They reasoned 
that Palestine’s absorptive capacity was not infinite, but that industrial centres such as the wholly 
Jewish city of Tel Aviv “which had grown in such a spectacular manner” had more to offer. It was a 
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city that had grown out of sand and in four decades had a population of 150,000. It, and other centres, 
would continue to grow as long as immigrants poured in. The Commissioners noted that the Jewish 
community in Palestine at the time numbered 400,000 giving rise to their observation that “[T]he 
Jewish National Home had practically grown into something like a State within a State”.313  
The Royal Commissioners refuted the claim that “economic absorptive capacity” should be 
the one determining factor for immigration. There were social, psychological and other inherent risks 
in applying this as the unique guiding principle as, indeed, “a more serious weakness [lay] in its 
exclusiveness”. Nevertheless, in spite of their earlier caution, the Commission, recommended that for 
five years immigration should be restricted to 12,000 per year “subject [again] to the economic 
absorptive capacity of the country”.314 
The inconsistency of immigration policy is a recurring theme throughout Peel’s four hundred-
page report. Peel argued that while ever-increasing numbers of Jews was anathema to the Arab 
majority, limiting the inward flow was merely palliative and destined to fail. The problem was 
worsened by the fact that impoverished Arabs were obliged to stand by while their Jewish neighbours 
were busily modernising. Palestinian Arabs watched while Jews seemed destined to attain national 
statehood. “The difficulty has always been ... that the existence of a [Jewish] National Home, 
whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment [of the same status as] all other Arabs”.315 
Without drastic measures, the Palestine question was insoluble. Britain’s WWI policy was 
partially responsible. During the Middle East campaign, it was essential to create close ties with allies, 
but close support demanded a quid pro quo. Britain had made peremptory promises to both Jews and 
Arabs and had nurtured irreconcilable expectations.  Britain had accepted its commitments under the 
terms of its Mandate anticipating that, before long, its obligations to both sides would be satisfied. It 
was expected that when Arabs reaped the material benefits of Jewish development then joint 
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cooperation would follow.  However, this earlier confidence that Arabs too would benefit was 
misplaced. Peel writes that Jews were predominantly of European origin while Arabs were chiefly 
Asiatic. The two groups were separated by religion, language, culture and social life. They were “as 
incompatible as their national aspirations”.316  
When, in 1936 the crisis intensified, nationalist Arabs (frequently the “patriotic youth-
movement”) mounted sporadic attacks against their Jewish neighbours and vented their anger against 
a beleaguered British Administration. “[A]s each community [grew] the rivalry between them 
deepen[ed]”. Peel reported that even had Britain “adopted a more rigorous and consistent policy” it 
would only have been a temporary solution.317  
The Royal Commission Review Cantonisation 
The Royal Commissioners accepted that the Arab-Zionist impasse particularly over the issue of 
Jewish immigration was so firmly intrenched as to demand some form of partition. First, they 
examined a system of Cantonisation which, the Commissioners reasoned, had some merit. They 
envisaged a federation of separate Jewish and Arab provinces (cantons). Jewish cantons would 
broadly include areas with the maximum concentration of Jewish people. The remainder would be 
allocated to Arabs. They contemplated that these cantons (whether Jewish or Arab) would be self-
governed and autonomous in matters of health, education, and public works policy. These 
autonomous regions would decide on issues of immigration and land acquisition but matters relating 
to defence, foreign relations, railways and customs duty would be retained at the centre by the 
Mandatory government. The Commissioners reviewed the problems associated with the scheme. 
They felt that disputes would arise over overlapping functions, giving rise to rival claims, and that 
both sides were likely to resent the Mandatory Authority making decisions that were rightfully theirs. 
Also, the positioning of lines of demarcation would involve complex constitutional issues. Finally, 
though broad delineation already existed, the partial intermixing of Jews and Arabs made it 
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impractical to fully separate rival factions into ‘own’ cantons.  Hence these intermixed areas were the 
principal obstacle to Cantonisation. The Commissioners believed that with their widely different 
goals, Jews and Arabs could not coexist in the long term.318 Any practical solution must take account 
of the breakdown in political relations between the three principal players. Zionists would settle for 
nothing less than the freedom to build a sovereign Jewish state with the right to determine their own 
immigration policy. Palestinian Arabs too demanded an independent state and dismissed Zionist 
ambitions. 
Partition is the Royal Commission’s Favoured Option 
 
The Royal Commissioners reasoned that if the problem could not be solved by granting political 
authority to one or other of the two sides over an unwilling minority then “neither [Arabs nor Jews] 
in the end [should] govern Palestine”. However, for all practical purposes, the Commissioners could 
see no reason why “each race should not rule part of it”.319 Severing off Transjordan from historic 
Palestine was “bad enough” but carving up the Holy Land was unacceptable to both sides. In answer, 
while there was clearly no moral value in perpetuating “hatred, strife and bloodshed” it was ethically 
acceptable if, in time, “peace and goodwill” emerged across a political dividing line.320 For the Royal 
Commissioners, Partition was the only feasible option, but unachievable for as long as the existing 
Mandate remained in force. They argued that steps towards the termination of the Mandate were a 
prerequisite for the success of Partition and a new Mandate should be drawn up specifically for the 
protection of the Holy Places. Palestine should be governed under a Treaty arrangement 
corresponding to precedents set in Iraq and Syria. Arabs and Jews would be separated by way of two 
independent sovereign states. To achieve this, the Commissioners adopted what would later be a 
controversial proposal. The Arab section, comprising the South West and eastern portion of 
partitioned Palestine, would be united with Transjordan (East of the River Jordan) which would 
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become a single contiguous Arab state. A varying ten-mile East-West strip of land connecting and 
including Jerusalem to the Mediterranean port of Jaffa would become a British controlled Mandated 
Zone. The remaining land to the north and west of the recommended border between the two new 
states, consisting of approximately 70% of the Mediterranean coastal plain, should be a fully 
independent Jewish state.321 (see Annex 6) The Commissioners’ report included an outline map 
showing new state borders that reflected the approximate Arab/Jewish demography. Wherever it was 
achievable, Arabs and Jews should be separated. Apart from most of the coastal plain, where the 
majority of Jews lived, they were also allocated the northern valleys and all of Galilee which 
comprised approximately 20% of western Palestine.322 Broadly, Jews were to be rewarded with land 
that they had already largely developed or were developing.  Much of this land was potentially fertile, 
with ready access to the Mediterranean. Although Palestinian Arabs were to have less readily 
developable territory, they would have the lion’s share of the total if united with Transjordan. Uriel 
Dann emphasises the importance of understanding Transjordan’s physical disadvantages. Before 
1967, he explains, the country had no mineral resources and barely one tenth of its 40,000 square 
miles was arable.323 Until major improvements could be implemented, conditions in the enlarged 
Transjordan would remain harsh and although, as a result of Partition, while the united entity would 
be denied the cultivable coastal plain, access to shipping routes via the Gulf of Aqaba, overland traffic 
routes to Jaffa and the deep-water port of Haifa would be guaranteed.324 Britain had military and 
commercial interests in the regions so that provision for the maintenance of land, sea, air and other 
assets would be attached to Treaty arrangements. Article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
included provision allowing a state to apply for membership. The Peel Commissioners assumed that 
Britain, as the Mandatory Authority, would undertake to support applications from both new states.  
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Population Exchange as a Last Resort 
The Royal Commissioners left the most difficult questions until last. If it was essential that Jews and 
Arabs should be separated, then simply drawing a border between the two states was not a satisfactory 
solution, as hundreds of thousands of people would find themselves stranded on the wrong side of 
that border. It was unclear how many people would be affected but, in any case, considerably more 
Arabs than Jews would be adversely impacted. Then there was the question of land. The problem for 
Jews presently living in the proposed Arab state was more easily resolved. As they were few, these 
Jews could readily be absorbed alongside their fellow Jews in a Jewish state and land found for their 
speedy resettlement. Jewish landowners in the proposed Arab state would sell their land to the 
Mandatory Authority at a fixed price which, in turn, would sell it on to Arabs. The problem facing 
Arabs left on the Jewish side of the border was more complex.  First, there was the extensive number 
of Arabs involved.  Second, while a small minority of Arabs could occupy the land vacated by Jews, 
the rest would be obliged to relocate to a region (including Transjordan) that was already deeply 
impoverished. Third, like Jewish landowners, Arabs would sell their vacated property to the 
Mandatory Authority leaving thousands of displaced Arabs on barren land incapable of supporting 
whole families.    
The Royal Commissioners cited a case where the exchange of people and land had been 
carried out. A year after the 1922 Greco-Turkish war, 1,300,000 Orthodox Greeks had been uprooted 
from Turkey and compelled to relocate to Greece. Similarly, some 400,000 Moslem Turks had 
relocated from Greece to Turkey. The shift was traumatic and “sharply criticised at the time for [its] 
inhumanity” but was completed inside eighteen months. However, “[t]he ulcer had been clean cut 
out” and calmer relations restored.325  
The above analogy was poor. Northern Greece had surplus cultivable land. Arab Palestine did 
not. To offset the disadvantage for Arabs, Peel proposed, opportunities for developing and irrigating 
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barren land needed to be identified and executed quickly. The essential finance would come from the 
British Exchequer and the Commissioners proposed that, if necessary, population exchange should 
be rigorously enforced.326 
On 20th July 1937 British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain conceded that his Government 
had not been consulted before Peel’s Report was officially handed over. He refuted Liberal MP, Sir 
Geoffrey’s Mander’s assertion that the Royal Commission had exceeded its terms of reference.327 In 
that case, Mander responded, the Prime Minister was apparently unaware that Peel had admitted to 
this accusation.328 While Lord Peel’s unanticipated population-exchange recommendation ultimately 
condemned the entirety of the report, his Commissioners were the first to officially declare the need 
for Partition.   
Ignoring the population-exchange element, the Commissioners’ report offered a credible 
proposal. The Royal Commission’s recommendation for a sovereign Jewish state was tantalising, but 
at just 5000 square kilometres, it fell short of what most Zionists believed was viable. Yet, for the 
first time a Jewish ‘state’ via Partition (unlike the blurred terms of Home or Homeland) was firmly 
implanted into official Government language, given, as Wasserstein argues, that years before Peel, 
Jewish and Arab leaders had already formed separate governances and created, in effect, “internal 
institutional Partition”329  
In an article published on the 16th of July 1937, the Spectator described the unanimity of the 
Royal Commissioners’, “impressive” and the fact that their report had met with the almost universal 
approval of the press may have persuaded the British Government to offer its guarded support. The 
Spectator ventured that although Jews and Arabs expressed considerable reservations, neither had 
rejected the Report in its entirety. Although regretting the necessity, the present inclination shared in 
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many quarters was that Partition was a fait accompli and it was therefore best to reserve criticism for 
the finer details.330 The Spectator article referred back to the years during and just after WWI: The 
then war-time Cabinet might be accused of “having sold the same pup twice”, but despite this, had 
an all-encompassing greater Arab state emerged out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, then the 
Arabs may well have accepted a Jewish state in one relatively tiny quarter. Also, had Britain pursued 
the Balfour pledge to Jews in the very early stages then it is arguable whether Arabs may have 
accepted a Jewish state in just part of Palestine as an irreversible fact. However, twenty years on and 
far from nearing a resolution, events had permitted the Palestine question to become more complex. 
The Spectator article maintained that even if the Royal Commission report signalled “the inevitability 
of partition” it was not yet an accomplished fact and it would be a mistake to underestimate Great 
Britain’s difficulties with its implementation.331 One major concern was Palestine’s strategic 
importance as an accessible maritime nation in the vital Eastern Mediterranean. Another was that 
Palestinian Arabs were troubled that while neighbouring countries had fulfilled or were about to fulfil 
their destinies, theirs was in doubt since “nowhere was the spirit of [independence] more acute after 
[WWI] than in … Middle East”.332 A case in point was Syria, with whom Palestinians and Syrians 
had a longstanding connection.  Events in either Palestine or Syria affected the other.333 From the 
beginning, Syrian nationalists had rejected the idea of mandatory governance and refuted Britain’s 
claim that Palestine was not part of a wider-Syria. By 1925, France had yielded in the face of fierce 
Arab opposition and divided Syria into nominally Arab administered, self-governing, entities 
(including Lebanon), prepared to join their Palestinian kinsmen during a general strike in 1925. Three 
years before, in 1922, a treaty of alliance between the British and Iraqi Governments replaced the 
British Mandate so that by 1925 an Arab constitutional monarchy became another Arab independent 
member of the international community.334 Again, intensifying Palestinian nationalism seemed bound 
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to change the political status of Transjordan. Transjordan was an extension of the Palestine Mandate 
and although subject to the advisory rule of Britain, it was recognised as the independent country of 
Transjordan in 1923. It seemed apparent to Palestinian Arabs that their East Bank neighbours had 
been singled out for special treatment. Transjordan had gained independence despite being poorer, 
grossly underdeveloped, and with only a third of Palestine’s population. In 1922 Winston Churchill 
(Secretary of State for the Colonies), while accepting that Palestinians were as “advanced” as their 
Transjordanian neighbours, excused the lack of progress towards independence because “the creation 
at this stage of a [Palestinian] national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made 
by the British Government to the Jewish people”.335 Palestine’s situation was unique. Its mandate was 
dissimilar to others in that both the Balfour Declaration and Britain’s Mandate for Palestine contained 
an irreconcilable pledge to two conflicting parties under the terms of the “dual obligation”; a pledge 
that was “wholly untenable”.336  
Before WWII, in the heyday of the British Empire, Great Britain had willingly subjugated its 
Dominions and the prevailing mood was that competing claims should be resolved in favour of “the 
tillers of soil”.337 Undeniably, Arabs laboured on the land; nonetheless the Royal Commission 
conceded that, though in a minority, Jews too were increasingly engaged in cultivating the land. The 
Spectator article also argued that the Commissioners had failed to grasp the full extent of the personal 
situation of German Jews or 3,000,000 Polish Jews, whose personal predicament was equally bad but 
whose economic conditions were worse. Until now, the Spectator article continues, it is “the unhappy 
fate of the Jewish migration to Palestine to palliate one tiny fraction of an immense problem by 
creating another problem, perhaps less extensive, but certainly not less insoluble”.338 Like the Jewish 
Agency, Arabs too objected to features of Peel’s report. The Spectator maintained that unlike the 
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Arab argument, the Jewish case had all the advantages of financial support and commendable 
marshalling of the world press, but it was unwise to assume that the principle of ‘les absents ont 
toujours tort’ should undermine Arab concerns.339 
Now, facing the possibility of war, Britain was reconsidering its options. This, coupled with 
the strategic value of Middle East alliances, meant that Britain’s seeming initial endorsement of 
Partition was temporarily relegated. It was essential for Zionist leaders to draft a response to Peel’s 
report before the opportunity was lost. 
Round Table Conference 
On the 7th of February 1937 Britain’s Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, assembled a Round Table 
conference in London. Zionists were becoming increasingly isolated and the messages coming from 
London did nothing to soothe their unease. It was no secret that Hitler and Mussolini supported the 
Arab cause. Mussolini believed that a Jewish Palestine would become another Malta or Gibraltar, 
simply outposts of the British Empire. The United States and France did not exhibit any immediate 
concern for Jews nor did the Soviet Union as its sympathies lay with Arabs. “Zionism”, Laqueur 
maintains, “was thus totally isolated, completely dependent on British goodwill”. A message from 
German Jewry reached London; “it is a question of life or death [and] inconceivable that Britain will 
sacrifice the German Jews”. The appeal had little impact. Still, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann saw 
London as an opportunity for direct talks with Arab leaders. Both refused to believe that, whatever 
happened, Britain would turn its back on the Zionist cause. Ben-Gurion predicted “two historically 
inevitable processes”; an Arab federation or alternatively, a Jewish state. Nonetheless, Jewish 
immigration was always a prerequisite before negotiations.340 
The tenor of the Round Table talks focused on the shifting circumstances in the lead up to 
war. In a fraught atmosphere, the Jewish delegation repeatedly stressed that Britain could rely on 
Jewish over Arab support in any military endeavour. British representatives were unimpressed. They 
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reasoned that on balance, the Arab revolt posed a greater strategic threat than any advantage likely to 
be gained from Jewish involvement. British representatives were unmoved by “veiled threats” of 
Jewish retaliation if illegal immigrants were refused entry into Palestine. Malcolm MacDonald 
(Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) cautioned that Jewish non-cooperation could lead to Britain 
turning its back and leaving Jews to their fate.341 The Conference closed on the 17th March.  London 
was a failure. This about turn in British attitudes was, Laqueur contends, “an unmitigated disaster”; 
“a death sentence” for Jews according to Weizmann.342 
Zionists Grapple with the Problem 
Just before Peel’s report was published in July 1937, an entire cross-section of Eretz Israel and the 
Diaspora were engulfed in a “swirling” debate. The “Great Pulmus” in 1937 created “a schism 
between and within the political parties, academics, teachers, writers and rabbis” and prompted 
“unprecedented ideological soul-searching and practical deliberations”.343 The schism pitted those 
who were strongly opposed to the Royal Commission’s Partition Plan against others who contended 
that it was a step in the right direction. A stubborn minority insisted that all of Eretz Israel was 
rightfully Jewish. Others argued that a plan was better than no plan and if Zionists rejected it, then 
Britain may decide that Partition was a step too far and impose a unitary state. Strong proponents of 
the Royal Commission’s plan argued that it was a springboard; a small foothold offering the prospect 
of an immediate sanctuary to thousands of distressed European Jews. Then, Galnoor maintains, there 
was an “undecided” group whose support was conditional on several preconditions. There was the 
question of size. The state had to be large enough to guarantee its economic viability. Then, whatever 
its size, came the question of security. State borders must have adequate defences against attack. 
Furthermore, the ‘undecided’ needed reassurance on their non-negotiable principle of immigration. 
Jews and Arabs could live together, but only on the condition that Jews were in a majority. Others 
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were concerned about the probable negative Arab reactions to Peel’s plan. Peace was paramount but 
future Jewish/Arab relations depended on peaceful coexistence. Pragmatists offered qualified support 
and reasoned that although the Plan was deficient in some key areas, it opened the door to a future 
Jewish state.344 Again, there was unease that an ill-considered or unduly delayed response would 
result in a British about-turn on its pledge to Jews. The Great Pulmus of 1937 had no obvious impact 
on Britain’s Palestine policy, but it did expose the spiritual and political cracks running through 
worldwide Jewry.  
20th Zionist Congress 
Time was running out when on the 4th of August 1937 the 20th Zionist Congress assembled to decide 
on the next move. Zionist leaders needed to formally respond to the Royal Commission’s report. 
David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann led the debate. Of the two, Weizmann was the pragmatic 
Zionist. An independent Jewish Homeland, Galnoor notes, “stood at the centre of [his] spiritual and 
practical world”. Ben-Gurion was socialist in practice and Zionist at heart. Whenever heart and head 
conflicted, his sense of Zionism fused with Weizmann’s pragmatic Zionism so that together, they 
were heavily influential and instrumental in the decision-making process.345 
Weizmann rose to speak. He announced that the Royal Commission had made a 
“revolutionary proposal”; a recommendation favouring Partition; a Jewish state in Eretz-Yisrael. 
Weizmann put the alternatives directly. There were just two options: either to accept a sovereign 
Jewish state in one small region or to remain a permanent minority within a majority Arab Palestine. 
For practical Weizmann, if the strong or more moderate opponents persuaded those who were 
wavering or undecided to rebuff the Commissioners proposal, then a golden opportunity would be 
lost.  There was impasse, but Weizmann was a shrewd political operator. A temporary respite was 
called for. Rather than accept defeat, he proposed that Congress empower a Directorate to open 
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negotiations with British officials.346 For Weizmann there were unchallengeable issues. First, the 
inviolability of a Jewish statehood (often couched in the vague rubric of ‘Jewish home’) and second, 
the state must have the right to determine its own policy on immigration. On the first, Weizmann 
recalled a biblical prophecy he had previously quoted to members of the Royal Commission: “God”, 
he urged, “promised Eretz-Yisrael to the Jews”. When questioned about Jewish immigration he had 
responded that in his opinion, just two million out of the total seven-million European Jews should 
be free to immigrate to Palestine and that this two million should comprise of young people. The 
aged, he said, “... have already become dust, economic and moral dust in this cruel world” and that, 
he understood, accorded with Jewish tradition.347 
By a nearly two thirds majority, the 20th Zionist Congress supported Partition in principle and 
rejected the Royal Commissioners’ hypothesis that the national aspirations of Jews and Arabs were 
irreconcilable. The Zionists declared their readiness to conduct joint talks. In the meantime, the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations spelled disaster for Arabs and they roundly rejected Partition. For 
them, the prospect of further Jewish immigration into a Jewish state, even in one in a small corner of 
Palestine, was an abomination and a population exchange involving swathes of Arabs against a trickle 
of Jews was unthinkable.   
Galnoor argues that by adopting the “all-or-nothing approach”, Arabs ignored the political 
reality. They had a choice between either a practical compromise or continued British subjugation. 
Insisting on an all-Arab Palestine meant that in the “long term all of Palestine was lost”. Moreover, 
Galnoor contends, their rejection of Partition as the only practical option left Arab Palestinians even 
more resistant to the prospect when it was offered ten years later in 1947.348 The Palestinian problem 
was now “irretrievably insinuated ... into the intricate, and ultimately devastating, web of pan-Arab 
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politics”.349 “Of all the dangerous places”, Gerald Isaacs350 declared, “in which to set up an 
unsupported, inexperienced State, I wonder whether at the present moment you could find a more 
perilous spot than the eastern end of the Mediterranean”.351 
While many Zionists rejected the Royal Commission’s Partition scheme the Zionist Executive 
was authorised to open negotiations with the British Government. Peel’s tantalising proposal had 
helped ally most diehard proponents and opponents of Partition. While there was near-unanimity 
among Zionists over the fundamental right for Jews to immigrate into a future Jewish state, questions 
remained as to its size and precise boundaries. Balfour, the Mandate and, in 1937, Peel had persuaded 
Zionists that independence was foreseeable. From here on, Zionist leaders were sufficiently assured 
not to react in haste, but to return to the negotiating table with their own set of proposals.  Ben-Dror 
maintains that the significance of Peel’s plan lies less in its minutiae, but rather that the concept of 
Partition had been flagged as an option.352 
In June 1937 Weizmann had met with a group of sympathetic British politicians, telling them 
that he was minded to consider Partition provided it included provision for between 50,000 and 
60,000 Jewish immigrants per year. Winston Churchill reacted strongly against Weizmann’s 
proposition. “Your [envisaged Jewish] state is a mirage [but, when fascism is defeated] your time 
will come”.  Arabs, Churchill warned, would “revert to provocation by shooting and bombing and 
eventually blaming [Jews] for sparking a bloody war”. Churchill also conceded that Arabs would not 
be discouraged, given Britain’s “disastrously weak government”.353 Now HM Government reverted 
to type. While prevaricating over the recommendations of one Commission, it bought time by 
commissioning a second. Thus, in September 1937, HM Government informed the League of Nations 
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Council that it had decided to send in another Commission with instructions to examine and report 
back with its recommendations.  
The Palestine Partition Commission (Woodhead Commission)354 
In the first half of 1938, violence seemed never-ending; intimidation and murder were commonplace. 
Hundreds of police, British personnel and many civilians were killed or injured. Distressed by the 
violence, the sensitive and impressionable General Sir Arthur Wauchope, who assumed that Arab and 
Jewish communities were fundamentally compatible, was induced by Colonial Secretary William 
Ormsby-Gore to resign. He was replaced on the 3rd March 1938 by the aloof and independent minded, 
Sir Harold MacMichael. The new High Commissioner moved to suppress the Arab revolt and pursue 
“harsh implementation of the White Paper” with, Kolinsky maintains, “inflexible disregard of the 
human consequences”. Yet, at the end of his tenure in July 1944, MacMichael too “advocated 
partition as a means of reducing the impact of Jewish immigration … on Arab opinion”.355        
By the time the Woodhead Commission arrived in Palestine, more than a year had passed 
since the publication of the Royal Commission’s report. Now, Arabs adopted a policy of non-co-
operation and refused to submit to formal questioning.356 Distancing itself from the Royal 
Commission and clearly implying the need for Partition, the Palestine Partition Commission 
(Woodhead Commission) concluded that based on available evidence it was clear that there was no 
appetite from either of the two parties and even less support from rural communities for an exchange 
of land; Jewish to Arab land or Arab to Jewish. Woodhead wrote that “[W]e have found it impossible 
to assume that the minority problem will be solved by the voluntary transfer of population”.357  
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Woodhead referred specifically to the compulsory element in Peel’s Arab relocation proposal 
and noted that in his dispatch of the 23rd December 1937, Lord Harlech358 reaffirmed HM 
Government’s rejection of Peel’s proposal for compulsory transfer policy. Harlech found “it 
impossible to assume that the minority problem will be solved [in that manner]”.359 Further, it was 
impossible to devise state boundaries so “as to include no Arabs at all in the Jewish State”. It was 
inconceivable that neither Peel nor HM Government had regarded the latter other than as a “fateful 
objection to any partition scheme”. Woodhead feared that, post-Partition, Arabs would have been 
fated to minority status in an immigration-swollen Jewish state and the morality of subjecting Arabs 
to Jewish political domination was questionable. Mass Jewish immigration, Woodhead argued, would 
make matters worse.360 
Zionists too rejected the need for population exchange but were encouraged that while a 
Jewish state lay somewhere in the near future, precise state boundaries were less clear cut. Zionist 
leaders argued that in the previous year, Peel’s Partition plan had made for an unsatisfactorily 
bordered state with little scope for planned future Jewish immigration. The Jewish Agency proposed 
an alternative. It proposed a state extending over most of the Northern Region, bounded in the north 
by Lebanon and Syria and to the west and east by the Mediterranean and the River Jordan 
respectively. Towards the north-east the new state would extend east across the River Jordan taking 
in a narrow north/south strip of Transjordan. Other than providing a narrow east/west access corridor 
from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and Jaffa, the Jewish state would gain the northern and coastal region 
stretching from Lebanon’s southern border south to within approximately twenty kilometres of Gaza 
City. Where the Royal Commission had proposed a wide Mandatory-controlled strip from Jerusalem 
to the Mediterranean, the Jewish Agency proposed to narrow the width to the benefit of the Jewish 
state. The Agency proposed that the Arab state should consist of a near-horizontal elliptical shape 
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(100km x 70Km) incorporating approximately 50km of the Mediterranean coastline and Gaza. Also, 
the Arab state would extend south to Beersheba with the West Bank and the Negev remaining under 
Mandatory authority. The Jewish plan broadly followed the pattern of existing Jewish settlements but 
enlarged to accommodate new immigrants and indigenous non-Jews. For its part, the Woodhead 
Commission contended that state size and levels of Jewish settlement were questions of degree; the 
degree to which they might be acceptable to both parties. Woodhead’s Commissioners explored three 
possible alternatives: Plan A (Appendix 7) was somewhat similar to the Jewish plan, but with 
important differences. First, there was no question of incursion into Transjordan. Secondly, most of 
the land that the Jewish Agency had proposed should remain under the authority of the Mandatory 
Authority (including the Negev) would instead become part of Arab-Palestine. Thirdly, and most 
contentiously, the Jewish state would be divided north and south (a tiny proportion of the whole) by 
a Jerusalem enclave (Mandated territory) 10km wide south of Tel Aviv but widening considerably 
up to and surrounding Jerusalem.  Although a fair proportion of the land allocated to Palestinian Arabs 
was relatively infertile, except for a small region around Tel Aviv, their state would be contiguous 
and at least twice the size of the Jewish state. Although Jews were allocated naturally fertile coastal 
regions and areas that they had helped cultivate, the restricted area on offer was wholly insufficient 
to satisfy Zionist demands.361 The Commissioners’ second alternative (Plan B - Annex 8) was like 
the first but offered less capacity for Jewish settlement; approximately a quarter (Galilee) would be 
mandated territory.  The region allocated to Arabs remained relatively unaffected.362 
The most radical proposal was the division of Palestine under Plan C (Annex 9).363 Under this 
Plan, the Jewish state would be restricted to a relatively tiny part of the coastal plain. Galilee and the 
northern territory would be classified as the Northern Mandated Territory. The boundaries of the 
northern section of the Arab state would remain relatively unaffected and, as before, the southern area 
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(including the Negev) would become part of an Arab state. Questions arose on issues surrounding 
freedom of movement between and across the partitioned states: on administrative, educational, 
economic, employment and the critical matters of immigration and security. In the case of security, 
it was essential that this tiny would-be Jewish state, fronted by sea and surrounded by potential 
enemies, could defend itself. The military authorities impressed on the Commission the difficulty of 
positioning defensible borders west of the River other than one providing minimal protection from 
small arms fire. Unless the opposing sides chose peace, then the strategic border issue of this plan 
cast serious doubts over the advisability of Partition itself.364 Still, Plan C, was, according to the 
Commissioners, “the best plan of partition which [they had] been able to devise”.365 Plan C was a 
reduced version of “the plan outlined by the Royal Commission [which was already] open to the 
objection that the area of the Jewish State is too small” 366 for “large numbers of Jews … facing ruin 
in eastern and Central Europe”.367 
Although Woodhead’s report signalled rejection of the Royal Commission’s Partition plan, 
its commissioners failed to agree on any one alternative plan. One of the four argued that Partition 
was impractical.368 The chairman and one other recommended reducing the size of the Jewish state 
and limiting its degree of sovereignty. A fourth disagreed and proposed its enlargement.369 However, 
the four unanimously rejected population transfer. Both Commissions had, in their separate ways, 
highlighted advantages and exposed the disadvantages of various forms of Partition. Nevertheless, 
the drive towards a two-state solution was accelerating.   
It is instructive here to outline Commissioner Thomas Reid’s370 balanced argument for and 
against Jewish immigration and what drew him to his independent conclusion.371 Thomas Reid was  
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opposed to Partition and though he confined his observations to Plan C, most, if not all his criticisms 
also applied to Plans A and B: The Woodhead Commission was directed to devise an equitable plan 
so that the minimum number of Jews would occupy Arab lands and vice versa. Plan C limited the 
Jewish state to a parcel of land on the Coastal Plain (around 300,000 acres “about as large as an 
English county”372) which, according to the Commissioners, was “the least objectionable”. The 
quandary was that in Plan C, while Arabs would comprise just 20% of the population of the proposed 
Jewish state, they would have owned a substantial 65% of the land.373 
Reid turned to the matter of consent.374 In July 1937, a British Government Statement of 
Policy included a statement that a scheme of Partition should secure “an effective measure of consent 
on the part of the communities concerned”.375 No universal consent was forthcoming from the Jewish 
community, and Palestinian Arabs had resorted to violence. Jews were unwilling to accept a plan 
unless it assigned an area at least on par with that proposed by the Royal Commission. “The 
Arab/Jewish divide was unbridgeable, thus, without consent”, Reid argued, Partition was 
impracticable.376 Just a single Arab witness suggested that in the long term most Arabs would consent 
to live peacefully in a partitioned Palestine. Without exception, the rest were opposed. One witness 
said that any attempt to impose Partition against the will of the majority would result in a major 
upsurge of violence. Others agreed, with one insisting that Arabs would refuse to accept a fait 
accompli and that “opposition will become more serious … a disaster” for Jews.377 Under Plan C, the 
Northern Territory was to remain under the Mandatory Authority with controlled levels of 
immigration.  Reid argued that although there was a clause that required Arab consent for Jewish 
immigration, Arabs feared that Jewish immigrants would ignore the ruling and gradually comprise a 
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majority. Similar concerns applied to the Southern Territory, though it was less likely given that the 
population of this area was largely Arab.378  
Arab suspicions were well founded. Increasing Jewish immigration stimulated the demand for 
land.  Limited supply and increasing demand resulted in soaring land prices. Some Arab families who 
had scraped a living for generations, parted with their land despite a risk of Arab reprisals. Moreover, 
future land sales would be financed from Jewish National funds and distributed under leasing 
arrangements; Jewish lessees were forbidden to rent to or even employ, non-Jews. Similarly, non-
agricultural Jewish employers were actively discouraged from employing Arab labour.379 New 
territorial borders presented anomalies. For example, hill families would be banned from 
supplementing their earnings during peak harvest seasons and families living on one side of the border 
could be separated from their land, which remained on the other. Jewish leaders claimed that their 
state would be non-discriminatory, yet Jewish labour policy favoured Jewish employees over Arab. 
The “system of Jewish economic penetration” Reid predicted, would inevitably lead to a climate of 
communal ill-will.380 Witnesses warned that the ill-will that some Arabs held against Jews would 
infect neighbouring Arab countries. If levels of violence escalated, then the police and military would 
be obliged to protect the borders of any new Jewish state. The costs involved in crushing resistance 
would be high; in lives, resources and in the loss to British reputation. Reid argued that the League 
of Nations, the British Government and the British people would quickly realise that the price was 
too high for what was, after all, a “defective partition plan”.381 Although Reid judged “Plan C [to be] 
the least objectionable that can be devised under our terms of reference”, he nevertheless urged 
against it claiming that “Immigration is one thing [but] immigration [that gives rise to] periodical 
additions to the Jewish State is quite another”.382 To Reid, Partition was an issue because he believed 
that it was unworkable. Although he appears to accept the inevitability of Jewish immigration, his 
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main concern was on the question of its scale. Nevertheless, by the time Reid and his fellow 
Commissioners left Palestine, it was evident that the Zionist leadership would settle for nothing less 
than a sovereign Jewish state. However, under the Commission’s latest Partition Plan, the availability 
of land for Jews would soon be overwhelmed by demand. Jews would be condemned to immigrate 
into and build a Jewish state in a tiny enclave in an already small and impoverished Palestine. 
When, on the 11th of November 1938, HM Government convened to consider Woodhead’s 
report, it concluded that “the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the 
proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution 
of the problem is impracticable”.383 Britain’s endeavours to establish a Jewish state, whether by 
Woodhead’s solution or another, were coming to an end. Nevertheless, Partition had been raised again 
as a preferred option. Before finally rejecting Peel’s recommendations on Partition, which had already 
been deemed impractical by Woodhead, and recognising the strategic war-time value of the Middle 
East, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stated that in his view it was more advantageous to “offend 
Jews rather than the Arabs”.384  
From 1933 when Hitler was elected Reich Chancellor, he was doggedly determined to rid the 
Reich of its Jewish population. Between 1933 and 1938, 150,000 Jews had fled persecution although 
worse was to come. Before the doors were finally shut, between November 1938 and September 
1939, Britain rescued some 10,000 Jewish children from Nazi Germany, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.385 Many of the parents were left to their fate and in the few remaining years before 
the outbreak of WWII, the situation for European Jewry swiftly deteriorated. Matters moved from 
bad to worse following the Nazi annexation of Austria on 12th March 1938 and worse still, from 9th 
to the 10th of November during Kristallnacht386 when 267 synagogues were destroyed, 91 Jews killed 
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and 30,000 incarcerated in concentration camps.387 Britain’s chargé d'affaires in Berlin reported to 
London that the latest persecution was “on a scale and of a severity unprecedented in modern 
times”.388 Months later, 30th July 1939, Chamberlain wrote to his sister, Hilda. Before speculating 
about Hitler’s sanity, he provides an insight into his personal sentiments: He wrote: “I believe that 
the persecution arose out of two motives, a desire to rob Jews of their money and a jealousy of their 
superior cleverness. No doubt Jews aren’t a loving people; I don’t care about them myself; but that 
is not sufficient to explain [Kristallnacht]”.389 Now, as their situation became more despairing, Jews 
pleaded for a way out.   
Evian-les-Bain Conference 
With the pressure mounting, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a conference (FDR’s 
“grand gesture”). This was a move supported half-heartedly in Washington (the US sent a lower-
level representative), but one applauded by FDR’s Jewish constituency; “splendid” wrote Herbert H. 
Lehman (New York Governor) – “I wish I could do more”, replied Roosevelt.  Accordingly, on the 
6th July 1938, representatives from thirty-two countries accompanied by scores of observers and 
journalists, gathered at the Hotel Royal in Evian-les-Bain.390 Wells claims that many participating 
nations were less than enthusiastic over the prospect of being drawn in and attended only out of 
respect for Roosevelt. FDR assured delegates that whatever assistance they gave would have no long-
term implications on their internal immigration policy arrangements and that any operation would be 
privately funded.391 The British Government was reluctant to attend for fear that it would open the 
debate over its own Palestine immigration policy. Therefore, Wells proposes, the HM Government 
needed persuasion. The nudge came from FDR who reassured Whitehall that Palestine was not on 
the agenda and that the debate would not stray beyond the bounds of German and Austrian Jews.392 
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Berenbaum maintains that Roosevelt agreed to the latter because he was anxious to avoid upsetting 
Britain, one of his closest political allies.393 FDR’s intervention was potentially crucial. Where, he 
asked, were many thousands of European Jews to be safely resettled? His own country, like many 
others, was still suffering in the aftermath of the great depression. He was conflicted on two fronts. 
Detractors were concerned that a sudden influx of thousands of immigrants would disturb America’s 
post-depression recovery. Other argued that the problem facing European Jews was so extreme that 
America must do more.394 
One after another, delegates rose to express sympathetic platitudes, but little of concrete value. 
The United States representative spoke in nonfigurative terms about “political refugees”; Australia 
had no “racial problem and [did not] want to import one”; Canada was struggling with the Depression 
and therefore “none” the delegate stated, “was too many”. The Columbian delegate was dismayed 
that Christian civilisation could “lead to this terrible tragedy” but offered nothing of substance and 
Venezuela could not disturb its “demographic equilibrium”. While Holland and Denmark opened 
their doors to a few escapees, the British delegate claimed that Britain was too small to take more.395 
The French delegate declared that France had reached saturation point and was closing its borders. It 
was not, according to a Foreign Ministry memorandum, “in France’s interest to appear as a refuge 
[for] all misfits and ... everyone Germany considers its natural enemy”.396 The one notable exception 
was the Dominican Republic’s compassionate offer of sanctuary to 100,000, though there were few 
takers. The German Foreign Office sneered “Since in many countries it was recently regarded as 
wholly incomprehensible why Germany did not want to preserve ... an element like the Jews ... it 
appears astounding that countries seem in no way anxious to make use of these elements themselves 
now that the opportunity offers”. Now that its policy of forced emigration had failed, Nazi Germany 
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soon adopted an alternative solution. Plainly, Berenbaum confirms, “no one wanted the Jews”.397 By 
the time Evian ended nine days later (15th July 1938), Britain’s Jewish immigration policy had finally 
crystallized. Earl Winterton398 stated that it was unrealistic to expect that the solution lay in 
unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine. The country itself was, he said, too small. In addition, 
the present unrest and the dual obligations prescribed in the Mandate made “such a proposition … 
wholly untenable”.399 It was a clear signal that Britain intended to deprive thousands of European 
Jews one of their last means of survival.400 Further, in May 1939, the Secretary of State cloaked 
Britain’s anti-Jewish immigration policy in the guise of Article VI of the Mandate, necessary to 
protect the “rights and privileges [of non-Jews]”. 
Now the HM Government was caught in a dilemma. Balfour and the Palestine Mandate were 
written pledges that Britain would facilitate a Jewish Homeland. However, in the charged atmosphere 
of pre-war Europe and the imminent requirement to reinforce Middle East alliances that might turn 
out to be strategically important, the Balfour promise had to wait. Meanwhile, in Europe anti-
Semitism was endemic. Some more fortunate or wealthy Jews were able to pay or bribe their way to 
join family or friends in America or Britain while others made it to temporary sanctuary elsewhere. 
Tens of thousands journeyed to Palestine, either illegally or through half-open legal channels, while 
British forces struggled to stem the flow. The Jewish population of Palestine burgeoned so that by 
1939 it comprised approximately one third of the total. Arab/Jewish tensions mounted, but neither 
side gave way.401 Whether Britain liked it or not, partition was unavoidable. 
 
 
397 Berenbaum, M. (2000, 50) The World Must Know 
398 In May 1937 Winterton was appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster before being promoted to the Cabinet by Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlin in March 1938.  Winterton led the British delegation at Evian. 
399 Defries, H. (2001, 163) Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews, (1900-1950) 
400 It should be noted that while Britain refused to amend its Palestine immigration policy, Britain’s own internal Jewish immigration policy was relaxed 
so as to allow thousands of victims of the Nazi purges to find refuge in Britain. They were saved through the efforts of Foreign Secretary, Samuel 
Hoare, and, most particularly, Neville Chamberlain. (for extensive detail see London, Louise (2000) Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British 
Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust. 
401 The figures used here are drawn from the UK Parliamentary White Paper of 1939 although UNSCOP estimated that around 84,000 Jews had settled 
in Palestine by 1922 rising to nearly 400,000 by 1937. From 1933 to 1935 – the first years of the Nazi purges – it is estimated that 135,000 Jewish 
people escaped to Palestine. 
 
92 
 
‘An act of perfidy’: The White Paper of May 1939 
The approaching war in Europe and the 1936-1939 Arab revolt had a profound effect on British policy 
in 1939. By the time Chamberlain had negotiated the Munich Pact with Hitler in September 1938 
(described by Churchill as a “total and unmitigated disaster”402), “civil government had virtually 
collapsed in Palestine”.403 Sachar argues that the Arab revolt had an unforeseen impact on the Arabs 
themselves. Jewish labour had supplanted cheaper Arab labour and markets now sold Jewish rather 
than Arab produce. The most crippling impact of the revolt was on local Arabs, and even the Arab 
middle classes were nearing the limits of their resources. While “the cost to the Arabs themselves 
became increasing punitive”, ironically, the revolt stimulated the Jewish economy.404  
 On the 26th September 1937, Arab rebels delivered another long-term disservice to their cause 
by murdering the District Commissioner of Galilee and Acre Lewis Y. Andrews and his 
accompanying police constable. Four days later, the Mandatory Government imposed “the most 
stringent emergency regulations in its history [with widest powers to deport] undesirables [and 
dissolve organisations] inimical to the Mandate”.405 The Arab Higher Committee was abolished. 
Five of its members were exiled to the Seychelles but the Mufti escaped the police cordon and made 
his way to Lebanon. Still, there was no let-up in the violence. Shootings and bombings continued, 
troop trains were derailed, and an oil pipeline from Mosul to Haifa was seriously damaged. Britain 
responded by dispatching additional army battalions and two RAF squadrons. Life sentences were 
commonplace and, in 1938 alone, fifty-four Arab insurgents were hanged. Hundreds of what 
remained of the functioning Arab leadership were either murdered or had fled in terror.406  
As the Palestinian Arabs’ ability to wage war against Jews was steadily eroding, the Haganah 
adapted its tactics to suit the extremes of full-scale conflict. The Haganah, first created as a self-
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defence force in 1920, grew to be an effective fighting force as increasing numbers of the able-bodied 
youth of the Yishuv were mobilised.407 By 1936, significant funds were directed towards military 
training and purchasing illegal weapons. Youth commanders were trained to “anticipate Arab 
marauders by striking first”. Now, with tacit British support, light weapons were distributed to 
“uniformed Jewish auxiliary guards” who carried out scores of ambushes and inflicted heavy 
casualties on Mufti rebels, keeping them “off guard and increasingly ineffective”.408 “20,000 British 
troops struggled to stem the revolt” until it finally petered out in 1939.409    
The Arab revolt had permanently transformed the Hagenah into an active military force. The 
near nonexistence of effective Palestinian-Arab leadership obliged their citizens to suffer the 
unavoidable economic, political and military costs. “Egypt and Lebanon were crowded with nearly 
18,000 fugitives of terror”,410 providing an opportunity for the Haganah to take the advantage. 
Christopher Sykes too argues that Palestinian Arabs suffered the long-term political consequences of 
the Arab revolt. The Mufti, their “one really vigorous leader” escaped, and in November 1941 made 
his way to Berlin and was soon collaborating with Hitler.411 Not a single Palestinian representative 
attended the inaugural meetings of the Arab League.412 This state of affairs continued beyond the end 
of WWII, when Palestinian Arabs most needed strong leadership. Sykes writes of an “odd paradox”: 
while Arab states outside Palestine were united over the Palestinian-Arab cause, “nationalists within 
Palestine were so disunited that no possibility of a strong Arab leadership in Jerusalem now 
remained”.413 Moreover, as the Jewish population in Palestine had soared from 174,606 in 1931 to 
474,102 ten years later, on any measure, the Arab revolt had failed to achieve its prime objective.414     
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Yet, despite the Arab revolt and against the background of probable war, Britain was about to 
readapt its wider Middle East policy and look beyond the recent Arab revolt. Ovendale argues that it 
was vital for Britain to re-establish friendly relations with the Arab world so as to maintain oil supplies 
and Near and Far East communication channels. It was clear that cessation of Jewish immigration 
was essential to soothe Arab concerns and draw Britain and the Middle East into closer alignment. 
PM Neville Chamberlain and Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, agreed that “benevolent 
neutrality” was essential in any coming war and that if either one or the other had to be marginalised 
then it was “preferable to offend Jews rather than the Arabs”. Chamberlain held that “in the [event 
of] war it was essential to keep control of Egypt and the Middle East … to bring about a complete 
appeasement of Arab opinion in Palestine and in neighbouring countries”.415 Similarly, Tessler 
confirms that with WWII just around the corner, “Britain had a strong interest in placating the Arabs 
of Palestine … and leaders of Arab states”.416  
The question of Palestine was debated in the House of Commons on the 22nd and 23rd May 
1939, to end the confusion and pave the way to the termination of the Palestine Mandate.417 The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (Malcolm MacDonald) pronounced that the Palestine Mandate 
should not be interpreted to imply that HM Government intended to allow unrestricted immigration 
for all the time and in all circumstances; nor, he stated, should immigration continue indefinitely. In 
a statement British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain sought to clarify the term “a national home 
for the Jewish people”. The extract, he contended, did not suggest that there should be a separate 
Jewish ‘state’ rather there should be “a [Jewish] home ... founded in Palestine” (own emphasis). Nor, 
he continued, did his Government accept Arab contentions that in 1915 Britain had undertaken “to 
recognise and support Arab independence”. His Government regretted “the misunderstandings which 
have arisen as regards some of the phrases used”. Instead it was decided that following a ten-year 
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transition period, Palestine should be independent, vis a vis “[a unitary state] one in which Arabs 
and Jews share government in such a way as to ensure [that] the essential interests of each community 
are safeguarded” with a proportionally representative government.418 
The 1939 White Paper echoed HM Government’s 1922 Command Paper: that Jewish 
immigration should not exceed the “economic capacity of the country”. It is unclear whether the 
‘economic capacity’ was a calculated figure based on a formula, or merely speculative. Nevertheless, 
according to the White Paper, ‘economic capacity’ was not the only limiting factor. Palestinian Arabs 
were fearful of Jewish domination, so that any increase whatsoever could bring about “a fatal enmity 
between the two peoples”.419 Evidently, concern about the latter assumed priority over “the present 
unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek refuge from certain European countries”.420 This 
near closed-door policy effectively blocked the one means of escape. Just 25,000, out of the hundreds 
of thousands of Jews who might have migrated to Palestine would be granted legal entitlement to 
leave immediately provided that their maintenance was guaranteed. They would be followed by 
10,000 each year for the next five years and thereafter, an Arab Authority would decide.421 
Britain was required to grapple with the dual issues of Jewish immigration and its attendant 
land settlement policy. If the Jewish population continued to increase then, so too would the demand 
for land. The Government responded by restricting the pace of land transfer from Arabs to Jews for 
fear it would materially alter the land ownership balance and significantly increase tensions.  Land 
transfer deals, the White Paper argument continued, would deprive Arabs of cultivable acreage and 
add to the problem of Arab landlessness. Britain’s territorial policy was adopted under the Transfer 
Regulations of 1940; that Palestine was to be divided into Zones. In Zones A and B, together 
comprising 95% of the land, sales were either prohibited or heavily restricted and transfers that did 
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take place would be subject to Administrative approval. Jews were permitted to purchase land in the 
remaining 5%; land chiefly on the coastal plain, with a relatively small acreage around Jerusalem.422 
Arguably, Britain’s land-transfer decision was a self-interested compromise. While land sales were 
practically brought to a standstill to comply with Arab demands, it also minimally fulfilled the Balfour 
pledge of a Jewish Home/State. It was a cynical attempt to extricate Britain from its dilemma. The 
Jewish Home (would-be State) on offer was tiny, but one built on prime land; productive land on the 
coastal plain; land with Jewish farms, factories and shared infrastructure. Eight years later members 
of the Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP) described a thriving Jewish economy that was 
also benefiting Palestinian Arabs.   
On the second day of the debate (23rd May) an Amendment to the Government’s White Paper 
Policy was tabled by Members who opposed the Bill. The Amendment read that Government policy 
is “inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Mandate and not calculated to secure the peaceful 
and prosperous development of Palestine, this House is of the opinion that Parliament should not be 
committed pending the examination of these proposals by the Permanent Mandates Commission of 
the League of Nations”.423 The significance of the Amendment lies in the concerns; the depth of 
opposition and the degree of uncertainty expressed by individual Members on both sides of the House. 
The Amendment was a delaying tactic to give time for the Mandates Commission to express an 
opinion.  It had little chance of success, but at least it opened the debate and offered the Opposition 
benches and Government opponents an opportunity to argue their case.  
Herbert Morrison (Labour) opposed the White Paper; supported the Amendment and was first 
to speak. He captured the widespread unease in the Commons. He started by accusing the Government 
of endeavouring to “twist” the wording of the White Paper creating the impression that it somehow 
reflected the spirit of the Balfour Declaration when, in his view, it did not. Morrison scathed that the 
Paper condemned Jews to permanent minority status - never allowed to exceed one third of the total 
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population – in a professed independent Home. The Government wished for and hoped that Jews and 
Arabs could live together in “friendly harmony” but, Morrison scolded, “hoping does not make the 
change occur”.424 His scorn swiftly turned to attack. In the starkness of worldwide persecution, what 
safeguards, he questioned, guaranteed Jewish safety? These were “matters for consideration when 
the time arrives”, the Secretary of State responded, “I do not know; I have not considered it”.425 It 
was an essential point given, Morrison revealed, that most disturbances were inspired, not by the 
majority, but by a minority; Arab agents provoked by the forces of European tyranny.426 Although 
the White Paper policy allowed for limited immigration (to a prescribed maximum), Morrison alleged 
that Government proposed a "crystallised Jewish National Home at its present stage of 
development".427 
While Morrison opposed the White Paper, he was at pains to emphasise that neither he nor 
the Opposition were “at enmity with the Arabs [and had] no prejudice against them”.428 He supported 
raising the social and economic standards of all Arabs in all Arab countries but believed that those 
efforts should not prevent Jews from developing their own Jewish Home. Indeed, he suggested, Jews 
had done more to raise standards across Palestine than the Palestine Administration had achieved 
during the lifetime of the Mandate. HM Government, he claimed, had been “weak and uncreative”; 
constantly vacillating over inconsistent policies, giving the widespread impression that “the way to 
make the British lion run is to make disorder, to murder, to ambush and to assassinate”.429 
Sir Ralph Glyn (Conservative) supported the Government’s position. No two MPs, he 
accepted, agreed on the policy issues involved. Glyn perceived a Jewish National Home as 
“spiritual”, a “Vatican City” type solution; a centre of excellence; a place where Jews would flock to, 
and once fortified, leave.  
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Sir Archibald Sinclair (Liberal Party leader) claimed that one Prime Minister after another 
had pledged that Jews would return to a Jewish land. It was a primary condition of the Mandate. Jews, 
he said, were not responsible for poor living conditions outside of the Jewish nucleus, but that 
nevertheless Arabs had also benefitted from the Jewish presence. Arab interests were also of primary 
concern; best served by continued prosperity. He reminded fellow MPs of the wording of Royal 
Commission report, that “the worst possible form of settlement” was one where Jews lived under Arab 
political domination against their will.430 Arbitrary limits set on Jewish immigration were unrelated 
to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. Thus, without corresponding limits on Arab 
immigration, the policy “[discriminated] against Jews on grounds of race and religion [and was a] 
grave departure from the terms of the Mandate”.431 Worse, the policy would provoke hostility within 
the five million strong Jewish communities in the United States and sour relations with Washington.  
In his maiden Parliamentary speech, Reverend Dr James Little (Ulster Unionist) warned that 
after termination of the Mandate, Arab resistance to immigration would multiply “ten times”. God, 
he entreated, “still has a deep interest in the Jews”. He drew parallels with Northern Ireland; invoked 
biblical verse and ended with a call for temporary withdrawal of the Paper while awaiting “Divine 
guidance”.432 The amusement that accompanied Dr Little’s speech should not, Mr Maxton MP kindly 
offered, be misunderstood as “derisive”, rather the laughter “arose from all the older Members of the 
House because we were delighted at the way with which this novice was getting away with something 
that all the rest of us would have been stopped doing”.433 Like many, Maxton had grave doubts about 
opposing the White Paper. It was for Jews and Arabs, he suggested, to determine their own destiny. 
Winston Churchill (Conservative) opposed the White Paper. For years, he explained, HM 
Governments’ remained sympathetic to Zionist ambitions. Zionists now looked to the Prime Minister 
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to honour and stand by his own deep convictions. Paraphrasing his own 1922 dispatch: Britain would 
not repudiate its obligations to Jewish people. Moreover, self-governing institutions in Palestine were 
subordinate to the promise of a Jewish National Home; a promise to Jews everywhere.434 The White 
Paper, Churchill stated, was a violation of the intention and the spirit of the Balfour Declaration. 
Placing immigration policy in Arab hands, he affirmed, was a “plain breach of a solemn 
obligation”.435 While the Mandatory Power had the right to “control or suspend” immigration, the 
League of Nations had not conferred an entitlement to end it. Churchill was adamant on this point. 
The Mandatory Power, he urged, had no right “to wash their hands [of immigration and] close the 
door”.436 
In his closing argument, Sir Thomas Inskip (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) claimed 
that few debates had the potential for such far reaching consequences and (referring to the deep 
divisions in the House) “still fewer in which the ordinary party divisions have had so little influence 
upon the formation of opinion” .437 Although the final result was never in doubt, it fell on Inskip to 
present the Government’s case in the best possible light and persuade the majority in the House that 
despite Members’ misgivings, the White Paper was the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration and the 
Palestine Mandate. 
The Government’s case for imposing immigration restrictions largely rested on the supposed 
limits of Palestine’s ‘economic capacity’, though the term itself does not appear in the Balfour 
Declaration or in the Mandate. Nevertheless, Government Ministers cynically adopted the term to 
justify policy as and when it suited. That said, the Mandate itself is a somewhat ambiguous legal 
instrument enabling politicians to construe its intentions. The Government seized on the Mandate’s 
interpretive vulnerability and morphed its sense towards its immediate pre-war Arab-leaning policy 
objectives. Ministers contended that in view of the progress Jewish people had made over the decades, 
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Britain had by now “facilitate[d] the achievement” of a Jewish Home in Palestine under the terms of 
the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate.  
The Amendment was defeated (281 to 181). The policy of the White Paper was approved (268 
to 179).438 In the end, although Churchill voted ‘for’ the Amendment he abstained on the substantive 
issue.  Later, when he became Prime Minister, he failed to help reverse his own Government’s latest 
anti-Jewish policy. As he bristled over the White Paper, any action he might have taken would have 
been too little, too late.  
The House of Lords and the Commons debated the Government’s policy on the same day.439 
Again, with some caveats, the Government’s case was clear-cut. The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava 
(Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) argued that the Mandatory Administration 
was obliged to place Palestine “under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home" though Britain was also duty bound to 
safeguard “the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race or 
religion”. Arabs, Dufferin continued, were apprehensive that the establishment of a Jewish National 
Home inferred unregulated immigration with the certain consequences of Jewish domination. 
Britain’s latest policy, Dufferin stated, mitigated Arab fears by guaranteeing their numerical 
superiority.440 He argued that because Jewish land purchases had led to an increase of landless Arabs, 
the Government had decided to restrict and, in many cases, prohibit land transfer.441  
Lord Snell (Labour) opposed the Government. The Mandate, he confirmed, left the term 
‘Jewish National Home’ undefined. The Mandate was, he judged “the worst drafted document that 
was ever issued or accepted by a responsible Government [and was] confusing”, even unclear to the 
Mandatory Administration.442 If, he argued, ‘home’ was to be defined as a place for a Jewish minority 
surrounded by a hostile Arab majority then, in spite of newly acquired Jewish political and economic 
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rights, ‘home’ merely implied maintaining the status quo. If the definition held, Snell continued, Jews 
already lived in ‘National Homes’ in, for example, Germany, Russia and Poland. Latest Government 
policy condemned Jews to live in a state of “perpetual minority”.443 The White Paper, Snell predicted, 
would be deeply resented and leave Jewish people “deeply wounded in their soul”.444  
Viscount Samuel (Liberal) opposed the Government’s land transfer restrictions. The policy, 
he proposed, would “strangle the Jewish National Home”.445 However, like Sir Ralph Glyn speaking 
in the Commons on the same day, Samuel said that he imagined the Jewish National Home in a 
religious rather than a territorial sense, analogous to Vatican City.446 447  
The Archbishop of Canterbury (Gordon Lang) focused his contribution on the number of 
Jewish immigrants. If immigration was restricted to the limits set in the White Paper then after five 
years, Palestine would fall short of its potential “economic absorptive capacity” by as much as fifty 
per cent. Earlier, the Under-Secretary of State had countered similar arguments by saying that as 
neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Mandate had coined the term, Britain was not obliged to 
consider it.448 The Archbishop continued: The White Paper stipulated that the Jewish population 
should not exceed one third of the total unless Arabs agreed to more. That, he quipped, would be 
“another of the wonders of the world”.449 Affirming Lord Snell’s contention, the Archbishop 
maintained that if carried to its limits, latest Government policy condemned Jews to life not dissimilar 
to that they experienced under Nazism. 450 
With no consensus and no agreed alternative to fall back on, the Government Motion was 
carried in the House of Lords on the 23rd of May 1939.451 Though the debates in both Houses bristled 
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with controversy, the speeches, particularly in the Lords, were master classes in Parliamentary 
diplomacy.  The debates left Britain’s ‘dual obligation’ claim in tatters. Later, reaction against the 
White Paper was fierce. Winston Churchill had railed against his own Government. Lloyd George 
called the Paper “an act of perfidy”.452 James Rothschild pronounced that “for the majority of Jews 
who go to Palestine it is a question of migration or of physical extinction”.453  
Arab leaders criticised the length of the transition period, though according to an HM 
Government memorandum later presented to UNSCOP, there were signs that they were prepared to 
acquiesce to the policy.454 For their part, the Jewish Agency protested that Britain’s latest policy was 
a violation of the terms of the Mandate which would lead to Jewish subservience to Palestinian Arabs. 
It added that if future Jewish immigration was left to the mercy of Palestinian Arabs, then Jews would 
remain in a similar state of perpetual minority, as they were elsewhere.  In a contemptuous response, 
the Jewish Agency wrote that the White Paper constituted “a breach of faith and surrender to Arab 
terrorism”. Prohibiting the Jewish population from exceeding one third of the total was tantamount 
to erecting “a territorial ghetto for Jews in their own homeland”. The Agency predicted that any such 
policy would have to be maintained by force.455  
Jewish resistance to the policy deepened. In the shadow of intensifying Nazi persecution, the 
Paper’s restrictive policies had the unforeseen effects of stimulating levels of illegal immigration and 
heightening British/Jewish tensions so that nothing short of partition had any chance of success.      
Less than a month later (June 1939), the Permanent Mandates Commission reported to the 
Council of the League of Nations that four of its seven members believed that the policy set out in 
the White Paper was at variance with the Commission’s understanding of the Palestine Mandate. The 
remaining three members were persuaded that the prevailing circumstances had changed such that 
the variance was now acceptable. 
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In the immediate pre-war years, the one realistically available means of escape for the mass 
of European Jewry was barred. For his part, US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt was dismayed over 
latest UK Government policy. “This White Paper [he said] is something that we cannot give approval 
to”. However, after France had fallen in June 1940, the US State Department warned against 
undermining Britain’s concerns in the Middle East, especially since Britain was the “last barrier to 
complete Nazi domination of Europe”. With geopolitical matters taking priority over domestic 
politics, in the early days of war, FDR heeded his State Department’s advice.456 
At the twenty-first Zionist Conference held in Geneva from the 16th to the 25th August 1939, 
just days before the outbreak of WWII, delegates condemned Britain’s 1939 White Paper and praised 
organisers of illegal immigration.  Closing the Conference, Dr Weizmann implored that he had “no 
prayer but this: that we shall meet again alive”.457  
With Axis-controlled doors being gradually closed, the annual rate of Jewish immigration 
plummeted from a 1935 high of 61,800 to just 16,400 in 1939 – a fraction of the potential demand.458 
Against the odds, an escape organisation (Beriha) rescued thousands of Jews from Nazi occupied 
Europe. Of the sixty-six ships that set sail only a handful avoided a Naval blockade and disembarked 
their passengers in Palestine. The captured immigrants were incarcerated in holding camps in Cyprus 
where most remained until Israel’s independence. Between 1939 and 1948, just 110,000 illegal 
immigrants (Aliyah Bet) escaped to Palestine.459 For millions more, as the Holocaust gathered pace 
the “international constellation could not have been worse … Never had the [Zionist] movement 
counted for less”.460 In 1939 the Palestine question was overshadowed by WWII. 
Again, the Balfour Declaration had been incorporated into the Mandate. Britain’s pledge – 
ratified by the League of Nations – was a commitment to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine while preparing this Class-A mandated country for independence. For their 
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part, Palestinian Arabs demanded an independent Arab-majority in Palestine. Predictably, it was the 
fear of the consequences of the Mandate giving open-ended entitlement to Jewish immigrants that 
continually fuelled the Arab-Jewish-British conflict. While Zionists insisted that the Judaism had an 
historical and religious connection to the Holy Land, Arabs opposed this, asserting that it belonged 
to them as the long-standing majority. The differences were irreconcilable. Cantonisation had been 
dismissed by both sides. With no other options available, full-scale Partition was unavoidable. 
Summary 
Partition had been mooted as an option. The Royal Commissioners had dismissed alternatives and 
recommended that Partition was an acceptable way forward. Initially, the British Government was 
minded to accept the recommendation. However, the fact that the Commissioners proposal included 
a population exchange element against fierce Arab opposition caused the Government to have a 
serious rethink. The prospect of disruption, with deeply contentious state borders, consigned a 
promising proposal to gather dust.  
Peel had noted that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had contained an explicit 
undertaking that with British assistance, Jews would be enabled to establish a permanent Homeland 
and that neither of the two documents had set an upper limit on the would-be scale of Jewish 
immigration. Nonetheless, there was an implicit understanding that the numbers should not prejudice 
“the rights and position of other sections of the population”.461  
Arabs argued that on-going Jewish immigration contravened the latter, by threatening to 
displace Arabs as the rightful heirs to the land. Thus, they asserted that Jewish immigrants should be 
barred. As far back as 1922, Winston Churchill had stated that “immigration [must not exceed] … the 
economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals … immigrants should not be a 
burden on the people of Palestine as a whole”.462 Echoing the latter, on the 13th February 1931, 
Ramsay MacDonald had written to Chaim Weizmann confirming that while his Government stood 
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by the wording of the Mandate, “immigrants should not be a burden on the people of Palestine as a 
whole [and that] immigration regulations must be … relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity”.463 
It is noteworthy that Britain repeatedly stated that levels of Jewish immigration should not exceed 
Palestine’s ‘absorptive capacity’ – (a term that is addressed in later chapters). On the question of 
immigration, Peel had argued that Jewish options were limited by immigration restrictions, 
unsustainable economic pressures forced on Jews in Poland and by Nazi fanaticism. He ventured that 
the emerging Jewish state’s rapid development was due to “the desire of the Jews to escape from 
Europe”.464 Nonetheless, faced with increased Arab hostility, Peel sought to appease Arab demands 
by proposing that Jewish immigration should be limited. He recommended that for a period of five 
years, Jewish immigration should be restricted in line with, again, Palestine’s “absorptive capacity”.  
Peel contended that “neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State”.465 
Therefore, Partition was thought to provide the solution and boundary plans were drawn up. Zionists 
were troubled by the inadequacy of the land allocated but it was an implied statement by a British 
Commission that in the foreseeable future, Jews would have a state of their own. It was also clear that 
Arabs and Jews would never agree. The predicament was compounded by predictions that given the 
status quo, it was unavoidable that Arabs would increasingly emerge as the numerically dominant 
partner in a unitary state. Estimates provided later by UNSCOP, show that by 1946 (without Jewish 
immigration), in a unitary state, there would be nearly twice as many Arabs than Jews.466 If Christians 
and other non-Jews were added to the mix, Jews would comprise just 38% of the total population of 
Palestine – not taking account of some 90,000 Bedouin seasonal workers. It follows that in a 
proportionally representative unitary state, unless there was a radical increase in levels of Jewish 
immigration, it was quite impossible for the Jewish constituency to gain control over their own 
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destiny. It is also worth noting that under Peel’s Partition Plan, Jews would constitute a narrow 
majority – 55% of the total.467 Clearly, Peel’s Partition boundaries were intended to confine the 
Jewish state into the smallest possible area containing a minimal Jewish majority. Taking all into 
account, Peel’s Commission was persuaded that a two-state solution was the only feasible option and 
becoming increasingly likely.  
When Zionists met to discuss Peel’s report, it generated a heated debate. There were those 
who envisioned an all-Jewish Palestine but now, since Peel, any notion that Britain or the Arab World, 
would allow that situation to develop was folly. Nevertheless, Peel’s Partition proposal was, for 
Zionists, a step in the right direction.  Now Britain dispatched a follow-up Commission into the region 
to look again. Woodhead’s Commission dismissed Peel’s population exchange element considering 
it unnecessary and unrealistic. However, it is important to note that only one of the Commission’s 
four members (Thomas Reid) opposed partition while the others, like Peel, were supportive but failed 
to reach a consensus on how best to divide up the region. One of the four had no such concerns 
arguing that the proposed Jewish state should be enlarged.  
Now, the UK Government was grappling with two Commissions both of which, while at odds 
over border issues, broadly accepted the inevitability of Partition. Nevertheless, just months before 
the start of WWII, Zionists suffered a temporary setback when Britain reversed its former pro-Zionist 
sympathises in favour of Palestinian Arabs. British policy- makers estimated that in spite of the 
encouragement given to Zionists, it was now more strategically advantageous to keep the Arab 
Middle-East onside even at the risk of weakening Jewish support. It was crucial to any future 
combined war effort that Britain and its allies could maintain trade routes especially though Suez and 
rely on an uninterrupted flow of oil from Iraq, through Transjordan then Palestine to the 
Mediterranean port of Haifa.468 Hence, to placate Middle-East leaders, Britain ruled that for five 
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years, Jewish immigration levels should plummet. Britain had manipulated both Arabs and Jews to 
suit their own purposes 469 and had forsaken European Jews and taken a calculated risk trusting that 
Jews would not do likewise to Britain. In fact, as predicted, thousands of Jewish fighters would later 
join the battle against Germany.470  
Referring to Peel’s Partition proposal, Tessler argues that “Partition was a logical response 
to the deepening conflict [between Arabs and Jews]”.471 Britain’s 1939 White Paper policy satisfied 
neither Arabs nor Jews. The British found themselves “reaping the bitter harvest of their own self-
interested way into Palestine … indeed, by 1939, it was doubtful if any policy satisfactory to both … 
could have been devised”.472 Undoubtedly, Partition was on its way but must wait until the world 
crisis was resolved. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Introduction 
On May the 6th 1942, while millions of their fellow Jews were soon to be herded into the gas 
chambers, Zionists and other interested parties gathered for a conference in the Biltmore Hotel in 
New York. Chapter 3 begins with this conference where Zionists met to debate the Palestine question 
and decide on a way forward.  
Conference attendees were divided. Stein argues that some preferred Weizmann’s cautious 
optimism and that their future remained in British hands, while others were swayed by Ben-Gurion’s 
conviction that after the war the United States would take the lead in world affairs. There were those 
who believed that the long-term solution lay in Arab-Jewish cooperation, while idealists insisted that 
the entire region of Palestine was rightly Jewish. Worldwide, there were broad variations: from those 
Jews who were content where they were to more strictly orthodox who were convinced that their 
destiny lay in the Promised Land.473 In the meantime, knowledge that European Jews were being 
systematically murdered, played no small part in convincing most Jews to follow Ben-Gurion’s 
unshakable conviction that the future survival of Judaism depended on the present nucleus developing 
into a secure, independent, Jewish state. It was not a question of “if”, as Stein argues, but more a 
question of “when and how”.474 Ben-Gurion dismissed the notion that a growing Jewish 
‘commonwealth’ (at this point he avoided the more controversial term ‘state’) would drive Arabs out 
of their homes. In any event, Ben-Gurion persisted, Arabs owned huge tracts of underdeveloped land. 
Like Horowitz and Weizmann in their testimony to the Special Committee in 1947, Ben-Gurion 
rejected as meaningless Britain’s ruling that Jewish immigration must be limited according to 
Palestine’s ‘economic capacity’.475 
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The Biltmore Conference of 1942 was a milestone. Conference resolved that a Jewish 
‘Commonwealth’ should be established; one entitled to decide on its own internal immigration and 
land purchase policies and with non-Jews guaranteed civil, political and religious equality. 
Ultimately, Ben-Gurion’s pro-American stance won the day and cemented his authority.  
The end of WWII signalled a seismic shift in the political landscape. The US had emerged 
from war as the undisputed world military superpower and demonstrated its capability to deploy 
nuclear weapons; a warning to Stalin that a military or ideological threat to America could be met by 
superior military firepower. After the war, news of the Holocaust provoked a groundswell of 
revulsion and public outrage. Ever the shrewd politician, Truman seized the moment and voiced his 
support for the Zionist struggle. He trusted that it would guarantee the crucial Jewish vote and 
improve his chances of winning a second term. With the mid-term elections just two years away and 
with Democratic colleagues facing similar electoral challenges, their political antennae were tuned to 
the influential news media and the all-important Jewish financial donations. Countering this, the US 
State Department feared that Truman’s pro-Zionist position would upset the political balance of the 
Middle East. State Department advisors argued that US support for Israeli statehood with the 
inevitability of Jewish immigration would damage US-Arab relations and clear the way for increased 
Soviet Union involvement. Then as now, scholars have debated Truman’s motives for refusing to 
budge against the powerful forces ranged against him.   
Like Governments across Europe, Attlee’s Labour Government was struggling to recover 
from the aftermath of war. To add to its problems, Britain’s Mandatory Authority was enmeshed in a 
seemingly unresolvable conflict in Palestine. With its military and economic resources stretched to 
near breaking point and all previous attempts at a solution having failed, the time had come for Britain 
to relinquish its League of Nations Palestine Mandate to its successor. In a speech to Parliament on 
the 13th of November 1945, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin confirmed that it was unlikely that the 
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differences between Arabs and Jews could be reconciled.476 As a result, HM Government believed it 
was time to refer the Palestine question back to the recently created United Nations which, in turn, 
established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). UNSCOP was charged 
to make recommendations concerning the future of Palestine; to report back its findings and propose 
possible solutions. However, the Arab Higher Committee had imposed a boycott on association with 
UNSCOP making it difficult to elicit comprehensive Arab views on the present unrest. Nevertheless, 
towards the end of their investigations, UNSCOP met with representatives from Arab states in Beirut 
and arrived at a more detailed assessment. 
To Arabs, UNSCOP reported, Zionism was viewed as nothing less than expansionism at the 
expense of Arabs and that Jewish aggression was the result of the Administration’s weakness. A 
Jewish state born out of violence would be met by “violence”, seen as a legitimate means of self-
defence.477 In December 1945, the Arab League had imposed an economic boycott on Jewish goods 
believing that it would break “Zionist existence”. Jamal Husseini, soon to installed as vice-president 
of the Arab Higher Committee, warned Arab “traitors” to beware of the consequences of any Arab 
foolish enough to break the boycott.478 Interested parties were asked to cooperate, but at its first 
meeting in Jerusalem, the UN Special Committee was informed that the Arab Higher Committee had 
chosen to “abstain from collaboration” and had resisted repeated requests. Arab states were less 
inflexible. Representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen (though 
indirectly through Lebanon) were invited to contribute. Apart from the latter, they accepted. 
Transjordan responded, but as non-member UN-state it felt obliged to abstain. Instead, King Abdullah 
offered to host a UNSCOP delegation in Amman.479 480 
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Zionists’ Set Out Their Stall: The Biltmore Conference 
The 1939 White Paper had been a setback for the Zionist project. While Britain had not rejected the 
concept of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, its restrictive immigration policy had deferred the final 
decision for at least five years. Even then, Britain had no clear policy on how the ‘dual obligation’ 
could be reconciled. British policymakers were not yet prepared to accept nor admit to the Arab World 
that partitioning Palestine was the only way to resolve their problem. 
For their part, Arabs refused to acquiesce to a five-year deferral of their long-term ambitions 
for independence; still less, five more years of Jewish immigration.481 Accordingly, both parties had 
rejected the White Paper. 
On the 7th December 1941, the 22nd Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland (the first 
important meeting since the outbreak of World War II). Attendees rejected any arrangement “which 
might postpone the establishment of a Jewish State, based on full equality of rights for all …”. While 
the Zionists preferred option was the constitution of all of Palestine, significantly, they had opened 
the door to Partition; a Jewish state “in an adequate area of Palestine”.482 In the meantime, while the 
full extent had yet to emerge, news of the unfolding tragedy facing European Jews was filtering 
through. It was already known that during the first years of war the Nazi regime had relocated tens of 
thousands of ‘undesirables’, including many thousands of Jews, to concentration camps. When, in 
June 1941, the Axis Powers invaded the Soviet Union, thousands more Russian Jews were murdered 
by the Nazis. Not content, in January 1942, Hitler approved the ‘final solution for the Jewish 
problem’; a plan to eliminate all European Jews.  
Against this background, six-hundred American Jews gathered from the 9th until the 11th of 
May 1942 for an emergency conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York.483 Colleen Brady 
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describes the conference as a “significant turning point in the history of American Zionism”;484 when 
the US was soon to replace the UK as the main decision-maker on the Palestine question. 
From the early nineteen thirties onwards, Ben-Gurion had little doubt that if Jews were ever 
to achieve full self-determinations then American-Jewish support was paramount. Determinedly, he 
began stimulating American Jewry to support Zionism without which it would remain a “weak and 
fractured movement”.485 Britain had already made its Palestinian policy clear in its 1939 White Paper. 
It had gone from initial support for Zionism to one of neutrality and finally to a complete about turn. 
To Ben-Gurion, Britain was now a lost cause and heavily dependent on American military might. It 
was clear that the United States was the emerging superpower and that post-war, Britain would carry 
less weight. Conference attendees also recognised that “the United States would [be] one of the 
primary architects of the post-war world”486 therefore they must “demonstrate their loyalty to the US 
Government”.487 The leadership were addressing a largely American audience and whether 
consciously or not, appears to have followed Samuel Halperin’s guidance that “[e]very organised 
interest must conform to the prevailing expectations and normative standards of the total society”.488 
Opinions were mixed: There were those American Jews who insisted that the priority was to 
expend their energy into rescuing European Jews from Hitler’s clutches, rather than to fulfil Zionist 
would-be ambitions. Then, Stein continues, there were those who preferred Weizmann’s stance of 
‘wait and see’ what Britain would do after the war. Others were likely to be persuaded by Ben-
Gurion’s active US engagement approach. For the majority, Stein contends, it was the combination 
of Ben-Gurion’s speech and the realisation of Hitler’s plan to eradicate European Jews that motivated 
American Zionists towards a consensus for a Jewish National state in Palestine.489  
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Aside from an unspoken sense of anti-Semitism within some US political circles, Ben-Gurion 
was encouraged by an implicit acknowledgement of the need for a Jewish state. Yet, with the Allies 
deeply embroiled in a world-war, many American Jews were reluctant to aggravate the situation by 
insisting on their demands or opposing the White Paper, for fear of accusations of “divided or 
treasonous loyalties”.490 Ben-Gurion dismissed these concerns as little more than expressions of 
“cowardice”. American Jews, he insisted, could not afford to remain neutral and must press ahead. 
Jewish efforts, he persisted “must be overboard”. This was not a time for waiting in hopeful silence 
for events to unfold, but a time for American Jewry to speak out and boldly confront the issue. Others 
disagreed. Rabbi Stephan Wise argued that with the world currently in turmoil, the Jewish struggle 
should take second place.491 Restraint while protesting the White Paper was called for. Jews, he 
asserted, “should shout in low tones”.  Wise argued that after the war, Zionists would be rewarded 
for their restraint. Rejecting this, Ben-Gurion advocated a policy of protest; a strong public campaign 
against Britain’s 1939 White Paper; “we must help the [British] army as if there was no White Paper 
and we must fight the White Paper as if there was no war”.492 
From 1940 until 1942 Ben-Gurion had spent extended periods in the US, during which he 
came to understand the vagaries of the US political system. Unceasingly, he struggled to sway Zionist 
doubters towards his own unshakable viewpoint. Nahum Goldmann described Ben-Gurion as the 
“most single minded, undeviating Zionist leader of [his] generation”.493 494 Ben-Gurion was operating 
in a multifaceted environment. There were those who had no intention of leaving their comfortable 
surroundings in the United States. There were others who preferred the notion of a Jewish spiritual 
homeland in Palestine. Others still, including Nahum Goldmann and Rabbi Wise, supported 
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Weizmann’s cautious confidence in Britain. Many believed that to declare an independent Jewish 
state in a majority Arab region would be suicidal and some argued that a Jewish state should wait 
until Arab support was assured. Otherwise, they maintained, an Arab/Jewish war was foreseeable.495 
Years later, (November 1978) Nahum Goldmann told a meeting including German Chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, that he believed that the United Nation’s failure to consult Arabs “began our 
Original Sin”.496  
Throughout his lengthy delivery, Ben-Gurion studiously avoided the term Jewish ‘state’ 
preferring instead Jewish ‘Commonwealth’ probably because the US State Department did not 
provide the term with a specific political status.497 Also, the syntactical difference, Stein suggests, 
would have appealed to his American audience since ‘Commonwealth’ echoed former President 
Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic pro-Zionist rhetoric.498 The political circumstances in the present war 
were different from those in World War One.  During and after WWI, Britain and its Allies resolved 
to restore a Jewish Homeland and because the situation was “not as yet hopeless, [rebuilding and 
resettlement] could proceed at a leisurely pace”.499 Now though, the situation facing European Jews 
was urgent. The rate of immigration must reach unprecedented levels. Ben Gurion claimed that 
Zionists must respond to the crisis with radical solutions, or Zionism itself was meaningless.  
Between the wars, particularly on occasions when immigration limits were relaxed, Palestine 
had absorbed more Jewish refugees than all other countries combined. Ben-Gurion addressed the term 
“absorptive capacity [which he described as] a peculiarly Zionist, or perhaps an anti-Zionist, 
invention”. The term itself, he argued, had no meaningful scientific definition. It was a “dynamic and 
fluctuating” concept. The human factor of “need” far outweighs natural conditions or land area. “It 
is need [he continued] that drives creativity, enterprise and devotion to Homeland founded, 
necessarily, on the political and administrative organs of the regime”. Ben-Gurion reminded his 
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audience that wave upon wave of Jewish immigrants had tilled the soil, irrigated it until it was richly 
fertile, planted seeds and used modern agricultural and animal husbandry techniques. All these 
methods were laying the foundations for successive waves of Jews to come. Five years before, the 
Peel Commission had stated that though the Jewish state had started out as an experiment, “today it 
is a going concern” and that the Jewish population had increased fourfold. Ben-Gurion portrayed an 
optimistic future: land that once sustained a fixed number of families now supported ten times that 
number and there was every reason to suppose that this trend should continue. For every family 
employed in agriculture, experience showed that at least three others could be employed in the 
industrial, professional and service sectors.500 
Ben-Gurion next turned his attention to the more difficult political problem, one, he stated, 
that had caused “so much confusion and misunderstanding”. Unlike Jews, Arabs were neither 
homeless nor landless. They owned vast tracts of largely undeveloped land. Theirs was not a problem 
of maximum absorptive capacity, but one of extreme paucity of population. For example, 
Transjordan’s population density was one twentieth of western Palestine’s. The latter under-
population factor, Ben-Gurion maintained, was “not only an economic impediment, but a grave 
political danger”. It was clear, he continued, that Jewish immigration and expanding Jewish 
settlements had not been at the expense of the indigenous Arab population. Jews were cultivating and 
increasing yields on previously uncultivated land. Not only did this provide the means for new 
immigrants, it also improved the general standard of living for all inhabitants. Ben-Gurion predicted 
large-scale Jewish colonisation, negating the need for Peel’s population transfer element.501 Quite the 
reverse, he envisaged a Jewish state with some one million Arab citizens sharing the same benefits.  
Then there was the suggestion that Arabs and Jews might benefit from parity in a bi-national state.  
At face value this appeared the best possible solution but ignored the “only problem that matters: 
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Jewish immigration”. Ben-Gurion claimed that Jews must accept that while immigration must and 
would continue, Arab opposition was the unavoidable consequence. Jews needed no one’s permission 
to inhabit the land of Palestine. Jews belonged to the Holy land. The Palestine Mandate, Ben-Gurion 
asserted, was an unchallengeable international commitment and immigration was an unstoppable tide 
“the only way of salvation and survival”. While Ben-Gurion was busily canvassing American support, 
Jews were determinately purchasing land, creating businesses, building and extending settlements in 
the embryotic Jewish state.502 
Ben-Gurion’s Essential Principles 
Now, Ben-Gurion presented delegates with his three “most essential principles”: 
1. The re-establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine; affirmed by the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate and clarified by President Woodrow Wilson on the 3rd of March 
1919.  
2. The Jewish Agency should have full control over Jewish immigration and be vested with 
decision-making powers in connection with land development. 
3. All Palestinians, whether Arab or Jews, would have complete equality in civil, political and 
religious matters and autonomy for each community on questions relating to their own internal 
affairs.  
Politically, whether Palestine should be part of a broad Near-Eastern Federation, part of the British 
Commonwealth, or an Anglo-American entity or similar could not yet be determined. However, 
whatever the future constitutional arrangements, Ben-Gurion sought to reassure doubters that Jews 
would cooperate with Palestinian Arabs and surrounding Arab countries.  He believed that, once the 
contentious issues around Jewish immigration were removed, the Jewish Commonwealth (State) 
would adopt full control over its own immigration policy and ultimately return to hitherto levels of 
Jewish-Arab cooperation. Finally, Ben-Gurion made an impassioned plea reaching into the very soul 
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of Judaism: was there, he questioned, something fundamentally wrong with Judaism if Jews were 
singled out as the “first and most catastrophic victims” when trouble erupts. At present, Jews faced 
total annihilation, but he urged that this threat should not mean the end of Judaism. Instead it should 
signal “the beginning of a new set-up for the world and for ourselves”. 
By the end of the Conference, the majority leadership affirmed their commitment to a Jewish 
Commonwealth in Palestine. Articles adopted on the final day of the Conference reaffirmed American 
Zionists’ commitment to the Allied war effort (Article 1).503 Palestinian Jews would contribute to the 
military struggle and to Ben-Gurion’s demand for a “Jewish military force fighting under its own 
flag” (Article 6).504 Expressions of hope and encouragement were to be conveyed to “their fellow 
Jews in the Ghettos and concentration camps of Hitler’s dominated Europe” (Article 2).505 Homage 
was to be paid to the achievements already made by Jews in Palestine - encouraging the “desert to 
blossom” (Article 3).506 Article 5 called for the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate 
by establishing a Jewish Commonwealth, as stated by President Wilson. Conference repudiated HM 
Governments’ 1939 White Paper and denied its “moral or legal authority”.507 Articles 7 and 4 are 
especially relevant. Article 7 acknowledged that Arabs had shared the benefits of the Jewish presence 
and Jews welcomed Arab redemption in economic and other terms. Article 4 emphasised that Jews 
desired full co-operation with their Arab neighbours. Finally, Conference delegates demanded 
unrestricted access to Palestine for Jewish people as a means to create a Jewish homeland. Conference 
“urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of 
immigration ... that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth”.508 This proclamation was 
the first explicit announcement that a “Jewish Commonwealth” predestined “the establishment of an 
independent Jewish state in Palestine”. Brady argues that by demonstrating their support for 
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America’s war aims and by acknowledging that the US replaced Britain as the “new battleground 
[for Zionist ambitions]”, Zionists had gained renewed credibility for an independent Jewish state. 
“Biltmore” Brady writes, “was a positive step forward for statehood”509 and, by implication, 
Partition.  
A Rift in Zionism 
The Biltmore Conference was dismissed by Weizmann as “Just a resolution like the hundred and one 
resolutions passed at great meetings”. Weizmann sensed, however, that there was a shift in favour of 
the younger Ben-Gurion. Although Weizmann remained highly regarded as the “spiritual and titular 
leader”,510 it was Ben-Gurion’s American strategy that won the day and ultimately reinforced his 
personal authority.  Soon after the conference ended, Ben-Gurion took the helm as Zionist leader 
from the more elderly Weizmann.511 
By the time the conference was over, the rift between the Zionism’s leaders had widened. 
Brady contends that American Zionists could be accused of being preoccupied with statehood at the 
expense of rescuing Jews caught up in persecution. Aaron Berman argues that powerful leaders 
concentrated on the Zionist cause rather than devoting their energies into extricating fellow Jews from 
the Holocaust.512 Brady, citing Berman, argues that twinning “an immediate haven [for survivors, 
with] a post-war solution”, represented an attempt to resolve both essential requirements as both were 
being addressed in parallel.513 Ben-Gurion rejected Weizmann’s gradualist approach. Instead, he was 
determined to sway American Zionists towards his point of view. Ben-Gurion was convinced that 
Zionist ambitions were best achieved by meeting the present predicament “by the use of force if 
necessary”.514 To Ben-Gurion, American pro-Zionism was irreplaceable. He had the foresight to see 
that without the blessing of the United States it is improbable that the State of Israel could come into 
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being. That said, while the United States was about to become deeply enmeshed in war515 “[d]espite 
the moral injunctions unleashed by the Holocaust”, Cohen argues that “[American] Zionists ... were 
Americans first, and that the cause of America at war transcended all others”.516 
The five-year restriction of immigration in 1939 came to an end in 1944. Of the 75,000 
immigration certificates that had been granted, only 51,000 had been utilised. The remaining 24,000 
individuals would have found it almost impossible to escape from Nazi occupied Europe. Under the 
circumstances, HM Government decided to extend the deadline, so that by the end of 1945 the residue 
of certificates was finally exhausted. From then onwards, the Government reverted to its former 
restriction of 1,500 per month pending a report expected from the Anglo-American Committee of 
Enquiry.517 
Jewish Demands 
In May 1945 the Jewish Agency formally presented the British Government with its full set of 
demands: that there should be an immediate announcement that “Palestine [would be established] as 
a Jewish State” and that the Agency should be responsible for settling as many Jews into Palestine as 
it saw fit. The Agency also requested that an international loan be provided for the “transfer of the 
first [of] millions of Jews”; that Germany (as the aggressor) should provide the Jewish people with 
reparations and finally, that the international community should make facilities available and assist 
with the transfer of “all Jews who wished to settle in Palestine”.518 This policy was formally adopted 
by the Zionist Movement.519 
At this point it is useful to pause; to reflect on the implications of the latter. Zionists were in no mood 
to enter endless political dithering over immigration after millions of European Jews had been 
systematically killed. Britain had refused to do other than offer a palliative solution now that a would-
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be Jewish state existed in Palestine in all but name. In 1945, the Jewish Agency had made demands, 
fully aware that Britain would reject them. In a Jewish ‘state’, the Agency insisted, (regardless of the 
endless semantic manoeuvring over terminology) Jews would decide for themselves how many 
immigrants should enter. Provision must be made for the exodus of the first tranche of survivors and 
the thousands more to follow. Britain could be in no doubt that the Jewish Agency had reached the 
end of its patience.  To all intents and purposes, a Jewish state existed. Jews were determined that 
they were prepared to defend it and see it flourish, whatever the cost. Either Palestine must be 
partitioned giving rise to a Jewish state or Jews would fight against any aggressor bent on the 
wholesale elimination of the existing proto-Jewish state. Post-war, there would be no more pogroms 
or Holocausts.  
A new chapter in the history of Palestine was about to unfold. The United States emerged 
from the war as the undisputed premier power and was the pre-eminent Western decision maker in 
the immediate post-war period.  In the event, Ben-Gurion predicted that the Zionist Movement was 
best served by concentrating on garnering support in the United States; paralleling, as Brady 
maintains, a “Zionist drift away from Great Britain ... in their pursuit of support for their cause”. This 
shift in emphasis is demonstrated by two sections of Article 5. Here, two discreet sections are 
juxtaposed in the same Article. The first highlights the US President’s support for a “Jewish 
Commonwealth” while the second “affirms [the Biltmore Conference’s] unalterable rejection of 
[Britain’s 1939] White Paper”.520 
Britain Enters a New Phase 
By the end of WWII much had changed. On the 7th of May 1945 the German High Command signed 
the Instrument of Surrender. In October 1945 the United Nations was established and on the 18th of 
April of the following year, the beleaguered League of Nations and its Permanent Mandates 
Commission were finally disbanded.  At the League’s final meeting a resolution was passed noting 
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that its Articles of responsibility over mandated territories were effectively mirrored in the Charter of 
the United Nations.521 From that point on, the United Nations, rather than its predecessor, became the 
organ through which Britain was obliged to exercise its responsibilities. Apart from the creation of 
the United Nations there were other shifts too. First was Britain’s Labour Party landslide victory in 
1945 under the radical premiership of Clement Attlee. The second and arguably more important for 
the future of Israel, was the start of Harry Truman’s (“the most powerful and diligent advocate of the 
Zionist cause”522) first term in office as president of the United States. Yet another was the early years 
of the Cold War during which official United States policy was fixated on Soviet containment. To 
the US State and Defence departments the Soviet Union inferred global instability and threatened 
America’s emerging pre-eminence as the principle world superpower. Great Britain and the United 
States had vital military and economic interests in the Middle East.  Instability in Palestine between 
Arabs and Jews and worsening Arab-British relations raised the spectre of opening the door to Soviet 
influence and shutting it to the West. Zionists had their own aspirations, and nothing would sway 
them from their right (enshrined by Balfour and reinforced by the British Mandate) to a Jewish 
Homeland. Zionists poured time and money into the United States to achieve their aspirations.523 As 
knowledge of the holocaust grew, so did public sympathy: “Public opinion also encouraged Truman 
to support Zionism”,524 a fact that Truman could not ignore. Nor could he ignore the constant pressure 
he was under from Jewish Lobbyists, his Jewish colleagues and many of his White House advisors. 
In 1947, his mid-term elections were less than two years away and many of his Democratic colleagues 
faced their own electoral challenges. He strove to keep the powerful Jewish-friendly press, Jewish 
financial backers and the sizable Jewish electorate on side.525 He wavered but finally tended towards 
the Zionist position against the advice of his State Department officials who advised him that US 
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support for a Jewish state would damage US/Arab relations and turn Arabs towards the Soviet 
Union.526 
For its part, Britain’s policy towards Palestine, expressed by the UK’s somewhat tactless 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was inconsistent. In a broad sense, Bevin shared the US State 
Department’s analysis over maintaining good relations with the Arab countries and fears of creeping 
Soviet involvement in Middle East affairs. Also, by the middle to late 1940s, Britain’s forces in 
Palestine came under frequent attack from radical Jewish militants, so that any compassion Bevin had 
for Holocaust victims quickly evaporated. If anything, he was an Arab rather than a Jewish 
sympathiser and refused to entertain Zionist calls for a Jewish state or a major policy shift on 
immigration. Statements and correspondence between and within their respective countries suggests 
a fraught relationship between Bevin and the U.S. President. For years, there has been controversy 
over whether Ernest Bevin was anti-Jewish (or anti-Israel) in policy and personally anti-Semitic. 
Barder527 argues that “casual anti-Semitism was largely taken for granted in the English upper and 
middle classes” – even in the post-war years when Nazi atrocities against Jews were well understood. 
In a nakedly partisan research paper commissioned by the UK Foreign Office and published in August 
1950, the author (unknown) reported on military engagements from 14th May 1948 until the Israeli-
Transjordan Armistice was signed on 3rd April 1949. The research paper strikingly supported an Arab 
contention that “Jews turned back [a] supply column on the pretext that it contained hidden arms and 
ammunition” while, obligingly, “the Arab Legion permitted the free passage of supply convoys to the 
isolated Jewish troops”. For Zionists, the research paper mocked, Partition “was to be accepted when 
it worked in favour of the Jews but not where it acted in favour of the Arabs”.528 Barder maintains 
that the Foreign Office had a reputation for pro-Arab, anti-Israeli bias stemming from the former 
influence of the so-called ‘Camel Corp’ - young men who were “bright, diplomatic service officers 
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trained as Arabists”. At the time they were usually graduates of the FO’s Middle East Centre for Arab 
Studies in Lebanon where they were immersed in Arab history and culture and became fluent in 
Arabic. They followed in T. E. Laurence’s swashbuckling footsteps and were regarded as the “crème 
de la crème of the service [and] rose to top jobs [and] undoubtedly had a strong influence on UK 
foreign policy in the Middle East”.529 The tenor of language and bias expressed would not have struck 
FO officials as anything other than perfectly commonplace. Whether Bevin was intrinsically anti-
Semitic is hard to judge, but statements he made to a Labour Party gathering does nothing to quell 
the suspicion. In June 1946 Truman was pressing Britain to admit 100,000 displaced European Jews 
to Palestine. Bevin observed that Truman was exerting such pressure because “They did not want too 
many Jews in New York”.530 Bevin lacked diplomatic finesse and “tended to make a bad situation 
worse by making ill-chosen remarks”.531 
WWII had left vast numbers of displaced people scattered across Europe. One way or another, 
thousands of Jewish survivors escaped their makeshift conditions and poured into the embryonic 
Jewish state.  At the same time countries across Europe were preoccupied with recovery. A severely 
weakened Britain was no exception. In a speech to the House of Commons on the 13th of November 
1945 Ernest Bevin confirmed that it was unlikely that the differences between Arabs and Jews could 
be reconciled.532 The time was approaching for Britain to pass on its poisoned chalice. Britain’s 
official sentiment was captured by the following statement: “His Majesty’s Government are not 
prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews 
cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them".533  
During WWII Churchill had forged a strong working relationship with U.S. President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. After Roosevelt’s death in the last months of war, his successor Harry H. Truman came 
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to the fore. This coincided, a few months later, with Churchill’s defeat in the United Kingdom’s 
general election. He was replaced by a new Labour government under Prime Minister, Clement 
Attlee. With the appointment of the arguably anti-Zionist, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, Zionists 
had lost a British champion in Churchill. On the 12th August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill had 
signed the Atlantic Charter: “… respect[ing] the rights of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they shall live”. Later, Churchill was pressurised by Washington to extend 
the rights across much of the world including India and probably Palestine. On the 9th August 1942 
he wired Roosevelt: “…in the Middle East the Arabs might claim that by majority they would expel 
the Jews from Palestine. I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy of which I am one of the 
authors”.534 In fact, up until 1939, the United States had shown little real interest in the Palestinian 
issue. However, as US troops forged East from Normandy on 6th June 1944 and reports filtered back 
describing of the degree of Nazi atrocities, Roosevelt felt powerless to intervene until the war was 
won. When the latter died on the 12th April 1945, his successor, Harry S. Truman, agreed with Attlee 
to dispatch a fact-finding delegation to Palestine. The Anglo-American delegates were given just 120 
days to complete their task and report back to their respective governments.535 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry 
From 4th January 1946 until the 4th of the following month, members of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry convened first in Washington DC, then in London and on to mainland Europe.  
Twelve members were elected to serve.  They were a mix of academics, politicians and diplomats – 
six representing the United States and six representatives from Britain.536 Under its terms of reference, 
the Committee was required to explore the situation regarding Jewish Holocaust survivors presently 
displaced in the temporary holding camps.  They were to examine what practical measures could be 
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taken by European countries to alleviate their suffering and were charged with estimating the numbers 
“impelled by their conditions” to settle in Palestine.537 To expedite proceedings, they divided into 
several subcommittees. Thus, between the 8th and the 28th February, subcommittee members visited 
camps in the British and American zones of Austria and Germany. However, the Soviet authorities 
advised that there was no problem in its sphere of operations and Committee members were denied 
the opportunity of observing conditions for themselves, including those in the Soviet zone in Austria. 
Although they had free access to France, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland, 
problematic circumstances prevented access to camps in Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria. Poland and Germany, according to anecdotal evidence, were deemed “the cemetery of 
European Jewry”.538 
The report reads as a fraught account of the conditions experienced by liberated survivors 
living in temporary accommodation. On the one hand it is a hard-headed report detailing the numbers 
needing assistance. On the other hand, and barely disguised behind cold-print, it is an expressively 
emotional account. Five million Jews, the Committee stated, had been exterminated, most of whom 
were amongst the weakest: elderly, sick, disabled including millions of innocent women and children. 
Those children who had survived were frequently orphaned. It was rare to find a Jew who was 
physically or emotionally unscathed or to encounter a fully functioning Jewish family.539 Jewish 
survivors, they found, were living under harsh conditions and were embittered seeing their former 
persecutors rebuilding their own shattered lives. A lasting image of the extermination camps was 
brought home forcefully when Committee members toured the remains of the Warsaw ghetto. It left 
“an impression which will forever remain”.540 The Report acknowledged that while military 
authorities did what they could to assist there is an implied accusation that European countries, a 
number of which had been complicit partners in the extermination programme, should have 
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shouldered a greater responsibility. NGO’s in the region had fought against the odds to restore some 
degree of normality. The recently established United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA)541 had assumed a co-ordinating and humanitarian role. The latter 
organisation had followed the Allies northern advance though Italy and had become the Army’s 
humanitarian wing; providing shelter, food, clothing and essential medical supplies. Jewish relief 
agencies of varying complexions were also singled out for praise. One was the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee (AJJDC) which, apart from providing health, welfare and other essential 
services also offered specialist education and guidance on spiritual matters. Importantly, it provided 
information on resettlement opportunities – specifically, ways and means for Jews to emigrate to 
Palestine. Whatever their circumstances, Jewish survivors, whether rich, poor, young or old, were 
reduced to the same level of need; reduced by years of interment and forced labour “to the same level 
of mere existence and homelessness".542 Thousands drifted across Europe trying to locate missing 
family members. Many migrated to the American zones, reacting to a rumour that this offered the 
surest way to Palestine.  
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had also been tasked with recommending what 
practical measures might be taken to combat discrimination. Country after country professed its 
opposition to anti-Semitism (“a poison which after years of infection takes time to eradicate”) but did 
little.543 The consequences of European anti-Semitism and vivid accounts of industrialised 
extermination impelled Committee members to report that nothing short of a new life in Palestine 
could compensate for the loss. Hundreds of thousands of Jewish survivors clamoured to escape but 
found potential escape routes barred. Witnesses expressed an “urgent, indeed frantic, desire” to 
 
541 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was an international organisation established in 1943. Originally under the 
umbrella of the United States to provide relief for the victims of war, it comprised representatives from forty-four nations and helped to coordinate 
the work of numerous charitable organisations. While not a UN agency when it was first conceived by the White House it became part of that 
Organisation in 1945, UNRRA played a major role in assisting displaced persons return to their homes in Europe.  Its operations were largely 
superseded by introduction of the US Marshall Plan in 1948.  (Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) 
542 (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the US Government and HM Government of the United Kingdom, Para 13) 
543 (Ibid, Para 17) 
 
127 
 
emigrate.544 To partly relieve the pressure, Committee members recommended that, in the short term, 
100,000 immigration certificates for admission to Palestine should be issued, in the hopes of 
encouraging others to wait “patiently” until their time came. Alternatively, if the post-war situation 
improved, there was a possibility that many Jews might decide to settle back in Europe.545 On the 
other hand, given the reluctance of many European governments to accept them and proven anti-
Semitism, Palestine offered the one safe option. The journey to Partition was becoming unstoppable.    
After just over three weeks examining the predicament of displaced people across mainland 
Europe, the full Committee travelled to Cairo and then on to Palestine, arriving on the 6th March to 
carry out the final stage of their investigation. Here they set about acquainting themselves with the 
everyday life of Palestinian people and from time to time dispatched subcommittees to regional 
capitals. On their travels they amassed a considerable body of private and public opinion and took 
witness statements from Arab Governments and representatives of other interested parties.546 
Giving his evidence before the Committee, Professor Martin Buber547 stepped aside from the 
commonly held Zionist viewpoint. He believed that while the idea of a Jewish National Home was 
widely recognised, the concept itself was not fully understood. Most Zionists demanded nothing less 
than the freedom to acquire land; land to which Jews held a centuries old spiritual connection. 
Reconstruction of the land required “a permanent powerful influx of [preferably youthful] settlers” 
with an unimpeded right to decide on their own fate and institutions. However, he contended, Jewish 
rights should not be at the expense of another’s. Jews and Arabs had always lived side by side. Rather 
than setting a Jewish majority against an Arab minority, Jews should “absorb [into Palestinian 
society]”. Buber disagreed with mainstream Zionism: that self-determination presupposed a Jewish 
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majority within a separate Jewish state.548 549 Based on the evidence presented to the Committee, 
there was broad consensus among the Jewish contingent on issues surrounding the right to settle, the 
right to acquire land and on the matter of Jewish self-determination. However, Buber’s position was 
unrepresentative of majority Zionist opinion on whether Jews should be enabled to establish a 
majority in an independent Jewish state. 
For his part, Moshe Sharett550 argued that Jews could only be secure in Palestine within a 
“framework of statehood, resting on the Jewish majority”. He contended that this did not deny Arabs 
their independence. After all, he argued, Palestine was surrounded by Arab neighbours and therefore 
Palestinian Arabs would always be a small section of a wider Arab majority in the Arab Middle East. 
Contradicting Buber’s evidence that Jews and Arabs had usually enjoyed social and economic 
harmony, and therefore Jews could be absorbed into the fabric of Arab society, Sharett argued that 
there had long been an undercurrent of “political strife”. He claimed that Palestinian Arab society 
would not absorb them and certainly not in terms of “twos or threes over the existing Arab villages”. 
In any case Jews migrated to Palestine in the search of their own independence “[not, according to 
Sharett, with the] intention of assimilating”.551 When Jews were invited to compare Jewish to Arab 
wage levels, Sharett continued, the question was really one of comparison between the wages paid 
by Jewish employers to Arab workers against those paid by Arab employers to Arabs. Commonly, 
he claimed, Arabs fared better under Jewish employers who had also helped to reduce Arab 
unemployment. Under British law, European Jews were prohibited from emigrating to Palestine even 
though “to the Arab race Palestine is a mere corner [but] to Jews it is the only place ... the Jewish 
State is an urgent necessity ... a burning world issue”. There was no protection other than that afforded 
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by a prospective Jewish National State.552 When questioned by the American representative, Bartley 
Crum,553 on whether he had once favoured partition, Sharett replied, “No, not quite”, but as the Jewish 
Congress of 1937 had decided, it was an option worth exploring.554  
The Committee also took evidence from Emil Ghoury who appeared on behalf of the Arab 
Higher Committee. British legislative and administrative policy, he explained, had been forcefully 
imposed on Arabs. Ghoury claimed that, to Arabs, anti-Semitism was a foreign concept, a European 
phenomenon and that Arabs had no quarrel with Jews. Instead, the dispute was explained by Arab 
opposition to political-Zionism’s resolve to press ahead with its plan to transform the Holy Land into 
a fully Jewish state. However, Jewish ambitions went further: they reached beyond Palestine to a 
“Land of Israel extending from the Tigress to the Nile”.555 Jews could, if they wished, embrace equal 
minority status as did 135,000 Christian Arabs. As a result, there should be no need to insist on 
achieving some “special status”. Ghoury confirmed that the wider Arab world supported Palestinians 
in their resistance to Balfour and Britain’s Mandate that had resulted in calamity. In 1918 Arabs had 
an absolute majority of 93% which was reduced to 68% in less than three decades. This reduction 
also coincided with the loss of Palestine’s most fertile lands. British policy, Ghoury argued, had 
allowed Jews to take control over Palestine’s economic resources. While Arabs had endured “a policy 
of bias and discrimination”; the Jewish Agency had gained the status of privileged de-facto 
government within government.556 Ultimately, it was not so much a question of whether Arabs had 
benefited from Jewish immigration and the Jewish economy, it was a fundamental matter of principle. 
The question was whether “might [should prevail over] “right”.557 Under questioning from 
Committee members, Emil Ghoury was asked specifically to address the issue of Jewish immigration. 
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Richard Crossman started the questioning. He asked whether Jewish immigration would be 
acceptable to Arabs if the concept of a Jewish majority state was abandoned and a Palestine Arab 
state was granted immediately. He also asked if Ghoury believed that there was actually a place for 
Jews anywhere in the Arab Middle East. Ghoury answered emphatically that under all conceivable 
circumstances there would be a total ban on Jewish immigration but, provided Jews abandoned 
Zionism and were prepared to “live in harmony with the Arabs … then there is a place for Jews in the 
Middle East”.558 William Buxton and Reginald Manningham-Buller expanded on Crossman’s line of 
questioning. Mannington-Buller appealed to Ghoury’s sense of conscience. He reminded him that 
amongst the remnants of Jews remaining in Europe many were “elderly, sick and infirm ... and were 
seeking a home and shelter ... for the last few years”. “Palestine”, Ghoury responded, “was not an 
asylum” and he claimed that Jewish immigrants posed a “danger and a threat to the Arabs in 
Palestine”.559 It may not have escaped Ghoury that there was a degree of anti-Semitism within British 
officialdom. Sir Alan Cunningham,560 for instance, described a Zionism where “the forces of 
nationalism are accompanied by the psychology of the Jew which it is important to recognise as 
something quite abnormal and unresponsive to rational treatment”.561 While in Palestine with the 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, Richard Crossman noted that “[British Officials]  are not 
really anti-Semitic [but] off the record, most of the officials here will tell you that Jews are above 
themselves and need taking down a peg or two”.562   
Finally, in April 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry made its 
recommendations. The principle of one was “that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an 
Arab state”.563 Four members of the twelve-man Committee had warned that it was impractical to 
expect that Palestine could cope with a large-scale influx of displaced European Jews. Some, they 
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imagined, would choose to remain in Europe though many more would seek a way out. Now it was 
time for the wider international community to accept its share of the ultimate responsibility. However, 
the signs to date were uninspiring “information as we received about countries other than Palestine 
gave no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave 
Europe”. To ease the pressure, the Committee had recommended that 100,000 immigration 
certificates should be issued immediately. Britain’s Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, refused. He 
insisted that mass immigration should be curtailed until such time that the Yishuv disarmed. Morris 
argues that this was a cynical ploy on Britain’s part when it knew perfectly well that disarmament 
was unachievable without large scale military intervention. Attlee’s Cabinet conditioned its 
acceptance on substantial US military involvement.564 Hoffman contends that, in any event, Attlee 
reasoned that both Arabs and Jews would reject the substance of the Committee Report and that Jews 
in particular  – in line with the central argument of this thesis - were resolutely determined to accept 
nothing less than Partition.565 
For its part, the US Department of War estimated that military intervention would necessitate 
the deployment of some 300,000 of its personnel. However, the United States was, like Britain, weary 
of war and decided against taking drastic measures. Instead, President Truman endorsed both the 
recommendation for 100,000 Jewish immigrants and another that would have rescinded Britain’s 
1939 White Paper restrictions on Arab to Jewish land transfer.566 In a statement of 4th October 1946 
Truman was “gratified” that the Anglo-American Committee had accepted his “suggestion that 
100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine ... [and still] maintained [his] deep interest in the matter ... 
that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment” to implement the plan.567 By contrast, Britain 
rejected the immigration recommendation and with it, the Committee Report in its entirety. Bickerton 
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and Klausner argue that Bevin’s refusal to accept the Committee’s suggested immigration increase 
“was a serious error of Judgement”, because it may have part-appeased Zionists and prevented much 
of the bloodshed that followed.568 The reason for the rejection is explained by the fact that Bevin’s 
military advisors warned that such a move would involve a considerable deployment of troops and 
impose a financial burden that Britain could ill-afford. Attlee contacted Truman on the 26th May 
advising him that Britain was ready to accept military intervention provided the US would help 
shoulder the burden. This, together with differences that had arisen over the future of Palestine, 
caused friction between the two Powers. Truman was anxious to press ahead and allow Jewish 
survivors to emigrate to Palestine. Attlee and Bevin were angered by Truman’s attitude. Bevin 
accused Truman of bowing to Jewish internal pressure and in any event, “they did not want the Jews” 
coming to America.  Indeed, between the end of the war and September 1946, fewer than six thousand 
immigrant Jews had been admitted into the United States. This contrasted with Britain’s commitment. 
By the end of 1945, as well as other military obligations, it had deployed 80,000 troops to Palestine 
and sustained numerous casualties. The region was scarred by attacks from opposition groups 
including the Stern Gang569 and the Irgun who were intent on creating pandemonium despite punitive 
British reprisals. In this highly charged political atmosphere relations between the United States and 
Britain became decidedly frosty.570 
The Anglo-American Committee’s proposals were published on the 1st May 1946. Given the 
present unrest and having recommended that Palestine should be neither wholly Jewish nor Arab, the 
Committee stopped short of bowing to the inevitability of Partition but recommended instead that 
Britain should continue temporary stewardship pending a UN Trustee arrangement. This temporary 
arrangement, the Committee suggested, might well continue for some time to come. There is scant 
evidence that the Anglo-American Committee accepted the Arab contention that Zionists had wider 
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territorial ambitions. However, the Committee may have been swayed by Arab reassurances that the 
present Jewish minority would benefit from equal status in a majority Arab Palestine, or (despite 
evidence to the contrary) by Buber’s argument that Jews could be readily absorbed into mainstream 
Arab society. In arriving at their recommendation for a unitary state, the Committee had bypassed 
evidence that European countries were refusing to accommodate a share of refugees, yet it had 
somehow acknowledged that 100,000 of these should gain immediate access to Palestine leaving 
hundreds of thousands of Jews to an unknown fate.  
The Morrison-Grady Plan 
Following on from the Anglo-American report, British and American officials drew up a further plan. 
On the 10th June 1946 Ambassador Henry F. Grady met in London with British representatives 
including the Deputy Leader of Attlee’s Labour Party, Herbert Morrison. The Anglo-American 
proposals were the basis for talks. The outcome was the Plan for Provincial Autonomy. Under the 
Plan, Palestine was to be effectively partitioned though this time divided into four provinces 
(cantons): one each allocated to Arabs and Jews with the remaining two under British authority. 
Collectively, the four would comprise a broad federation controlled at the centre by a British High 
Commissioner. Reflecting on the Anglo-American recommendations, British restrictions on land 
purchases were to be rescinded. Somewhat surprisingly, considering Bevin’s former opposition, there 
was to be provision for 100,000 Jewish immigrants.571 Ultimately, the Morrison-Grady Plan failed to 
impress. Arab delegates restated counter proposals that Palestine should form a single unitary state 
overseen by a proportionally apportioned Legislative Assembly, but that Jewish representation should 
not exceed one third of the total. 
After the war, British naval efforts to stem the flow of illegal Jewish immigrants disembarking 
in Palestinian ports imposed a heavy strain on British/Jewish relations. Opposition elements (notably 
the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi572) created chaos amongst British forces, which came to a 
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head on the 22nd July 1946 with the bombing of the King David Hotel, “the nerve centre of British 
rule in Palestine” and causing the deaths of ninety-one people including Britons, Jews, Arabs and 
others. Hoffman argues that the Irgun had achieved its objective by alerting the world’s press to its 
struggle and the mayhem in the region. In its analysis of the atrocity, the Manchester Guardian 
reported that the bombing would “be a shock to those who imagined that the Government’s firmness 
has put a stop to Jewish terrorism and brought about an easier situation in Palestine. In fact, the 
opposite is the truth”.573 Events had reached a crisis point and British forces reacted swiftly by 
incarcerating over two thousand Jews. In the meantime, politicians dithered over Papers and Plans 
while unprecedented numbers of refugees streamed out of the post-war chaos of Europe into 
Palestine. To make matters worse, Zionist forces intensified the pressure on the beleaguered 
Administration. In a letter addressed to General Sir Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner for 
Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee demanded the death penalty for all Jews found guilty of 
terrorism.  The Jewish Agency responded that they had no connection or control over terrorist 
organisations and denied a Daily Telegraph suggestion that the Agency had the power to prevent 
attacks. Meanwhile, the Stern Gang vowed to fight on. Bevin was reportedly willing to consider 
Jewish and Arab counterproposals but for the moment, in his view, provisional autonomy was “fair 
and workable”. Looking ahead, he referred to the possibility of a United Nations controlled 
trusteeship arrangement.574 
Britain’s Last Gasp – Ernest Bevin’s Plan 
In February 1947, Ernest Bevin, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, convened a meeting of interested parties 
in a last-ditch attempt to break the current deadlock. Having already wasted time with commissions, 
parliamentary procedures and endless political manoeuvrings, HM Government had consistently 
failed to arrive at a policy which was acceptable to either of the two conflicting parties. Jews 
demanded free immigration into an independent homeland (a Jewish state) while Arabs refused to 
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concede on both demands. Bevin was running out of patience. Notwithstanding the problematic issue 
of Palestine, HM Government was also preoccupied with other concerns. Like many European states, 
it was struggling with the herculean burden of recovery from the ravages of a war that had ended less 
than two years before. Bercuson sets a vivid scene: Wartime rationing remained in force; major 
factories were lying idle and unemployment was increasing. Wheat and simple household goods were 
in short supply. With coal at critically low levels, power stations failed to meet demand. Millions 
strove to make ends meet. Parts of Europe were in an even sorrier state. Whole cities lay in ruins. A 
large percentage of Jews had died in the Holocaust: homes and personal belongings had been 
destroyed or appropriated and many survivors roamed across the European continent in search of 
missing family and friends. Now in the winter of 1946/1947, huge numbers of displaced people 
crowded into makeshift camps including most uprooted Jews “unable or unwilling to return ‘home’”- 
a ‘home’ that no longer existed in the European killing-grounds.575 Against this background and 
during an abnormally savage winter, Bercuson highlights what was soon to become one of Britain’s 
final political acts on the Palestine question. Continuing in evocative style, Bercuson writes that in “a 
cold room at the Foreign Office, with the lights flickering because of power shortages, Bevin [laid 
out his plan]”.576 
Under Bevin’s plan, again, Palestine would be partitioned into ‘Cantons’. Individual Cantons 
would have either sizable Jewish or Arab majorities reflective of local demographics; each to enjoy 
a large measure of political autonomy. For five years, Britain would enter into a Trusteeship 
arrangement supervised by a High Commissioner charged with protecting minority interests. The 
Trusteeship would oversee the formation of a representative Advisory Council and later, an elected 
Constitutional Assembly. If all agreed after the five-year period, Palestine could become an 
independent entity. If not, the matter would be referred to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. 
4,000 immigration certificates were to be issued each month for a period of twenty-four months (i.e. 
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96,000 in total) after which the High Commissioner, in consultation with the Advisory Council, would 
rule on the matter.577 In fact, Bevin’s plan was not too dissimilar to the Morrison-Grady plan, so it 
would have come as little surprise that it too was also roundly rejected. Later, the majority of 
UNSCOP members were unimpressed by both the cantonal and the bi-national state proposals. These 
would have necessitated dubious artificial adjustments to achieve the required political and numerical 
divisions. Also, the majority of UNSCOP members later argued that given the manner in which the 
Arab population was diffused across Palestine, Bevin’s cantonal proposal implied troublesome 
fragmentation of service provision. Both the Morrison-Grady and Bevin plans were compromise 
solutions. The Plans were predicated on a theoretical two-state solution with Cantonisation being a 
disjointed form of Partition; itself the legal consequence of immigration policy under Article 6 of the 
British Mandate, vis-à-vis “The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and 
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish 
immigration”.578 Jews and Arabs rejected Cantonisation leaving full-scale Partition as the one 
available option. Jamal Husseini, who had recently become vice-president of the Arab Higher 
Committee, refused to consider any solution other than an independent Arab Palestine. On 30th 
December 1946 he reported to al-Wahba:579 “[Arabs will fight Partition since] even the tiniest Jewish 
state will be a rotten apple in a box of otherwise good apples”.580 
As the years passed, it became increasingly apparent to one investigative Commission after 
another that Balfour’s 1917 ‘dual obligation’ pledge could only be resolved by Partition. Now, thirty 
years on and still unprepared to grasp the unavoidability of the latter, Britain found its forces trapped 
in a conflict spiralling out of control. With its military and economic resources stretched to its limits, 
the time was ripe for Britain to surrender its League of Nations Mandate to the United Nations. 
Matters had reached a critical point. In a speech made to the House of Commons on 18th February 
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1947, Bevin stated that “[Arabs] regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as 
jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine ... [Arabs] are 
therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine”.581 Karsh argues that 
Bevin’s motives were mixed. Either the UN would react to his announcement by providing a clear 
mandate for a British imposed trusteeship, or alternatively, by establishing a unitary Arab state either 
controlled by or absorbed into Transjordan.582 Either way, Jews would comprise a minority of the 
population. Bevin justified his announcement by suggesting that a two-state solution was not viable 
though, evidently, a one-state solution was. In either case, Jewish immigration was unstoppable. It 
was time for Britain to relinquish responsibility and for the United Nations to find an alternative 
arrangement. 
Britain Surrenders the Mandate to the United Nations 
On the 2nd April 1947, with pressure mounting and options running out, the United Kingdom 
government referred the question of Palestine to the United Nations General Assembly, requesting 
that a Special Committee be constituted to prepare and submit an account of the Palestine Mandate 
and to make recommendations. As a result, on the 28th April, Secretary General, Trygve Lie, 
summoned UN members to a special session. First there were procedural matters to attend to: 
Representing the UK, Sir Alexander Cadogan set out his government’s position "We have tried for 
years to solve the problem of Palestine. Having failed so far, we now bring it to the United Nations, 
in the hope that it can succeed where we have not”.583 It was unavoidable that as neither of the two 
main protagonists was prepared to surrender its position, Britain, as the Mandatory Power could do 
no more. As a result, the General Committee (which served as the Agenda Committee of the General 
Assembly) met in New York on the 29th April 1947. They discussed the United Kingdom’s proposal 
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that a special committee should be established to prepare a report on the question of Palestine. Most 
members of the Assembly had already responded favourably to the UN Secretary-General’s request 
to convene in special session.584 
Mr Asaf Ali, the Indian representative opened the questioning. He asked Sir Alexander 
Cadogan (United Kingdom) that if press reports were to be believed, the UK Government would not 
necessarily abide by a United Nations recommendation. He went further and retorted that if this was 
the case, there was no point in considering the agenda item. Hassan Pasha, representing Egypt, agreed 
and insisted that the United Kingdom answer the question, since only then could he decide whether 
to support inclusion of the item. The USSR representative, Mr Gromyko also agreed. The Chairman, 
Osvaldo Aranha (Brazil), reminded Ali that this committee was charged with deciding only on the 
inclusion of an agenda item and not, according to Rule 33, to rule on political questions. Clearly, 
Ali’s question was intended to disrupt proceedings. Aranha gave Cadogan the opportunity to respond. 
Cadogan referred to a recent House of Lords debate during which Lord Hill had stated that he could 
not “imagine His Majesty’s government carrying out a policy of which it did not approve”. Hill’s 
statement, Cadogan continued, did not imply that HM Government would refuse to accept any 
recommendation; just those it believed were wrong.585 Neither Pasha nor Ali were satisfied. Hill’s 
statement, Ali persisted, implied that if HM Government did not approve of a UN recommendation 
then it “will walk out of the whole show”, despite an understanding that all UN signatories should 
accept and agree to abide by its decisions. Ali argued that, by implication, consideration of the present 
agenda item was “a sheer waste of time”. In response, Cadogan reasoned, that if the GA’s decision 
ignored the fact that Britain bore the “responsibility [of Palestine] single handed ... [one] which we 
could not reconcile with our conscience, should we single-handed be expected to expend blood and 
treasure in carrying it out?”.586 
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Egyptian and other Arab delegates had proposed a supplementary or amending proposal, one 
that would bind the special committee to accept that the independence of Palestine was guaranteed. 
In Arab terms, this would imply that Arab Palestine was a single indivisible entity but after a vigorous 
debate the inclusion of the UK proposal on the agenda was adopted vis-à-vis “Constituting and 
instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of Palestine at the 
[General Assembly]”.587 
Now the question of the Special Committee’s terms of reference was referred to the then UN 
First Committee for consideration. After a series of twelve meetings the First Committee reported 
back on the 13th May 1947.588 The Committee had granted hearings to representatives from the Jewish 
Agency and the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine as it was agreed that these organisations were 
pertinent to the constitution, and instructions given to the Special Committee. Some fringe 
organisations had asked to be heard but were refused because it was felt that they did not necessarily 
speak for Palestinians. It was agreed that a future Special Committee would be free to decide 
otherwise.589 
Before arriving at an agreement, the First Committee and its sub-committees were obliged to 
navigate through a maze of proposals, counter proposals and amendments from the US, the USSR, 
India, Poland, Iraq and others. India and the Soviet Union submitted a joint proposal for “the 
establishment without delay the independent democratic state of Palestine”. The proposal was 
defeated.590 The First Committee accepted an amendment extending the Special Committee’s terms 
of reference. Provided Special Committee members agreed, they would be free to conduct their 
investigations “wherever it may deem useful”.591 Thus, Special Committee members were given the 
freedom to journey to any camp in any city of their choosing, including those in war-torn Europe and 
permitted to collect testimony from Jewish survivors. The latter amendment was crucial. At a stroke, 
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the First Committee had forged a plausible associative connection between displaced European Jews 
and Palestine. Yet to be determined was the composition of the Special Committee and whether it 
should include one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Australian 
representative argued against this, suggesting that it should be composed of eleven independent 
members. His proposal was narrowly accepted. With little contention, the countries selected were 
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay 
and Yugoslavia.592 However, there was some dissent to the overall proposal. This came from the 
Lebanese representative who echoed the views of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He announced 
that he would abstain from voting since there was no “mention of independence of Palestine [which] 
had been severely suppressed from [the Special Committee’s] terms of reference”. Likewise, he 
protested that the scene had shifted from one of offering advice to the Mandatory Authority on how 
it should conduct the future governance of Palestine to “consideration of the so-called problem of 
Palestine in general”.593 
Finally, by a majority, the First Committee recommended to the General Assembly that: a 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) should be created and its membership 
should be as above,594 it should be granted the widest powers to ascertain, record and investigate all 
questions relating to Palestine,595 it should determine its own procedure,596 it should “investigate in 
Palestine and wherever it may deem useful”,597 it should consider all “religious  interests in 
Palestine”598 and make proposals for a solution reporting back to the General Assembly no later than 
on the 1st September 1947.599 
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The United Kingdom had negotiated the first UN hurdle relatively unscathed and had taken a 
step towards extricating itself from the Palestine predicament. Zionists had also taken another step 
towards their goal. From day one it was evident to all participants that whatever the eventual decision, 
Arabs would accept nothing less than an independent Arab-majority Palestine. They were seen to be 
fighting for their cause, but their intransigence would doom them to failure.  
The General Assembly Decide 
On the 14th May 1947, the GA convened at Flushing Meadow, New York to discuss the First 
Committee’s report and consider its recommendations. Again, President, Oswaldo Aranha (Brazil) 
was in the chair.600 He explained that the report was the subject of high controversy. The rapporteur 
for the First Committee outlined the work that had gone before and called attention to the strongly 
held reservations of some of the previous participants. He warned that if the problem was to be solved 
at all it was one that required a spirit of fairness, understanding and conciliation. It was not just a legal 
problem, but “above all, a problem of human relations”.601 
Mr Jamal, representing Iraq, lost no time in coming to the point. He claimed that draft after 
draft had contained the term ‘independence’, but now suddenly the word had been removed entirely 
from the terms of reference when independence was the only way to “peace based on Justice”. In 
Jamal’s opinion, justice meant granting political freedom specifically for the Arabs of Palestine. The 
Mandate should be terminated, but the terms of reference implied that “the only instruction was that 
there shall be no instruction”.602 Jamal was adamant that though the Palestine question was difficult, 
the answer was simple. To “prevent the aggressive invasion [by Jews]” intent on establishing a Jewish 
state in Arab occupied land, the solution lay in reaffirming those principles enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter guaranteeing the political rights of the present inhabitants.603 Jamal’s delivery was 
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uncompromising and would have come as no surprise to the gathered Assembly. However, all 
members would be concentrating on the translation when the influential voice of a permanent member 
of the Security Council, Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, delivered Stalin’s verdict.604 
Stalin Lays His Cards on the Table 
That the Palestine question had been referred by the United Kingdom exposed the acuteness of the 
political problem. It followed, Gromyko stated, that the Mandatory Administration had failed. The 
Peel Commission of 1937 echoed the Permanent Mandates Commission’s conclusion that it was 
impossible to implement the Palestine Mandate and the 1936 Arab uprising merely confirmed the 
“bankruptcy” of the Administrative system. Gromyko reminded the GA that, on the 18th February 
1947, UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had himself confessed that “the mandate [was] 
unworkable” because Jewish and Arab political ambitions where irreconcilable.605 Both sides were 
at odds, but they were also at odds with the British administration. The “so-called” Anglo-American 
Committee, Gromyko mocked, arrived at the same conclusion: “That Palestine ... has become “an 
armed camp” is a fact that speaks for itself”.606 Time and again Gromyko was increasingly cynical 
about Britain’s administrative efforts. He cited the burgeoning numbers of police and prison service 
personnel employed in Palestine. He derided the fact that while expenditure on law and order had 
burgeoned, only a tiny fraction of available funds had been devoted to the essential services of health 
and education. Levelling his condemnation directly at the United Kingdom he quoted the Anglo-
American Committee’s appraisal that “even from a budgetary point of view, Palestine has developed 
into a semi-military or police state”.607 This, he said, raised the question whether a satisfactory 
solution could be found in conformity with the interests of all concerned. Gromyko drew a link 
between Jewish displaced people in Europe and a future Palestine administration.  Jews, he 
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emphasised, had undergone “suffering [that was] indescribable ... only around a million and a half 
[out of approximately seven and a half million in Western Europe] had survived the war”.608 He 
pointedly accused Western European countries of failing to provide adequate assistance to Jews and 
to protect their very existence as a people. He argued that this underlined the fact that Jews needed to 
establish their own state, so it was incumbent on UNSCOP to consider this important aspect. “[T]here 
are many different plans regarding the decisions of the Jewish people in connection with the Palestine 
question”. Among the best known, he continued, were: a single Arab-Jewish state in Palestine with 
equal rights for all its inhabitants, or the Partition of Palestine into two independent states, or an Arab 
state without due regards for Jewish rights, or finally, a Jewish state lacking consideration for Arab 
rights. He emphasised that as both sides had historical roots in Palestine, it was their shared homeland 
as each belonged to the economic and cultural life of the whole. Thus, the latter two extreme unilateral 
solutions to the Palestine question should be ruled out. In an ideal world the Soviet Union favoured 
the establishment of a single “independent, dual, democratic homogeneous Arab-Jewish State”; one 
dependent on a climate of mutual co-operation.609 
Gromyko had forged a strong link between Jewish refugees in Europe and a Jewish state in 
Palestine. “It would be unjust [he said] not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the 
Jewish people to realize this aspiration”.610 Of course, mass Jewish immigration into Palestine was 
the crux of Arab-Jewish hostility. This new-found sympathy with Zionism was a reversal of the Soviet 
Union’s earlier position. Ben-Asher explains that as far back as 1919 Jewish communists had 
encouraged the Soviet authorities to outlaw Zionism. Leon Trotsky had labelled Zionism as “a 
reactionary utopianism, an unrealisable chauvinistic dream,” though Vladimir Lenin had denied 
Zionist assertions that anti-Semitism ran through the fabric of Soviet society. Up to this point, the 
Soviet leadership had shown no special concern regarding the issues in Palestine.611 However, now 
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that the war was over, the political climate began to favour Zionism. Jews, who had previously 
supported the Allies, now turned on Britain’s Mandate. This encouraged Stalin to achieve two aims 
in parallel; to end Britain’s imperialistic interference in the Middle East and to open the door to Soviet 
Communist involvement in Palestine. One small step came in 1945 when the Kremlin authorised and 
smoothed the passage for thousands of Jewish survivors in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
Hungary to relocate to the American zone - one step closer to Palestine.612 
Gromyko had referred to the deteriorating situation at some length so before launching into 
the final part of his speech that surely had Stalin’s blessing, he announced his country’s final position. 
He avoided addressing separate Jewish and Arab Cantons and announced that, if in the event, 
UNSCOP concluded that due to irreparable Jewish-Arab relations, a single state “proved impossible 
to implement” then Partition was the only available option.613 At this early stage Gromyko had made 
Stalin’s views clear. Having stated that Partition may prove to be the one realistic option, then as a 
powerful permanent-five UN member state, the Soviet Union’s stance would have carried 
considerable weight within its sphere of influence and made Partition significantly more probable.  
Arabs State Their Bottom Line 
Arab countries disagreed and objected strongly on grounds that the Special Committee’s term of 
reference did not include consideration of a Palestinian-Arab independent state. They dismissed 
outright a credible connection between displaced European Jews and Palestine.  Citing ancient 
historic and biblical sources, the Syrian representative, El-Khouri, rejected claims that Jews had 
proven claims on Palestine.614 Rather than assimilate into what is, after all, an Arab country, Jews 
could “create good understanding with the people of their own homes from which they had been 
displaced ... with people who speak the same language” and migrate to European countries that 
claimed to have re-established democracy and liberty. Instead, displaced Jews were actively 
 
612 UN General Assembly (A/2/PV.77) Seventy-Seventh Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1947, pages 132-132 
613 (Ibid, 11-12) 
614 UN General Assembly (A/2/PV.78), Seventy-Eighth Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1947 
145 
 
dissuaded from this by the political ideals of Zionism. El-Khouri argued that Palestine was a land of 
deserts and mountains with a population of around two-million and too tiny to consider partitioning. 
Palestine had already taken in thousands of Jewish survivors leaving “no room [for] more”.615 Jewish 
refugees, he asserted, must not be enabled “to dominate [nor] exterminate”.616 Malik, representing 
Lebanon, expanded on El-Khouri’s denial of the Jewish refugee/Palestine connection. He argued that 
it was the Jewish Agency that had persuaded the authors of the draft terms of references to grant 
permission to UNSCOP to investigate “wherever it may deem useful”.617 He claimed that this was an 
open invitation to Special Committee members to visit displaced Jewish camps in Europe. The 
Committee would necessarily draw a connection, however strained and artificial, between the 
problems of Jewish refugees and Palestine. This connection had been established without study into 
the subject and without definitive General Assembly authority. Malik also protested that whenever it 
was proposed that Palestine could expect to become independent like other Class-A mandated 
countries, it was argued that “independence would prejudge the issue”. Moreover, Malik continued, 
the Jewish Agency had somehow persuaded many that de facto recognition of Palestine’s 
independence would load “the dice [in favour of] Arabs against the Jews”.618 Henríquez Ureña 
representing the Dominican Republic, reminded the Assembly that although the term ‘independence’ 
was not in UNSCOP’s terms of reference, it was likely to be considered “one of the solutions”.619 
The General Assembly Debate UNSCOP 
The First Committee had recommended that permanent members of the Security Council should be 
denied membership of UNSCOP because the Permanent-Five carried considerable authority that 
could tip the balance one way or the other. It was probable that some undecided or dependent 
countries could be leaned on by one or other of the great Powers. However, Mr Picerno, representing 
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Argentina, supported their inclusion as they were “important and influential powers in the political 
structure of the world [and could] render valuable assistance”.620 Nonetheless, the Permanent-Five 
members ruled themselves out.  
Quo Tai-Chi’s was an important intervention. As neither a majority Jewish, Moslem nor 
Christian country, he said China (P5 member) was a “completely disinterested [though not an] 
uninterested party” to the Palestine question.621 The aspirations of Palestinian Arabs 0acknowledge 
the Balfour Declaration which was, on reflection, merely a British statement of policy supported by 
a questionable British Mandate. However, the Holocaust had aroused “spontaneous [international] 
sympathy” and having contributed much to mankind, Jews were surely deserving of “a place [they] 
can call its own ... free from the eternal fear of persecution”.  He suggested that the answer to the 
problem was not to be found in history or in legal terms, but rather in “the clear voice of the human 
heart and the human conscience”. China too had drawn a direct connection between Holocaust 
survivors and Jewish independence in Palestine. Like Quo Tai-Chi, Henríquez Ureña (Dominican 
Republic) called for action to lessen the suffering of thousands of displaced Jews.622 
On the second day of the two-day Special Session, Asaf Ali (India) made his country’s 
position known. It was a significant development given that India too was about to be entangled in 
the violent consequences of Partition.623 While Ali expressed reservations (undoubtedly under 
instruction from Nehru) and started prudently, he later ill-advisedly overlooked Nehru’s ruling. 
Kumaraswamy claims that Ali had been advised to seek Indian membership of UNSCOP, but not to 
commit India to any substantive viewpoint without first obtaining permission from New Delhi. Egypt, 
Kumaraswamy writes, had proposed an agenda item which, if approved, would have opened a debate 
on the question of Arab-Palestine independence. While Nehru was sympathetic to Egypt’s proposal, 
he was anxious to avoid straining relations with other countries.624 Ali supported Nehru’s Indian 
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National Congress plainly pro-Arab position, but disregarded New Delhi’s cautionary advice that it 
was for sponsors to make their own case but instead he “argued vehemently [for the] Arab 
proposal”.625 Ali had been instrumental in persuading Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, to 
give evidence before the General Committee. Now, in a move that surprised and upset many of his 
fellow Muslims, he pressed that leaders of the Jewish Agency should be afforded the same courtesy. 
If one or other of the two main parties were denied this opportunity then, Ali argued, the United 
Nations would be seen to be favouring one side over the other.626 Kumaraswamy confirms that in 
accordance with Indian official policy, Ali voted against a Panama-Guatemala proposal allowing 
UNSCOP members to visit displacement camps in Europe. Delhi consistently refused to accept any 
connection between displacement camps and Palestine. Also, Ali agreed to the exclusion of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council from serving on UNSCOP. During his unguarded 
delivery he inferred that, other than China, the neutrality of the remaining P5 members was 
questionable because they had interests of one form or another in the Middle East.627 On several 
occasions Ali drew parallels with the situation facing his own country. Directly aimed at Middle East 
representatives, Ali pressed that should the GA reject independence then Arab countries “will be free 
to do exactly as you like. Who says you should not?” He compared the Arab fight for independence 
in Palestine to that of India’s; “you can kill us [but] we are independent, and we shall see that nobody 
treats us otherwise”.628 
Jewish Immigration at the Core of the Problem 
Asif Ali next focused on Jewish immigration - “the core of the problem”. He deflected his evident 
opposition by suggesting that, rather than Jews, there could be two million Arabs from elsewhere 
who may decide to enter Palestine. He asked, “do you realize the danger?”.629 Nevertheless, he 
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appealed to Middle East States to maintain a climate of peace. Then, allowing his emotions to 
overcome reason, he warned, “that if the peace of Palestine is disturbed, the third great world war 
will definitely be precipitated. I have no doubt of that”.630 
Asif Ali’s speech infuriated the Indian Congress Party. Reacting to Ali’s suggestion that the 
Jewish Agency should testify, ‘The Dawn’ (a Karachi-based daily newspaper) reported that “Ali does 
not represent Muslim India and is acting contrary to Muslim India’s views”. Zionists were also upset 
by Ali’s clearly pro-Arab stance.631 On the 14th May 1947, Nehru voiced his concerns: “It pays often 
enough not to give too frequent expression of our views ... when there are many observations they 
are apt to irritate one party or the other needlessly”.632 Nevertheless, it was obvious to the General 
Assembly that Palestinian Arabs had gained a predominantly Hindu country to their cause.   
During the lengthy two-day session, the United Kingdom found itself at the centre of criticism. 
Other than stating the “extreme complexity” of the problem and assuring members of its intention to 
facilitate the investigation, Sir Alexander Cadogan refused to be drawn into the wider substance of 
the matter.633 In the meantime, the United Kingdom would continue its restrictive Jewish immigration 
policy. The Special Session was originally convened to debate procedural issues and establish the 
ground rules for what would eventually become UNSCOP. However, the debate had strayed onto the 
complexities of the Palestine question and as a result the divergent views of the assembled countries 
were exposed before UNSCOP had examined the issue and expressed its opinion. 
UNSCOP Established by the UN General Assembly 
On the 15th May 1947, the General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the First Committee 
by a majority decision.  Thus, an eleven-member UNSCOP was established and granted “widest 
powers” to investigate, to travel to whatever destination most suited and to gather evidence from 
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sources including governments, organisations and individuals. A Norwegian proposal calling for a 
climate of peace in Palestine to ease progress towards “an early settlement of the question of 
Palestine” was passed unanimously.634 
Members of the GA were determined that UNSCOP should remain free from outside 
interference. Britain, as the mandatory power, had first-hand knowledge of the complexity of the 
issues involved. However, other than participate as a key witness, it had no role to play in the decision-
making process.635 Ben-Dror explains that the United States, having been recently involved in the 
fraught Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry deliberations, stepped to one side without argument. 
Again, the Soviet Union distanced itself from UNSCOP. By excluding the Permanent Five members, 
the General Assembly intended that the eleven members elected to serve should “make their 
recommendations free of any pressure of the great powers”. Similarly, Arab representation was also 
excluded.636 
General Assembly Members Elected to Serve on UNSCOP 
Out of 56 full members of the General Assembly, it was decided to exclude the five Permanent 
Members and members of Arab states. Eleven countries selected their official Representatives and 
Alternates. In his memoirs of the time written soon after the event, UNSCOP’s Guatemalan Delegate, 
Jorge Garcia-Granados gives his impressions of his UNSCOP colleagues: 
Granados describes UNSCOP’s Chairman, former Justice of Sweden’s Supreme Court, Emil 
Sandstrom, as a slim, white-haired, handsome individual usually dressed in a white shirt and maroon-
coloured bow tie. A man who stood out from the from the crowd. Clever and cunning, autocratic at 
times, he was accustomed to getting his own way.637  
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Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand was Canada’s representative. Granados describes him as a 
large, balding, slightly stooped, middle-aged man with a near-melancholic air given to ruminating 
over some obscure legal point.638 
Australia’s delegate was John D. L. Hood. A “retiring, soft spoken and athletic figure”. Hood 
was a former Rhodes scholar and had worked for the London Times.639 During days of debate, his 
opinion was influential.  
Having served in several European cities, Czechoslovakia’s delegate, Dr Karel Lisicky had 
long experience in the diplomatic world. Granados describes him as “a big painstaking man” 
somewhat sardonic in tone with an undercurrent of bitterness towards the world in general. 
Unflatteringly, Granados describes Lisicky as “slow in action, conservative in policy and exact in his 
labours”.640 
The Netherland’s delegate Dr Nicholaas Blom is characterised as smiling, blond-haired and 
early middle aged. With a passion for detail he was inclined to meticulously dissecting a discussion 
“until he had exposed it with [exhaustive] clarity”.641 
Unlike the other ten appointees to UNSCOP who were assisted by just one Alternative 
representative, the Yugoslav delegation consisted of Dr Vladimir Simic (President of the Yugoslav 
Senate), his Alternative, Dr Jose Brilej, six secretaries and a press officer. During WWII, Brilej had 
fought with the Yugoslav Partisans and had been a member of the non-communist Catholic Workers 
Association in Yugoslavia. His senior, Vladimir Simic, is characterised by Granados as a non-
communist, democratic president of the Yugoslav Bar Association.642 
Sir Abdur Rahman was a middle-aged, non-drinking (explained also by his faith), non-
smoking, highly excitable individual with an explosive temperament. Nevertheless, despite his 
“constant irritation”, Granados warmed to him. A devout Muslim, member of the Indian Congress 
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Party and High Court Judge, Rahman was appointed by Nehru, Prime Minister of a largely Hindu 
India. In the aftermath of the post-Partition riots in India and Rahman’s concern for his family’s 
safety, it transpired that he was constitutionally opposed to Partition.643 
Rahman and Nasrollah Entezam, former Foreign Minister of Iran,644 were the two Muslim 
members of UNSCOP. Entezam, was a dark, slight man who combined “the courtesy and the subtlety 
of the Oriental with the customs and expression of the West”. He and Granados became close 
colleagues.645 
Uruguay’s delegate, Professor Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, was a former Minister of 
Education. His character becomes clear in Granados’s account of when he, Garcia Salazar (the 
Peruvian delegate) and Fabregat first drove into Jerusalem. Fabregat was a romantic who thrilled in 
the delights of his surroundings. He gloried in all that was noble and beautiful. His innate romanticism 
was swept along in a tide with laughter that shook him from head to his “somewhat bandied legs”. 
Granados revelled in his good nature.646 
Peruvian delegate Dr Arturo Garcia Salazar was Peru’s ambassador to the Vatican. He 
represented Latin America in UNSCOP, along with Fabregat (Uruguay) and Granados (Guatemala). 
As a Conservative Catholic, Salazar was initially stoic when it came to the future of Jerusalem. Later, 
he was prepared to compromise on several issues and subsequently emerged as an independently 
minded member of UNSCOP.  
The final member of UNSCOP’s team was Jorge Garcia-Granados himself. He was a 
grandson of former President of Guatemala, Miguel Garcia-Granados. He compared the backward 
social and political systems that once affected his own country, with present-day Palestine. Both 
countries were essentially agrarian economies with tracts of land in need of modernisation. His 
background was scarred by violent upheaval and political struggle. He suffered frequent terms of 
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imprisonment, had been exiled and, on one occasion, had faced a possible death sentence. In 1944, 
Granados was elected to serve on the Constituent Assembly, becoming its President until 1945 when 
he served as Guatemala’s Ambassador to the United States.647 Having been elected to serve on the 
Special Committee, the above eleven members were ready to move onto the next stage.  
Summary 
Britain’s 1939 White Paper posed a challenge to Zionists though by the time they met to discuss the 
matter at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May 1942, attitudes had begun to crystalize. To Ben-
Gurion, who had by now assumed the lead role, Britain was a lost cause so that while Jews should 
demonstrate their loyalty to Britain in wartime, they must also realise the advantages to be gained by 
close alignment with the United States Government and American Zionists.648 Ben-Gurion sought a 
compromise sufficient to satisfy colleagues who believed that rescuing endangered Jews from the 
European arena was of more immediate concern than others who believed that Zionists ambitions for 
a Jewish state came first. Ben-Gurion’s twin-track approach that these two requirements were not 
mutually exclusive persuaded the majority of the need for an independent Jewish state free to set its 
own immigration policy with the proviso that the non-Jewish community retained civil, religious and 
political autonomy over their own internal affairs. Although dismissed by Weizmann as 
inconsequential, Biltmore, Brady contends, was a significant step towards Jewish statehood649 and, 
by May 1945, the Jewish Agency was in no mood for compromise. The Agency demanded that Britain 
should announce the immediate establishment of a Jewish state and the transfer of the first million 
Jewish survivors.650 However, Britain under Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin, had other ideas. Any sympathetic consideration was soon dispelled by the extreme 
levels of violence perpetrated by Jewish militants on British troops in Palestine. 
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After witnessing the predicament facing Jewish survivors in post-Holocaust Europe, Anglo-
American Committee members, while undoubtably mindful that a number of European Nations were 
complicit, proposed that all should help shoulder the burden. As a starting point, the Committee 
supported the issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates to Palestine. Truman accepted while 
Bevin’s refusal was “a serious error of judgement” and conceivably added to future bloodshed.651 
Most notably, the Committee had established a causal connection between Jewish survivors and 
Palestine.  
In 1946 Britain’s Herbert Morrison and American Henry Grady proposed fragmented 
Partition (separate Provinces) as did Bevin in 1947 with his Cantonisation proposal. Both 
arrangements met the same fate. With options exhausted, Britain surrendered its task to the United 
Nations.  In turn, the UN General Assembly established an eleven-member UNSCOP with free rein 
to gather evidence from Middle East sources and war-torn Europe. This decision was a major 
milestone on the way to Partition.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Introduction 
The thesis continues with an examination of the pivotal work of UNSCOP. It scrutinises 
Britain’s near-impossible mission in Palestine and casts a fresh eye on the conflicting evidence 
offered by British, Arab and Jewish interviewees. 
In contrast to Palestinian Arabs who refused to participate in the proceedings, the Jewish 
contingency cooperated. The Arab omission was offset to some extent by evidence presented by 
statesmen from neighbouring Arab states, all unanimously agreeing that continued Jewish 
immigration threatened the stability of the region. While materially and economically life had 
improved for all, Jews were the major beneficiaries while the pace of progress within the Arab 
community was painfully slow. Palestinian Arabs protested that the majority of available finance was 
used to shore up internal security rather than providing essential services. Arabs gains from the 
expanding economy failed to quell fears that immigration posed an existential threat to Arab-
Palestine.    
The Special Committee members recalled bouts of violence inflicted by dissident Jewish 
groups on British Administration forces and the latter’s preventative measures. Hundreds of Jews had 
been incarcerated so that from the beginning, members were inundated with pleas for intervention. 
On one occasion they anguished over a case where three young men had been condemned to death. 
This case is important in that it exposed Committee divisions, introduces key UNSCOP members 
with their individual and country standpoints. The issue highlights the fissures within UNSCOP itself, 
but also demonstrates the limits of UNSCOP’s influence on internal matters and Britain’s 
imperialistic inclinations.   
Evidence gathered indicated that legal and/or illegal immigration would persist as long as 
Jews were determined to create a Jewish state. Special Committee members considered the latter to 
be the main obstacle to a peaceful solution.  Statistical analysis demonstrated that, although over the 
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previous decades the Jewish population had increased as a percentage of the total, Jews would 
constitute an ever-decreasing minority if immigration stopped. An Anglo-American committee’s 
recommendation for the issue of 100,000 immigration certificates would only partially rectify the 
imbalance.    
From the start of UNSCOP’s deliberations, no straightforward solution could be devised that 
would satisfy the conflicting demands for an independent Arab-Palestine on the one hand and an 
independent Jewish-state in all or part of Palestine on the other. Ultimately, the Committee narrowed 
the options down to just two: A minority maintained that the wider mixed population of Palestine was 
best served by partitioning Palestine into the somewhat artificial federation of two semi-autonomous 
nations while the majority favoured partitioning Palestine into two independent states both 
participating in a joint system of economic unity.    
Before returning to New York, an UNSCOP sub-committee visited Jewish refugee centres in 
Europe to establish which option was the most practical: resettlement in their present host country, 
repatriation to their former homes, or immigration to Palestine or elsewhere. UNSCOP reported that 
most survivors had their hearts set on Palestine.  
The Special Committee Establishes its Modus Operandi 
UNSCOP members met privately in New York on the 26th May 1947 to establish their rules of 
procedure. The Secretary General, Trygve Lie, reminded them that the General Assembly had 
authorised maximum flexibility and that UNSCOP was “master of its own procedure”.652 
The First Committee had previously heard representations from the Jewish Agency and the 
Arab Higher Committee. Other groups and individuals had requested a similar courtesy, but it was 
decided that, with limited time remaining before the completion date of 1st September, their evidence 
should be presented in writing followed if necessary, by verbatim evidence. Other practical matters 
were left to a Procedural Working Group drawn from UNSCOP members.653 
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Sweden’s Chief Justice Sandstrom was elected to chair UNSCOP, easily defeating the 
Guatemala contender Ambassador Garcia Granados.654 The new chair read out a letter which was to 
be sent to interested organisations. The letter stated that although their presence before the First 
Committee had been denied, they would not necessarily be deprived of an opportunity to present their 
evidence.655 
It was agreed that the Mandatory Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher 
Committee, could appoint liaison officers to distribute and supply information to UNSCOP.656 
Meetings would be held in public, but those of a more sensitive nature would remain private. A Press 
officer would accompany UNSCOP and make available public information as and when appropriate. 
UNSCOP sub-committees would carry out agreed specific functions and secretarial staff were 
appointed to prepare the essential groundwork, minute verbatim accounts and other necessary reports. 
Before departing to Palestine, Special Committee members held their final meeting in New 
York on the 7th of June 1947. Since the previous meeting, potential witnesses had responded to an 
earlier invitation with many asking for special consideration. One such witness was an inmate from 
the Jewish displaced camp in the American Zone in Germany. The presiding secretary explained that 
the sentiments expressed were representative of a further 20,728 received. Abdur Rahman, the Indian 
member, argued that rather than attend to the many communications it had received, UNSCOP should 
focus on the specific issue involved. Sandstrom concluded that from what he had gleaned, the 
sentiments did not justify formal hearings. Without further comments, the matter was dropped. Apart 
from concerns about their own safety, Garcia Granados (Guatemala) asked if the safety of 
underground organisations could be guaranteed should they wish to testify and wanted assurance to 
this effect from the Palestine Administration. Sandstrom acknowledged the anxiety but proposed that 
general security issues should be addressed when UNSCOP arrived in Palestine.   
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Before they left New York, a press release was issued to the Palestinian press detailing 
UNSCOP’s expected arrival date and asking for interested parties to submit their written 
statements.657 While the Palestine Administration and the Jewish Agency acquiesced, a similar 
request was declined by the Arab Higher Committee.658 
UNSCOP Committee Members in Palestine 
On the 15th June 1947 UNSCOP arrived in Palestine. The following day all eleven of its members, 
together with two of the secretariats (UN Assistant Secretary-General and Garcia Robles) convened 
in private at the YMCA Building in Jerusalem.  Robles informed members that the UN Secretary-
General had received a telegram from the Vice Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee advising 
him of its refusal to collaborate with UNSCOP.659 It was anticipated that the Arabs would eventually 
relent or at least provide written evidence.  Adopting a tellingly different attitude, both the Jewish 
Agency and the Palestine Administration extended welcomes; expressed their willingness to 
cooperate at all levels and appointed liaison officers so to help facilitate the process. The 
Administration was concerned about the risk attached to staff giving evidence in a public forum. In 
response, two members Granados (Guatemala) and Brilej (Yugoslavia) warned of “political 
repercussions” if members of the public were excluded. Countering this, Hood (Australia) quipped 
that the Committee could choose to hear this evidence in private “or not at all”. He proposed that the 
press be informed that while meetings would generally be open to the public, it would be necessary 
for some to be heard in private session. He explained that this was not with a view to gathering 
previously undisclosed confidential matter but “on grounds of the prevailing [violent] situation”.660 
On the same day (16th June 1947), Sir Henry Gurney, Chief Secretary of the Palestine 
Mandatory Authority gave his evidence. Special Committee members devoted time to questions 
surrounding Palestine’s population density. They focused on the Gaza region. This, members learned, 
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was divided into two sub-districts totalling 13,689 square kilometres. The first of these, Gaza itself, 
consisted of a narrow coastal strip with a predominately Arab population of around 150,000. The 
other sub-district was Beersheba, which included the Negev – a sparsely populated desert area with 
around 90,000 nomadic Bedouins and a settled population of some 7,000. Provided ground water 
existed, the Negev had growth potential.   
The Special Committee’s first visit to the Holy Places had been arranged to take place two 
days later. Because of Palestine’s instability, the Committee decided that the press should not be 
informed until after the event.661 During their investigative tour UNSCOP members witnessed 
armoured military vehicles negotiating between barbed wire protected road blocks. They discovered 
that violence was ongoing, curfews were commonplace, and that hundreds of Jews had been 
incarcerated with many denied the right to appeal.662 663  
By 1947, British military forces were struggling to stem the flow of tens of thousands of 
Jewish immigrants some of whom had resorted to a campaign of terror. Despite this, UNSCOP also 
found instances of amicable relations, such as joint Arab-Jewish strike action and collaboration on 
several agricultural forums. Though limited, these examples might yet provide a way forward for 
more significant Arab-Jewish economic cooperation in a future solution. 
From the start, the Special Committee was inundated with requests for assistance over 
immigration certificates, internment camp conditions and interventions over prisoner release. One 
such was an appeal by the relatives of three young Jewish men faced with execution imposed by the 
Military Court of Jerusalem. Although letters of concern were exchanged, the Special Committee 
resolved that issues outside of its own narrow remit should not dissuade it from carrying out its 
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primary task. In his diary, Ralph Bunche (future mediator) wryly noted that the “British helped the 
committee get started by sentencing five (three?) terrorists in military court today to death ...”.664 
Events were moving quickly. Acting through informal channels, David Ben-Gurion, Chaim 
Weizmann and Moshe Sharett reminded pliant Committee members that the principle of Partition 
was worthy of serious consideration. Again, acting on their own initiative, Ben-Gurion and his 
associates presented a confidential map outlining boundary proposals of a partitioned Jewish state 
which effectively covered some 70% of western Palestine.665  
Since Britain’s 1939 White Paper, Jewish immigration and land sale restrictions were major 
obstacles to Zionist ambitions. Palestine had been divided into zones, each determining the extent to 
which land could be sold to Jews leaving just 5% freely purchasable. During his evidence before the 
Special Committee on the 17th June 1947, Moshe Sharett666 maintained that land transfers had not 
resulted in a landless class and emphasised that in instances where land had been purchased from 
absentee landlords, former tenants had been resettled. The Jewish Agency had identified land that 
offered potential for Jewish settlement including the Negev region comprising around 40% of the 
country’s total. This largely desert region was sparsely populated, but with effort and irrigation its 
northern section could flourish and offer “extensive agricultural development”. Jews, he asserted, 
were drawn to Palestine. Driven out from elsewhere by suffering, it “was the only country where 
[Jews] could hope to rebuild their lives on secure foundations and become a nation again”667. 
Immigration, Sharett argued, was the “prime agent of [Palestine’s] progress”. Turning his bitterness 
on Britain, he protested that the 1939 White paper represented a “somersault” in British policy. It 
was this reversal, he claimed, that had resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocents who might 
otherwise have escaped to Palestine.668 In 1947, the restrictive White Paper policies remained in force. 
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It was noticeable that during the previous decade the Jewish Agency had focused on resettling young 
people. During that period around 18,000 Jewish adolescents and children had been resettled making 
a combined total Jewish population of some 630,000. Of this number, a little over a third were born 
in Palestine with the remainder claiming fifty-two national origins representing, in Sharett’s words, 
“a vanguard preparing ground for the absorption of more to come”.669 He added that the Jewish 
Agency welcomed Jewish assimilation to encourage a distinct Jewish identity. Palestine was to be a 
home in which, by their own efforts, Jews would be “independent in the real sense of the term”. That 
independence, Sharett maintained, could only be realised via an independent Jewish state. Moshe 
Sharett argued that existing Jewish towns and villages had scope for further expansion and could 
absorb many more Jewish immigrants. If, ultimately, Palestine was partitioned into two states, Jews 
had no need to live amongst the “Arab population in the economic and territorial sense ... [a self-
contained national system] is the only way [Jews could] hope to settle in large numbers and to feel 
economically secure and nationally independent".670 Sharett had made it clear that, unlike Arabs who 
had refused to discuss the matter, Zionists were prepared to negotiate on a two-state Palestine. Thus, 
without the prospect of a workable compromise, Partition was unavoidable.   
While Zionists enthusiastically proposed their own solutions to the Palestine question, 
UNSCOP was hampered by the lack of communication from the Palestinian-Arab contingent. On the 
17th June 1947, UNSCOP members met in private to discuss this omission. Acting on behalf of the 
Arab Higher Committee, its Vice-Chairman Jamal Husseini, telegraphed UNSCOP via the UN 
Secretary General reiterating the Committee’s intention to impose an Arab boycott on UNSCOP’s 
investigatory work. An Arab general strike was called involving public and private concerns with all 
forms of communication with UNSCOP forbidden. There were to be no exceptions to the ruling.671 
The Arab refusal to co-operate presented UNSCOP members with a dilemma. Without any opposing 
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evidence, UNSCOP’s enquiry was seriously flawed. With the General Assembly as the final arbiter, 
Jamal Husseini’s refusal to allow Palestinian-Arab participation had delivered a fatal blow to their 
ambitions. Partition became all but certain. UNSCOP’s Yugoslavian member, Dr Jože Brilej, 
captured UNSCOP’s sentiments. While the Yugoslavian people supported Arabs and the Palestinian 
“[fight] for their freedom and independence [non-cooperation with UNSCOP] would make it 
impossible for the interests of the Palestine Arabs to be represented before the Committee [and that 
the boycott] might postpone the final solution of the Palestine problem”. He proposed informing the 
Arab Higher Committee that an Arab presence would help fulfil the interests of Arab Palestinians. 
Sandstrom (Chairman) and others agreed with Brilej’s reasoning but finally favoured Sir Abdur 
Rahman’s contention that it was advisable to await developments.672 In the event, the Arab Higher 
Committee held its ground and refused to change its position. 
UNSCOP Members Face a Stiff Test 
It had been previously agreed that the majority of UNSCOP’s meetings would be open to the public. 
However, at times some were conducted in private, particularly those where potentially incendiary 
matters were discussed. In these cases, public disclosure would usually follow after decisions had 
been made. One of the issues debated in private concerned the death sentences handed down by the 
Military Court on three Jewish men found guilty of acts of sabotage. As a result, relatives of the young 
men had written to the Special Committee hoping to “to prevent the execution ... by procuring 
commutation of the death sentence”.673 However, intervention on legal and/or political matters could 
call into question the Special Committee’s independence and credibility and raise security concerns 
or even jeopardise individual Member’s safety.  
The death sentences had been imposed on the very day of UNSCOP’s arrival in Palestine. So 
far as the British Administration was concerned, Norway’s call at the UN for a climate of peace while 
UNSCOP was in the region had gone unheeded. The timing of the sentences could not have been 
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more inappropriate. Importantly, the effectiveness of the British Mandate and the Palestine 
Administration’s enactment policy, were now openly questioned. The Administration’s perceived 
mishandling of the Mandate was already under scrutiny and the potential negative ramifications to 
Britain were evident. Moreover, this inept timing placed UNSCOP’s specific role under the gaze of 
the press.   
The debate was vigorous. Several UNSCOP members insisted that legal matters fell within 
the Committee’s remit while others, most notably Sandstrom the Chairman, argued against. Though 
he accepted that his Committee was caught in a dilemma, he reasoned that “any decision constituting 
intervention would reflect on the prestige of the Committee”.674 With no consensus in sight on whether 
the matter fell within UNSCOP’s terms of reference, Sandstrom finally ruled that he would personally 
approach the High Commissioner.  
By the time the Committee met for a second time two days later, UNSCOP’s deliberations 
had been leaked to the press through an unknown source. Garcia Granados (Guatemala) revealed that 
a newspaper source had told him that somehow the press had obtained information regarding 
Sandstrom’s visit to the High Commissioner and that the leak had come from a Briton. Sandstrom 
advised his Committee against making unguarded comments. He outlined his conversation with the 
High Commissioner: He reported that there was a second aspect that had been largely misunderstood. 
Since the General Assembly’s call for calm during UNSCOP’s investigations, Sandstrom reminded 
his colleagues, that the “Jewish underground” had murdered over thirty British soldiers. These acts, 
according to the Chairman, were against individuals who were “perform[ing] a heavy duty under 
strained conditions” so it was perhaps inadvisable for UNSCOP to interfere with the Mandatory 
Authority’s due process. It seemed to him that the Irgun and other radical organisations had ignored 
the truce and were “use[ing] the Committee to get out of the line of fire”. Responding to a question 
posed by Sir Abdur Rahman (India), Sandstrom reassured him that his conversation with the High 
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Commissioner was in a personal capacity and not necessarily reflective of the Committee’s position. 
The Committee members remained divided on the issue, so it was decided to seek guidance from the 
UN Secretary General. Later, the Committee were informed that according to a press report, Trygve 
Lie had refused to be drawn into the debate, believing it to be a matter for the Special Committee. 
Granados stated, supported by Fabregat (Uruguay), that in the event of an announcement of non-
entitlement to intervene, he (Granados) reserved the right to inform the press that he disagreed with 
this decision. Instead, he would report that, in his opinion, the Committee could have “ask[ed] for 
mercy”. Deliberation over this matter was temporarily deferred, but in the meantime the record was 
to be considered confidential.675 
By Sunday 22nd June 1947 the Special Committee met again to deliver its final judgement on 
whether to intervene in the Administration’s internal legal affairs. Individual members had had time 
to reconsider and were ready for a robust debate. The Chairman was confronted by a minor rebellion. 
Some members notably, Simic (Yugoslavia), Granados (Guatemala) and Fabregat (Uruguay) 
challenged Sandstrom’s opinion that, under its term of reference, the Committee lacked legal and/or 
political authority to intervene. Rahman (India), Hood (Australia), Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) and 
Rand (Canada) took the opposing viewpoint. There were also implied criticisms of Sandstrom’s 
discussions with the High Commissioner. Simic (Yugoslavia) opened the debate, one that highlighted 
the fraught relationship slowly developing between several UNSCOP members. The debate centred 
on whether “[executing] the three men [was] liable to entail undesirable consequences and that the 
Committee [should] take appropriate steps with the Government of Palestine to obtain mercy for the 
condemned men”.676 There were procedural matters to resolve: whether without the express direction 
of the General Assembly, the UN Secretary General was empowered to address individual 
governments (in this case the Administrative Authority), whether interference in sovereign affairs 
would set a precedent, whether individual members necessarily spoke for their governments and 
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whether a GA appointed Committee was empowered to approach a foreign government without going 
through the proper channels of the General Assembly. There was speculation but none of the 
questions were definitively answered.677 
At the end of a heated debate, Sandstrom shrewdly led his Committee. He gave free rein to 
dissenters and compromised on several bureaucratic issues. Ultimately, his authority prevailed. By a 
majority it was agreed to send two letters – one to the relatives of the condemned men and another to 
the UN Secretary General.678 The relatives were informed that it was “beyond the scope of 
[UNSCOP’s] instruction and function to interfere with the judicial administration of Palestine [but 
that the matter was now in the hands of] the proper authorities”.679 A majority voted to send a letter 
to the Secretary General expressing “concern as to the possible unfavourable repercussions [on 
UNSCOP]” if the execution went ahead. The letter asked that this message should be conveyed to the 
Mandatory Power. The representatives of India, the Netherlands and Canada dissented from 
expressions of ‘concern’ and Australia and one other country (unrecorded) abstained. A press release 
was approved.680  
It came to nothing. In early July 1947, the three men were hanged. On the 11th and 12th of 
July, the Irgun reacted swiftly by hanging two British sergeants. Bagon argues that this reprisal had 
a profound effect upon on Anglo-Jewry “testing dual allegiance to its limit and resulting in anti-
Jewish rioting across Britain”. The act is “irrefutable evidence that the Jewish underground ... had a 
direct … and discernible impact upon Anglo-Jewry”.681 
Analysis of the three-day debate reveals UNSCOP’s determination to achieve goals, but also 
the limitations of the various members. During the debate, the Swedish Chairman, Emil Sandstrom 
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demonstrated his ability to garner support and force his will by steering “widely varied types of 
personalities, each accustomed to authority”.682 He was, Garcia-Granados writes, “a wily old fox”.683 
Sandstrom judged correctly the widespread unease felt among UNSCOP members. Despite the 
General Assembly’s resolution of the 15th May calling for peace during the investigation, there had 
been no let-up in the level of violence. Sandstrom proposed issuing a public statement to the effect 
that continuing violence “constitute[d] a flagrant disregard” of the GA’s wishes.684 It is probable 
that UNSCOP’s seeming acceptance of the Palestine Administration’s process over the death 
sentences would have incensed radical elements of the Jewish underground. This perception together 
with Jamal Husseini’s mistrust of UNSCOP’s motives were enough for some members to fear that, 
despite security measures, their own safety was at stake. Nevertheless, there was still disagreement. 
Viswanathan, the Indian Alternative, challenged Sandstrom’s proposal. He declared that while he too 
condemned the violence, he believed that UNSCOP had no jurisdiction over internal matters.685 Apart 
from Viswanathan and Hood abstaining, Sandstrom’s proposal was accepted. 
The executions and the reprisals that followed inflamed an already volatile situation and 
widened an already unbridgeable divide between the opposing sides. To UNSCOP, finding a way to 
best satisfy Jewish and Arab ambitions on the dominant issues of Jewish immigration and land sales 
was paramount. Arguably it was Emil Sandstrom’s influence and strong grip on UNSCOP’s majority 
that was steering the way to a two-state solution.  
Ben-Gurion Presents His Evidence 
Time was slipping by and the Arab boycott was likely to lead to one-sided appraisal of the Palestine 
question. There was no shortage of Jewish evidence and they willingly filled the void left by 
Palestinian Arabs’ refusal to participate.  
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On the 4th July 1947, Ben-Gurion, representing the Jewish Agency, took his place in a public 
session. After formal courtesies, Ben-Gurion began his delivery. He expressed his disappointment 
with the “numerous commissions” that had gone before. He suggested that it was understandable that 
people were sceptical as to their value and baffled by Britain’s contemptuous shelving of the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry’s recommendations. These had been unanimously agreed and 
considered “a tremendous achievement”. While welcoming the latest enquiry, he doubted Britain’s 
willingness to respect its outcome any more than on previous occasions.686 
Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion accepted that as it was no longer in Britain’s hands and, as 
UNSCOP was a United Nations inspired committee, the solution to the Palestine problem lay in the 
involvement of the international community. It was, according to Ben-Gurion, “the [UN’s] supreme 
test”.687 He questioned whether it was presumptuous to expect that the United Nations was prepared 
to fulfil its obligations “in the spirit and the letter”. He referred to the Balfour Declaration and 
maintained that it was a commitment by the British government to preside over the reconstitution of 
a Jewish national home in Palestine. This same commitment was embodied in the Mandate and 
supported by the then 52 member-states of the League of Nations. The Balfour Declaration was a 
public statement of intent that Jews are “a people with rights to a national home”; a place for the 
“Jewish people in its entirety”. Now, though this contention provoked conflict it was a conflict 
between two unequal parties with one being “stateless, homeless ... people with nothing but the graves 
of six million [Jews]”, confronting a mighty Empire. Ben-Gurion insisted that the League of Nations 
had merely granted Britain temporary custodianship and that Palestine was not Britain’s dominion. 
Britain’s presence in Palestine was intended by the League of Nations only “to give effect to 
internationally guaranteed pledges”.688 Time and again, statesmen had accepted the concept of a 
Jewish ‘home’. In 1920, Churchill had envisaged a Jewish National “state” of up to four million Jews 
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living under the umbrella of British Crown. Churchill had stated that notwithstanding its worldwide 
benefits, a Jewish state would serve the “interests of the British Empire”. Again, Ben-Gurion 
continued, in 1937, Peel’s Commission reasoned that the Balfour Declaration encompassed the entire 
area of Palestine including Transjordan. Writing in 1918, the scholar George Adam Smith imagined 
millions of Jews migrating to Palestine in sufficient number to “form a nation”, having adequate 
space and the means to support them. Article 4 of the agreement between Emir Feisal and Dr 
Weizmann (3rd Jan 1919) confirmed that large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine should be 
“encourage[d] and stimulate[d]”. At the time of Balfour, Lloyd George contemplated that provided 
Jews eventually comprised a majority, Palestine would become “a Jewish Commonwealth”. Yet 
despite this pledge, HM Government’s 1939 White Paper effectively “scrapped the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate”. This, Ben-Gurion argued, condemned Jews to permanent minority 
status; people forbidden to acquire land in meaningful amounts. The Jewish Agency’s immediate 
response had been to denounce the White Paper as a “breach of faith … a surrender to Arab Terrorism 
[that threatened to widen the breach] between Jews and Arabs”.689 Britain’s 1939 White Paper 
represented a death sentence for millions of Jews who might otherwise have been saved. Its restriction 
on Jewish immigration had come as “a mortal blow to the Jewish people”.690 Ben-Gurion was 
merciless in his account. By closing entry to Palestine “in the hour of the greatest peril [the White 
Paper was] responsible” for the extermination of thousands who might otherwise have escaped the 
gas chambers. He recalled the case where just before the outbreak of war, permission was refused for 
the safe passage of 20,000 Polish children and 10,000 young people from the Balkan states to 
Palestine. As a result, they met their end in Dachau and Treblinka. He also referred to the steamer 
‘Struma’ bound for Palestine with 729 Jewish passengers. After repeated pleas for assistance were 
rebuffed, the ship sank and everyone on board lost their lives. For these and many more Jewish people, 
reaching Palestine was a matter of “life or death”. Ultimately, they were “direct victims of the White 
 
689 (Ibid, 5-11) 
690 (Ibid, 13) 
168 
 
Paper” Ben-Gurion continued. He cited a recent Gallop Poll conducted by the Military Authorities 
in the American Zone in Germany which indicated that as many as 60% of Germans approved of 
Hitler’s extermination programme. The former birthplaces of the survivors had become 
“graveyard[s] of their people”. What remained was a longing to return to “their national home”. 
Ben-Gurion argued that a “Jewish national home” in Palestine was a place as “Jewish as an 
Englishman is English”. Ben-Gurion was unequivocal. To him, Jews must live in a Jewish ‘state’; 
one entirely Jewish in character. He stated that Jews needed no justification for building a Jewish 
“civilisation” with Hebrew as its language and conducting its affairs in accordance with Jewish 
principles and beliefs. Jews would not assimilate into a non-Jewish culture and had not assimilated 
with Europeans. Even supposedly assimilated Jews had not been spared from the Holocaust. 
However, he emphasised, non-integration did not prevent a return to good relations with Arab 
neighbours whose fate is “bound up with ours and whose advancement is as vital for us as it is for 
[them]”.691 
Repeatedly Ben-Gurion criticised the White Paper. Its restrictive policies were imposed by 
force. Palestine had become a police state. The Palestine Administration adopted unlimited powers 
of arrest, search and confiscation of property. There was detention, often without trial. Thousands of 
prisoners were serving extended sentences and denied justice. Military Courts had wide powers. They 
could impose death sentences for using or even just carrying firearms, with the liability extended to 
other members of a group. Civil liberties were effectively abolished. For years the press had been 
censored and curfews and identity checks were enforced. Collective punishment was commonplace. 
The list of oppressive policies was striking. Ben-Gurion confirmed that the fault lay not at the level 
of the soldier or the policeman, but solely with Britain and its 1939 White Paper policy which 
represented, in Churchill’s words, a “squalid war against the Jews”.692 
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Special Committee members were divided on how best to organise Palestine, but these views 
were not shared by Ben-Gurion. He was committed to an independent Jewish state therefore the “most 
crucial question is immigration”. Ben-Gurion cited two conflicting options. First there was the anti-
Zionist bi-national option, as envisaged in the 1939 White Paper. This, he continued “prohibits Jewish 
immigration, condemns Jews to remain a permanent minority and perpetuated the homelessness of 
the Jewish people”.693 Second, there was the Zionist option where the population of the Jewish state 
would increase by up to four million; a state where citizens would exploit its developmental potential 
and cultivate large tracks of previously uncultivated land. This policy would raise living standards 
for all in a state where Jews and Arabs “cooperate and work together as free and equal partners” so 
as to fulfil the Balfour original intentions.694 He entreated UNSCOP members to consider that 
although millions more had suffered, Hitler had singled out Jews as a special case for extermination 
because they possessed neither land nor sanctuary in a “state of [their] own … able to protect, to 
intervene, to save and to fight [for]”.695 
Ben-Gurion had conflated the first option under one broad anti-Zionist heading, but 
fundamentally he raised the question of an entirely Jewish Palestine; one to which a notable number 
of his Zionist colleagues subscribed and believed was just and achievable. Ben-Gurion walked a fine 
line between the realists and the idealists. Recognising that his compromise might have to be a 
partitioned Palestine, he ventured that after WWI, Arabs had gained their freedom in an area of some 
1,250,000 square miles, 125 times larger than Western Palestine.  This left the restoration of the 
Jewish nation unfulfilled under the term of the Balfour Declaration.696 Ben-Gurion considered it a 
mistake to consider Arab-Jewish relations in terms of one small Arab country (Palestine). The 
problem should be viewed within the wider context of the wider Arab Middle East. If before the war, 
the Jewish people had had a state of their own, then the Holocaust could have been avoided. Given 
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the status quo, he ventured, who was “prepared and able to guarantee that what happened [to Jews] 
will not happen again?”. Jews in Palestine and Jews worldwide, he asserted, must be given the 
freedom to determine their own destiny. Only Palestine could fulfil the Jewish “desire or the prospect 
of attaining statehood”.697  
During his lengthy delivery, Ben-Gurion argued three Zionist objectives: an immediate 
reversal of HM Government’s 1939 White Paper restrictions on immigration, a renewed Arab-Jewish 
alliance and, crucial to worldwide Jewry, a United Nations commitment to an independent Jewish 
state in Palestine.  
Horowitz Gives His Analysis 
Jewish Agency representative, David Horowitz, provided an important contribution to UNSCOP’s 
work. It was understood that the level of immigration was limited by Palestine’s “absorptive 
capacity”, but the question was how many immigrants Palestine could absorb before it had a serious 
negative effect on the existing population and whether Palestine’s economic productive capacity 
could meet the challenges of large-scale immigration?698 Horowitz addressed these questions directly. 
UNSCOP members were now faced with an array of instructive facts and figures. Horowitz 
maintained that the limit to economic absorption was a question that applied across the world, not 
just in Palestine. Absorptive capacity was not some arbitrary arithmetic concept, but rather a complex 
function of variables: a function of area, “natural resources ... skill, knowledge, capital, productivity 
[of the workforce] ... [and] the determination of the people to reconstruct a certain economy”.699 
Horowitz had the support of Chaim Weizmann who confirmed that ‘absorptive capacity’ is a man-
made concept, but in order to create it “you need [a majority to develop] on a scale which only 
government could give”.700 Similarly, Horowitz made the case that absorptive capacity is in constant 
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flux; it is a man-made creation. He exemplified his point by comparing Palestine with roughly equal 
sized states. Palestine had population of some 2,000,000 in an area of some 10,000 square miles. On 
the other hand, Sicily, Lombardy and a successful economy like Belgium (for example) were roughly 
the same size, but with populations of 4,000,000, 6,000,000 and 8,000,000 respectively.  Conversely, 
neighbouring Transjordan was three times larger than Palestine, but housed a population density 
fifteen times smaller.701 In short, the relationship between land area and population density is 
complex, but in general, the ‘absorptive capacity’ of a country is fluid. 
There is an inherent paradox in the idea of this fluid absorptive capacity, but it is unclear if 
Special Committee members noticed it. On the one hand, Zionists insisted on the need to inhabit as 
large a space as possible. On the other, according to Horowitz, from an economic perspective “human 
factors [outweighed] the availability of space”.702 If he was correct, then taken literally, (and using 
Belgium as an example) the coastal plain alone was more than sufficient to accommodate millions 
more incomers.  
Using a range of charts, Horowitz demonstrated that given modern agricultural methods, land 
and livestock could be turned into highly productive resources. He compared Jewish and Arab 
agricultural regions. On produce after produce, Jewish farms were significantly more productive than 
Arab. The increase was the result of large-scale irrigation projects making previously arid land fertile. 
He claimed that already, seemingly barren land had been turned into fertile farms. In the time taken 
for the population to increase by 144%, the amount of irrigated land had increased by a factor of five 
proving just “how elastic the capacity of absorption is and how vastly it can be increased”. The same 
rules apply to industrial expansion: “the process of industrialisation exceeded by far the increase in 
population”.703 Tellingly, Horowitz demonstrated the inverse relationship between increased Jewish 
immigration and decreased levels of unemployment. He produced convincing evidence showing that 
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in predominantly Jewish areas of Palestine (industrial and agricultural), Jewish immigration 
stimulated growth and growth reduced unemployment. In 1931, the Palestine Administration had 
conducted a census of Palestine. It showed that far from approaching its absorptive capacity, Arabs 
from across the region had tended to immigrate into rather than emigrate out of Palestine. Despite the 
supposed oversaturation, the latter trend was most marked in the coastal plain. Horowitz claimed that 
Arabs gravitated from more sparsely populated areas to the most densely populated “because [of] 
Jewish development”.704 He also affirmed that far from demonstrating a lack of cooperation between 
Arabs and Jews, the opposite was true. Also, without exception there was a consistent correlation 
between immigration and Government revenue: “As immigration increases, revenue increases; as 
immigration decreases, revenue decreases”. Horowitz inferred strong correlations between the 
growth of the Jewish population and increased Arab living standards and life expectancy, decreased 
infant mortality, decreased incidences of sickness and decreased incidence of malaria.705 He 
illustrated credible causal links to support this hypothesis. 
Horowitz confirmed that his figures were based on Government statistics as presented to the 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.706 This calls into question of how, in its 1939 White Paper, 
HM Government deduced that maximum absorptive capacity would be breached by anything over an 
additional 75,000 Jewish immigrants incrementally over a five-year period. Also, Horowitz’s analysis 
does not tally with the Anglo-American Committee’s proposal that the figure should be 100,000 
Jewish immigrants. Judging from Horowitz’s evidence, there was little logic attached to either 
Britain’s 1939 White Paper or the Anglo-American Committee’s estimates of Palestine’s capacity to 
absorb Jewish immigrants. Horowitz’s statistical analysis was fundamental to UNSCOP’s 
understanding of the implications of Partition. 
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A Jewish State and Still No Compromise 
Ben-Gurion had been heavily critical of the Mandate and the way it been implemented by the 
Palestine Administration. He faced questions two days later.707 It is important to note that while 
UNSCOP sampled conflicting evidence, Ben-Gurion (representing the Jewish Agency) reflected 
majority Jewish opinion.  
Sandstrom took control of the public meeting. Which Authority, he asked, would oversee 
immigration and what type of Government would be put in place if the Mandate ceased? Ben-Gurion 
contended that the terms of the Mandate had been violated and that the White Paper policy was 
“illegal”. He proposed that any transition would be determined under the “highest supervision of the 
United Nations” for a period pending the establishment of a Jewish state. As for the type of 
Government, Ben-Gurion described a democratic and independent Jewish state with a Jewish 
majority; one “based on absolute equality of all her citizens”. The Jewish Agency would oversee 
material development but functions of Government such as “safety, security, [and foreign] relations” 
were temporary matters best decided by the United Nations. He predicted that the first wave of around 
1,000,000 Jewish settlers would arrive relatively quickly to speed up development raising the living 
standards of Arabs “to the same level, as possible, as the Jewish”.708  
Sir Abdul Rahman (India) was quick to challenge, asking if the United Nations should impose 
on Arabs a Jewish ‘state’ or Jewish immigration by force of arms. If so, Rahman quizzed, “[w]ould 
it not mean an absolutely bloody war between [Jews] and the Arabs?”. The question was rhetorical, 
and Ben-Gurion avoided answering directly. It was presupposed, he replied, that “no armed forces 
are loosed against anybody”. British armed forces were already used to prevent Jewish immigrants 
from landing. He argued that this was evidence of racial discrimination against Jews. The United 
Nations would be duty bound to implement any decision made. Rahman was clearly irritated and 
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quick to show that he supported the Arab position. There was a short stand-off between the two 
men.709 
Now Sandstrom turned to Ben-Gurion’s interpretation of the specific term ‘Jewish National 
Home (not a State) ‘in Palestine’ - according to the wording of the Balfour Declaration. It was a 
crucial question and posed a potential obstacle to Jewish ambitions. Speaking on behalf of the Jewish 
Agency, he approached the question cautiously. He commenced his lengthy reply by addressing the 
Balfour reservation that “non-Jewish communities should not be prejudiced”. However, he proposed 
that the definition of ‘National Home’ rested at the heart of this reservation.  He reasoned that if 
Balfour had intended that Jews were to comprise a minority in a majority Arab Palestine, then Arabs 
would have no need for safeguards. A majority community would provide for its own safeguards. It 
would follow that minority Jewish rights would be prejudiced, and it was Jews who would require 
protection in a majority Arab state. If on the other hand it was contemplated that Jews should remain 
a minority, Ben-Gurion questioned, “why [state or no state] must you [provide] safeguards for the 
rights of a majority. It is nonsense”. He claimed that this was evidence that it was not intended that 
Jews would comprise a minority. Therefore, he concluded, Balfour and the Palestine Mandate had 
envisaged a Jewish majority in a Jewish ‘state’.710 Under the Balfour Declaration the British 
Government had no legal authority to give Palestine as a “State” to either Jews or Arabs. It could 
commit only to using its “best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object” (See the Balfour 
Declaration - final draft). At the time it was for the League of Nations only to rule on the outcome. 
Ben-Gurion argued that the Declaration clearly stated that Jews should have a “National Home”. The 
emphasis here is on the word ‘National’ which has a definitive meaning. For example, the French are 
French ‘nationals’; citizens of the Nation ‘State’ of France.  Balfour used the terminology “the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home ... “(own emphasis).  The phraseology “in Palestine”, 
he inferred, did not preclude Palestine from becoming a Jewish state “because if [Britain] had meant 
 
709 (Ibid, 8) 
710 (Ibid, 12) 
175 
 
in part of Palestine they [the British] would have said so” (own emphasis). He entered a discourse 
on the issue of Balfour and reasoned that the words ‘National’ and ‘State’ are mutually inclusive.  
The Chairman now focused on the ‘dual obligation’. Did Ben-Gurion consider that while 
Britain was committed to protecting the rights “of existing non-Jewish communities [that obligation 
acted as] an obstacle to Jewish immigration?”. Ben-Gurion’s reply was unequivocal: “[W]e [agree 
with the commitment] wholeheartedly ... because it is right”. However, he continued, although 
‘immigration’ did not feature in the Declaration, its political implications were conveyed into the 
Mandate. This afforded Jews the opportunity to immigrate into Palestine to build “a Nation ... a 
National Home”.711 Sandstrom persisted. Did the Mandatory Administration’s commitment oblige it 
to impose Jewish immigration on resistant Arabs despite the risk of a Jewish/Arab war? Ben-Gurion 
objected. He claimed that Jews and Arabs could coexist on equal terms and insisted that the Britain 
should remove its armed forces from Palestine and should not “impose non-immigration”.712 
Special Committee members continued to press Ben-Gurion on his interpretation of the 
Declaration, the Mandate and its implementation. In answer to questions posed by Ivan Rand713 
(Canada) Ben Gurion conceded that had it not been for the protection offered by the Mandatory 
Authority as far back as 1922, the small minority of Jews could have been wiped out. However, events 
had moved on. Members explored the issue of ‘protection’ and how far Jews would go to protect 
themselves. Ben-Gurion foresaw no problems in this respect as Jews had shown themselves to be 
perfectly able live in peace with their Arab neighbours.714 If, however, “right [prevailed] and force 
[proved] necessary, you have to apply it”715 If necessary “we will defend ourselves by all means and 
we will build by our own means. We will bring Jews by our own means. We will not give up”.716 
 
711 (Ibid, 12-16) 
712 (Ibid, 16) 
713 Ivan Cleveland Rand was selected to serve as Canada’s representative on UNSCOP. Out of a list of possible candidates presented to Canadian Prime 
Minister, MacKenzie King, he considered Rand as “easily the best”. Although Rand lacked clear knowledge of the issues he emerged as an astute 
politician and had previously formed an affinity with Louis D. Brandeis so would have been fully aware of his fellow Harvard graduate’s deep 
commitment to American Zionism (Bercuson, David, J., 1985: ‘Canada and the birth of Israel – a study in Canadian foreign policy) 
714 UNGA (A/364/Add.2 PV.19), 7 July 1947, Pages 22-23) 
715 (Ibid, 18) 
716 (Ibid, 37) 
176 
 
In answer to a question posed by Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) on whether in Zionist terms, 
compromise implied Partition, Ben-Gurion replied that Jewish Agency had previously agreed to 
consider Partition provided the division of the country left a Jewish state in control of an “adequate 
area”. He refuted Simic’s reference to parity of Government. He maintained that parity in a bi-
national state led inevitably to permanent deadlock and could not be contemplated over decisions 
involving levels of immigration or development.717 Although there was scope for compromise on 
state-size and economic cooperation, Zionists would stop at nothing to secure and defend an 
independent Jewish state.  
By now UNSCOP had been conducting its investigation for nearly a month. Before leaving 
Palestine, those members seen to be supportive of Partition were invited to a meeting on the 14th July 
1947 held at Moshe Sharett’s home.718 Senior members of the Jewish Agency were in attendance as 
well as Sharett (head of the political department). These included Ben-Gurion (Chairman of the 
Jewish Agency), Golda Myerson719 (Sharett’s deputy at the time), Eliezer Kaplan (Jewish Agency 
treasurer), Leo Kohn (political department secretary) and others. Ralph Bunche took notes for internal 
circulation. This “secret meeting”, Ben-Dror maintains, was so sensitive that for the most part it was 
written out of participants’ memoirs. During the meeting, UNSCOP members elicited the Agency’s 
opinions for and against Judah Magnes’s720 proposal for a bi-national state based on political and 
numerical equality and their interpretation of UNSCOP Canadian member, Ivan Rand’s 
“commonwealth of two states” proposal. Ben-Gurion took his position as Chairman of the Jewish 
Agency to beyond its usual limits. Abba Eban, liaison officer to the Jewish Agency,721 describes “our 
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[members of the Jewish Agency] astonishment [when Ben-Gurion crossed a red line] took out his 
pencil … and sketched a map [of a would-be Jewish state while] at his most authoritative, [having] 
broke[n] all precedents”.722 
The Mandatory Authority Comes under Fire 
HM Government, the Palestine Administration, the Mandate and its implementation had all come 
under fire. On the 19th July 1947, representatives of the Administrative Authority had the opportunity 
to refute Zionists’ allegations and present their case.723 
Chief Secretary to Palestine, Sir Henry Gurney, maintained that far from failing to fulfil its 
international pledge under the terms of Mandate, a Jewish National Home was an established fact 
thanks to Britain but gained at the expense of British lives and resources. But for British defensive 
forces, the National Home “would have disappeared” under the Nazis. By referring twice to the 
“establishment [of a Jewish] National Home” Gurney had endowed Jews with a sense of permanence 
in Palestine.  
Ben-Gurion had accused the Mandatory Authority of failing to fulfil an international pledge 
given to Jewish people. Countering this, Gurney argued that under Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the Mandatory Authority was bound by specific obligations relating not only to 
Jewish people, but also to the non-Jewish population. The enforcement of a Jewish ‘state’ against the 
will of the Arab constituency would be a violation of Article 22.724 
Gurney also addressed the question of immigration.  Before WWII, British officers had 
rescued thousands of Jewish legal certificate holders from Germany just before international frontiers 
had barred their means of escape. After 1945, when the 75,000 legal immigration quotas were 
reached, an additional 30,000 Jewish immigrants also entered Palestine. Relative to its size, Gurney 
confirmed, an influx of Jews on that scale was the equivalent of 6.5 million entering the United States. 
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But Gurney had skirted the main point. Zionists objected to the 1939 White Paper, claiming that had 
it not been for immigration restrictions many thousands of European Jews might have survived. 
Nevertheless, after gathering evidence in Palestine, the Special Committee had still not heard the 
Arab case. This omission could be partially rectified, and it was time to move on 
Arab States speak for Palestinian Arabs 
Palestinian Arabs were obliged to accept a ruling passed down by the Arab Higher Committee 
forbidding their appearance before the Special Committee. Nevertheless, neighbouring Arab 
countries had expressed a willingness to represent their own and Palestinian-Arab interests. 
Arrangements were in place for a joint meeting between UNSCOP members and the former at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beirut.  
On the 22nd of July 1947 the Vice President of the Council of Lebanon (Bechara El Khoury) 
opened proceedings.725 Finding a satisfactory settlement appeared complicated but, EI Khoury 
claimed, it was “very simple if settled in the right light”. Otherwise, he warned, the imposition of a 
Jewish home in Palestine was a threat that Arab states would not ignore. 
The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hamid Frangieh brought matters into focus. He 
reiterated what had been said at the General Assembly. The “simple” solution was to end the British 
Mandate and to declare Palestine as an independent Arab state, in conformity with the founding 
principles of the United Nations. He declared the Balfour Declaration invalid and affirmed that its 
text was inherently ambiguous. He said the Declaration had opened the door to Zionist sponsored 
immigration into a Jewish National Home.726 Although Palestine was 93% Arab, Arab opinion had 
not been formally tested. From the fall of the Ottoman Empire there was steady rise in Arab 
nationalism. Both Jews and Arabs were competing for Palestine and Balfour had caused serious 
disruption. Frangieh characterised this nationalist trend as the “the natural awakening of the Arab 
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peoples”.727 He maintained that the Allies had reneged on their promises. While most Arabs countries 
had gained their independence, Britain had rigorously imposed the Mandate so that it worked in 
favour of Jews, rather than encourage Palestine towards self-empowerment, “National liberation 
[was, Frangieh claimed] nothing more than a mirage”.728 To Frangieh (who was also articulating the 
views of Arab states), the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate were illegal instruments biased 
in favour of Zionists. This enabled Jews to immigrate into the predominately Arab world in such 
numbers that eventually Arabs would be displaced by a Jewish majority. 
In his summing up, Frangieh maintained that Zionists were intent on expanding their reach 
beyond Palestine into the wider Middle East. He argued that at first, Zionists had been content to view 
Palestine as a place of refuge, but later this had morphed into a desire for a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine.  Later plans involved the establishment of a Jewish state and following this, a state 
encompassing the entire region of Palestine. Not content with that, Zionists were fixated on 
expansionism, threatening the very existence of neighbouring Arab countries. He continued: a Zionist 
memorandum presented at the 1918 Peace Conference claimed territorial rights over Transjordan 
(later, Jordan) and beyond to regions of Syria and Lebanon. This was proof of expansionist ambitions. 
Frangieh argued that Ben-Gurion had convinced Jewish settlers that Palestine was just one small step 
towards their ultimate goal which had been stalled temporarily by a feeble Administration. Jewish 
terrorism was proof that Zionists would allow nothing to stand in their way. Further, because mass 
immigration was vital to the Zionist agenda, Arab states had “the right to oppose [it] ... it is their 
duty”.729 
By the end of the first session, Arab countries had unanimously set out their demands. 
Palestine was an Arab land and must be declared as an independent Arab state. The Zionist ambition 
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for numerical superiority must be stopped by an immediate ban on Jewish immigration. Palestine’s 
Arab neighbours had drawn a non-negotiable line which paralleled the intransigence of the Jewish 
Agency just two weeks before. At this late stage, with complete polarisation and no real expectation 
of reconciliation, UNSCOP seemed certain to recommend a form of Partition.  
Arab Statesmen Have the Last Word 
The above meeting had been held in public, but the following day, 23 July 1947, Arab statesmen gave 
their evidence in private session.730 731 UNSCOP’s first questions focussed on issues surrounding 
immigration and land issues. In the absence of one common language there was confusion around the 
term ‘illegal immigration’. Emir Adel Arslan (Syrian representative), Fadel Jamali (Iraq) and Fouad 
Hamza (Saudi-Arabia) responded, but as before, it fell upon Frangieh to provide a definitive answer. 
Since Balfour, he maintained, all Jewish immigrants had entered Palestine illegally. Those who had 
been granted permission by the Mandatory Authority would therefore be classed as “citizens de 
facto”. Jews who had not acquired citizenship status would be “considered as foreigners”. In the 
meantime, until an Arab-Palestinian state was established with its own judicial system, immigration 
should be prohibited together with land transfer from Arabs to Jews. Frangieh contended that apart 
from the unique 1941 coup d’état in Bagdad when the Nazis had incited Arab violence against Jews, 
Jews and Arabs had enjoyed centuries of “perfect harmony”. That aside, Jews would continue to 
benefit from autonomy in an independent Palestinian Arab state. Zionism, he maintained, had 
poisoned the relationship. Jews, according to Fadel Jamali (Iraq), are “part of us” and had achieved 
prominent commercial and political success, but Zionism had soured an otherwise cordial 
atmosphere. The latter sparked a contest among Arab states vying for the distinction of having 
enriched and politically integrated the greater number of Jews.732 
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Of the options available: partitioning Palestine into two independent states with separate 
immigration policies, or a federation of semi-autonomous states also with individual immigration 
policies, or finally, a bi-national state implying substantial curtailment of Jewish immigration, were 
all dismissed on grounds that each shared “the same number of disadvantages”.733 In his summing 
up, Jamali argued that “alien dreamers formed designs to come and occupy Palestine [but it was an 
act] of aggression and a violation of the principles of peace, justice and democracy”. As there was 
an outright refusal to consider the alternative options for Palestine, Jamali maintained that it should 
be declared an independent Arab state. In that state, Jews whose status was deemed ‘legal’ could 
remain, benefiting from equality, citizenship and a degree of autonomy. Jewish immigration would 
stop, and future policy left to the vagaries of a predominantly Arab political authority. The fate of 
non-citizens (‘illegal’ immigrants) was uncertain, though they faced the prospect of expulsion. While 
Arabs condemned the Holocaust and sympathised with the predicament faced by survivors, the 
problem was one that required wider international attention. “Palestine”, Jamali stated, “is not a land 
without people to be given to a people with no land”.734 
UNSCOP’s Swedish Chairman, Sandstrom, focused on the nub of the problem. Given a single 
Palestinian Arab state, he questioned the fate of illegal Jewish immigrants already living in Palestine. 
Hamid Frangieh (Lebanon), replied that it was important to define the term ‘illegal’. He argued that 
Arab states were unified in their opinion that as the Balfour Declaration was itself illegal, then it 
followed that all Jews who had entered Palestine since Balfour were illegal immigrants. However, he 
conceded that Jews who had been granted Palestinian citizenship under the Mandatory Authority 
could be regarded as de facto Palestinian citizens but those who had entered the country under British 
restrictions would be considered as having entered the country illegally. They would be treated in the 
same manner as an Arab illegal entrant and faced “expulsion from the country”. A future independent 
Arab Government of Palestine would determine the fate of Jews who had entered according to the 
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rules in force under the Mandated Authority, but who were not yet Palestinian Nationals. Noting 
Frangieh’s former qualification, Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) asked for clarification. Adel Arslan (Syria) 
did nothing to oblige. To him, whether an immigrant was a de facto citizen or not, those who had 
entered Palestine post Balfour were illegal entrants.  Now there was an air of confusion.735 Although 
the dilemma was left unresolved, Arab intentions were clear. The Balfour Declaration was null and 
void and the British Mandate an illegal instrument. Jewish immigration since Balfour was illegal and 
immigrants would be subject to the restrictive laws of a future Palestinian-Arab state. 
Reading from a prepared statement, delivered in public on the previous day, the President of 
the Council of Lebanon now adopted a more conciliatory tone. Again, he was speaking on behalf of 
his fellow Arab Leaders. He reminded Special Committee members that the non-Jewish population 
of Palestine was nearly nine-tenths of the whole. Collectively, Arab states were “emphatically against 
the entire Zionist programme [and it was] one thing upon which the population of Palestine was … 
agreed upon”.736 No state, he argued, would tolerate immigration on the scale that Palestine was 
experiencing. It was natural that all countries should impose immigration restrictions in their own 
best interests. It was the opinion of Arab states that the solution lay in the formation of a free 
Government of Palestine based on proportional representation. Although Arabs had long believed 
that Jews who had entered since Balfour in 1917 were illegal immigrants, those who had entered 
“though legal channels” would be granted the same rights as Arabs.737 The Arab position on Jewish 
immigration still remained unclear. Sandstrom persisted with his line of questioning.738 He asked how 
a ban on Jewish immigration and land transfer would harmonise with the claim that Arabs adhered to 
the principles of human rights. In his reply, Hamid Frangieh (Lebanon) retreated to familiar territory. 
Ignoring Sandstrom’s reference to human rights, he insisted that Jewish immigration and land transfer 
would cease until the new Palestine Government decided future policy. 
 
735 The confusion may have been due to the difficulty in translation. Some of the Arab statesmen spoke only Arabic, others, according to Fouad Hamza 
(Saudi Arabia) did not understand English and some of the interpretation was from French.  
736 UNGA (A/AC.13/PV.38) 22 July 1947. Page 4  
737 (Ibid, 8) 
738 UNGA (AC.13/PV.39) 23 July 1947 
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One after another, Arab statesmen insisted that Jews had always enjoyed the same rights as 
their Arab counterparts in Middle East countries. Indeed, several Jewish people had achieved high 
office. Apart from the single instance in 1941 during which Baghdad was the scene of a Nazi coup 
d’état that had provoked anti-Semitism, Jews were well assimilated into the mainstream. Many more 
Arabs than Jews had died because of the coup and those Arabs who had participated in the disturbance 
had been severely punished. Speaking in support, Fadel Jamali (Iraq) maintained that “[w]ere it was 
not for Zionism ... [the atmosphere between all religions] would be very harmonious and peaceful”.739 
The problem was not the result of differences between ordinary Jews and non-Jews. The enemy was 
Zionism.  
Seeking a compromise and thinking ahead, Sandstrom asked the Arab statesmen if they 
believed there was danger involved in a small Jewish state being carved out of Palestine. Frangieh 
responded with the collective view of his fellow leaders that whatever its size, a Jewish state would 
create friction, exert economic pressure and would “gradually infiltrate in order to create disorder”. 
He drew a connection between a Jewish state and immigration. A Jewish state, he argued, would 
control its own immigration policy, leading to the probability of unlimited and unsustainable 
population growth. Since Balfour, Zionist demands had shifted from the question of “cultural home” 
to “national home” and then to a demand that all of Palestine should become a Jewish state. By some 
accounts, this could even stretch “from Sinai to the Euphrates”. Fadel Jamali (Iraq) elaborated. He 
maintained that it was in the very nature of Zionism to start with the modest before demanding the 
intolerable. Therefore, under such provocation, he predicted, “struggle will be coming”.740 Reacting 
to Lisicky’s (Czechoslovakia) provocative logic that the Arab concept of compromise implied that 
“[Arabs] ask for one hundred per cent of [their] claims and the others can share the rest”, Fadel 
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Jamali retorted that compromise was not the issue. Would Lisicky, he quizzed, compromise in the 
face of an assault and part-annexation of Czechoslovakia?741 
In a pre-prepared statement, Fadel Jamali (Iraq) subscribed to the unified view of the Arab 
Higher Committee.  Balfour, he said, was a violation of the principles of moral and human rights and 
“the root cause of all the trouble”. He contended that the League of Nations had violated its own 
covenant and turned Palestine into a land of bloodshed.  He added that Jews had a spiritual connection 
to the Holy land, as did Christians and Moslems, but this did not imply an implicit political 
connection. Jamali refuted the Zionist claim that Jews had materially raised Palestinian Arabs’ living 
standards. It was the age-old Imperialistic argument; “the white man’s burden” and a fallacy that had 
led to numerous wars. Arabs needed no help from Zionists and were, he confirmed, rich “in 
civilisation and culture”.742 
Next, Jamali addressed what his colleagues had agreed was a “dangerous” supposition that 
Jews were homeless and therefore needed a homeland they could call their own. There were vast 
underdeveloped regions as far flung as the United States or Australia, where unrestricted immigration 
was an alien concept. He submitted that a Jew’s home is the country of his or her citizenship. An Iraqi 
Jew is at home in Iraq, an English Jew’s home is England, a French Jew’s in France. The list was 
endless. Jamali cautioned that the Zionist concept of Jewish state was “rendering a great disservice 
to Jews all over the world”.  He argued that Zionists exert huge economic and political pressure. Arab 
farmers gave way and sold land to Jews at exorbitant prices which were far beyond the reach of 
ordinary Arab land owners. Through a well organised machinery of propaganda, Zionists had 
infiltrated the centre of Western public opinion, manipulating it into the mistaken belief that Arabs 
had much to gain under “Zionist domination”. Zionists, he continued, exploited the issue of displaced 
European Jews for their own political ends, making it a humanitarian concern requiring an 
international response. Summing up, Jamali questioned whether “money, distorted propaganda, 
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political pressure and Terrorism [should be allowed to overcome] the principles of peace and 
justice”. 
Nearing the end of their investigation, a party of UNSCOP members made a brief visit to 
Amman to meet King Abdullah of Jordan. Previously, the King, had privately offered his support for 
Partition in return for Jordan’s annexation of the remaining area. Now, with “winks and smiles”, he 
changed tack.743 According to a report of the visit seen by Garcia Granados,744 the King was asked 
whether he would accept Jewish refugees into his own country. Now that the Arab world had spoken 
with one voice, King Abdullah laughed and responded that it would be like “asking me to cut my own 
throat”. In an impartial world, there would be no Jewish nor Palestine problem. Later, in a supposedly 
off-the-record private conversation, Jordan’s Prime Minister claimed that Jewish immigration should 
be ended. As far as illegal immigrants were concerned and in contrast to the attitude voiced by fellow 
Arab leaders, the Prime Minister conjectured that remaining Jews, whether legal or illegal, should be 
granted citizenship.745 By the time UNSCOP left the region there was no doubt that other than 
Abdullah who had other ambitions, Arabs bluntly refused to accept Zionist ambitions. With neither 
side prepared to give way, UNSCOP left the region to decide on the least-contentious way to partition 
Palestine.  
Summary 
By refusing to participate in proceedings, the Arab Higher Committee had delivered Palestinian Arabs 
a disservice. Fortunately, neighbouring Arab statesmen had partially filled the breach and made a 
compelling case that Britain, in choosing to ignore Arab opinion, had rendered The Balfour 
Declaration illegal. Moreover, the Declaration, having been ratified by the League of Nations also 
rendered the Mandate illegal. Thus, to Arab statesmen both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate 
were illegal instruments and had no legal status whatsoever. In their evidence, Arab statesmen 
 
743 (Ibid, 29-30) 
744 Granados did not attend the meeting as he was on his way to Geneva 
745 Garcia-Granados, J. (1948): ‘The Birth of Israel – The Drama as I saw it 
186 
 
considered that Palestinian-Arab resistance was justified. Above all, Arabs were determined that 
Jewish immigration had gone beyond acceptable levels and were fearful that granting more was 
merely a prelude to a Jewish takeover of large swathes of Arab territory. In any event, the post-war 
Jewish refugee crisis was of wide international concern, and not one to be imposed solely on Palestine. 
Therefore, under new constitutional arrangements, Jewish immigration would stop and those deemed 
to have entered illegally would be expelled. Nevertheless, Jews who had entered through legal 
channels would enjoy equal rights in an Arab-majority Government. Of course, the latter was a far 
cry from Zionist aspirations. Giving his evidence, Ben-Gurion was determined that, whatever the 
obstacles, Jewish immigration would continue. Also, David Horowitz had dismissed Palestine’s 
apparent lack of ‘absorptive capacity’. If immigration was important before the war, then it was 
doubly so since the Holocaust. Jews had died because they were trapped. Ben-Gurion and others 
seemingly accepted Partition and were (in the same way that Arabs had agreed to a Jewish minority 
in an Arab-majority state) willing to accept Palestinian Arabs on equal terms in a Jewish-majority 
state. 
UNSCOP had entered into a country that was rife with violence - barely contained by extreme 
and repressive measures of control. Without an immediately orchestrated alternative solution to the 
Mandate, Palestine would soon descend into anarchy.              
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CHAPTER 5 
Introduction 
The early chapters of UNSCOP’s final report deal with issues surrounding its own origins, 
demographic and economic matters and a review of the British Mandate, together with an appraisal 
of the Arab and Jewish cases. This chapter continues with matters specifically relating to the Holy 
Land.746 While the above topics are discussed in previous chapters, the thesis would be incomplete 
without UNSCOP’s analysis of the main solutions proposed. The proposals fell into three broad 
categories. First, a Palestine partitioned into two independent states with or without economic unity. 
Second a disjointed but otherwise partitioned federal state constructed such that minority rights are 
guaranteed in politically autonomous or semi-autonomous regions. Lastly, a single state where an 
Arab majority guaranteed Jewish autonomy over primarily Jewish affairs. This last option would be 
quickly ruled out.  
The Palestine Royal Commission (Peel) had argued that the differences between Arabs and 
Jews were so entrenched that Partition was the only feasible option. The Special Committee 
acknowledged that Peel’s Commission was first to draw boundaries of separation between the two 
sides. ‘Partition’, according to Peel, was “the only solution which offered any possibility for ultimate 
peace”.747 
Although Peel’s report had been published ten years earlier, it is interesting to note the 
similarities between its analysis of the divide between Jews and Arabs with UNSCOP’s own findings. 
Both reports leave little doubt that nothing short of Arab-Jewish separation by way of full-scale 
partition into two independent states or, at the very least, partition by way of Cantonisation were the 
only realistic options. Also, given that Partition in any form was now roundly rejected by Arabs and 
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that both groups were seemingly prepared to fight one another over the issue, the prospect of future 
long-term stability looked bleak.  
UNSCOP Report to the General Assembly 
Census statistics from 1922 to 1946 offer an insight into the interconnection between a Jewish state 
and its reliance on immigration. During that time the total population of Palestine had almost tripled. 
While the Arab population had nearly doubled, the Jewish population had burgeoned from (83,790) 
by over seven-fold (608,255) largely due to immigration.748 In 1922 Jews made up nearly 13% of the 
total population. In the space of just twenty-four years this had increased to 33%.749 It is a complex 
picture, but given similar trends, extrapolating over the following twenty-four-year period, by 1970 
Jews would outstrip Arabs by over two million. The increase in overall population from 1922 to 1946 
is partially explained by natural birth rate (Arabs greater than Jews) and increased life expectancy for 
both groups. However, by far the greatest factor was Jewish immigration. If Jewish immigration 
continued at the same rate as 1922-1946, then by 1970, in a single state, Jews would become the 
dominant population. Arabs had conceded that Jews could share proportional political representation 
in an independent Arab state provided that the Jewish population did not exceed one third of the total. 
This fraction was already reached by 1946. To Arabs then, the Jewish population was about to exceed 
acceptable limits.   
 
748 (Ibid, 22) 
749 The figure given in the report of 31% in incorrect. It should be noted that quantitative data occasionally vary throughout the existing literature. 
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Population of Palestine by Religions * 
 
Moslems Jews Christians Others Total 
1922 486,177 83,790 71,464 7,617 649,048 
1931 493,147 174,606 88,907 10,101 966,761 
1941 906,551 474,102 125,413 12,881 1,518,947 
1946 1,076,783 608,225 145,063 15,488 1,845,559 
* Statistics drawn from UNSCOP Report to the UN, A/364 3 September 1947, Page 22 
 
By 1960, excluding immigration, the estimated population distribution was as follows: ** 
 
      Estimated population of Palestine in 1960 (excluding immigration) 
 
Arabs Jews Christians other Total 
1946 (actual) 1,076,783 608,225 145,063 15,481 1,845,559 
1960 (estimated) 1,533,000 664,000 176,000 21,000 2,394,000 
** Statistics drawn from UNSCOP Report to the UN, A/364 3 September 1947, Page 23 
 
The figures indicate that if immigration ended, then, by 1960, the percentage of Jews to the total 
population was projected to drop from 33% to 28% of a total population which itself was expected to 
increase by approximately 30%. Before long, given a complete stoppage of Jewish immigration, 
unequal natural birth rates threatened to create an unacceptable (to Zionists) ever-decreasing Jewish 
minority in an ever-increasing Arab majority single state. Crucially, if, according to Arab states, 
illegal immigrants were expelled, the problem facing Jews was significantly worsened and certainly 
not envisaged in the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate or any one of a number of investigative 
Committee in the thirty years from 1917 until 1947. While there is no evidence that the above statistics 
were examined, this thesis argues that their implications would have led inevitability to Partition. 
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Also, as Jewish communities were clustered mainly around the Coastal Plain, West Jerusalem and 
the Northern Uplands a plan could be devised for a partitioned Jewish state.  
Now UNSCOP members turned their attention to the many thousands of European Jews 
anxiously waiting their turn to start a new life in Palestine. Committee Members noted that the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry recommendations for immigration conflicted with Britain’s own 
policy. The Anglo-American Committee had proposed that 100,000 Jewish immigrants should be 
admitted immediately. Later, Britain appeared to have endorsed the substance of the proposal, but it 
was never acted upon. Neither was the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendation that all land 
transfer should be free for “sale, lease or use of land irrespective of race, community or creed”, which 
would have effectively freed land transfer from the restrictive policy set out in the 1939 White 
Paper.750 With regard to land use and agricultural practices, from its earliest days the Palestine 
Administration had entered a country that was “disease ridden, under-developed, poverty stricken” 
with “an indifferent agricultural regime” and beset with lawlessness.751 From 1921 until the Special 
Committee arrived in 1947, there were outbreaks of civil disturbance. This meant that attention was 
shifted towards containment of unrest rather than expenditure on essential social and economic 
development. The slow rate of progress in Arab occupied areas drew criticism from influential Arab 
leaders who contrasted it with the rapid pace of development within Jewish settlements. The Special 
Committee noted that Jewish finances were directed primarily at improving Jewish services. 
Therefore, theoretically, the larger share of governmental financial resources were available to meet 
Arab needs. However, Arabs were critical of this assumption, and not without reason. Less than 4% 
of total expenditure was devoted to education and a miserly 3% was spent on public health. 
Meanwhile expenditure on police and other security measures multiplied. Despite the inadequacies 
of provision, in the previous twenty years there had been improvements in health. An example of this 
was a fall in child mortality. Though literacy rates had improved, illiteracy remained uncomfortably 
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high. Just over half of school-age boys and less than a quarter of girls attended Government schools. 
The Special Committee accepted the Royal Commission’s analysis that this shortage of educational 
facilities intensified Arab frustration.752 Despite the evident deficiencies, there were material 
improvements across the population and the Jewish community had contributed to this increased 
prosperity. Two years before, the Royal Commission had reported that “Arabs have shared to a 
considerable degree in material benefits which Jewish immigration has brought to Palestine” and 
that their “economic position … has not so far been prejudiced by the establishment of the National 
Home”. Reporting ten years later in 1947, the Government of Palestine reached a similar conclusion. 
It cited improved material standards, an increase in self-sufficiency and a decreased mortality rate, 
which all combined to improve the lives of the Arab community.753 Although improved living 
standards were also partially due to their own efforts, Arab leaders refused to concede that many of 
the gains made were as a direct result of a sizeable Jewish presence in the region. Nevertheless, with 
the opposing sides firmly set on their own viewpoints, there was no realistic scope for conciliation.  
From the early days of the Mandate, Britain had taken some positive steps forward. In 1923 
Britain proposed the establishment of an Arab Agency. This Agency would have been established 
under the same Article 4 accorded to the Jewish Agency and analogous to it. Again, the proposal was 
rejected claiming it failed to meet Arab aspirations. However, occasionally matters improved. In 1937 
Peel’s Royal Commission reported that it was impressed with the Arab National movement. It 
reported that it was an efficient centralised political machine representing Arab and Christian interests 
with party leaderships represented on the Arab Higher Committee.  Decisions taken at the centre were 
relayed to mainly agrarian Arab communities via a network of local committees.754 On several 
occasions, particularly during the crisis days of the late nineteen-thirties, Arabs who refused to abide 
by Arab leadership rules were intimidated, or in some instances, assassinated.755  
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British policy favoured the establishment of Palestinian self-Government but preferred a 
gradual approach. In 1922 a proposal for a Legislative Council had been rejected by the Palestine 
Arab Executive, claiming that Arabs should maintain an overall majority. By 1935 twenty elective 
municipal councils were in operation and another equally balanced council was established in that 
same year. Though Jews criticised perceived restrictions on their own municipalities, these were 
positive steps on the way to local autonomy. Later in 1935, moves were afoot to revive a Legislative 
Council. A twenty-eight-member legislature Committee would be empowered to make legislative 
recommendations, provided that the provisions of the British Mandate were inviolable and 
immigration policy remained under the control of the High Commissioner. Arab attitudes were 
divided between moderates inclined to accept the proposal and those who believed it failed to satisfy 
demands for full Arab national autonomy. Jewish leaders, however, feared Arab domination.  
The 1939 White Paper showed that Britain was reaching the end of its tether and set its sights 
on terminating the Mandate. If, within ten years, Britain’s “commercial and strategic requirements” 
had been satisfied and provided that “peace and order” had been restored, British and Palestinian 
representatives would meet to discuss constitutional arrangements. During this time, Palestinians 
would gradually have an increased role in running their own affairs. Ultimately, Palestinians would 
be placed in charge of all Government departments but with ultimate control exercised by the High 
Commissioner.756 Unsurprisingly, Jewish reaction was opposed. As before, Arab opinion was split 
between National Defence Party moderates in favour with Arab opposition forces against. With 
insufficient support, the proposal was dropped.  
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UNSCOP Members Address the Concepts of State versus Home 
“Homeland provides nourishment, permanency, reassurance and an identification with the soil, and 
… historical ties of identity”.757 
 
It was widely understood that Zionists had long aspired to creating a Jewish National Home. 
UNSCOP addressed the political implications of the term: use of the word ‘Home’ rather than ‘State’ 
had been the result of a compromise between UK Government Ministers who considered that 
statehood was the goal, and those who were opposed. It seemed Britain was reluctant to officially 
commit itself. So far as was possible, the Special Committee explored a precise meaning of ‘Jewish 
National Home’, a term that had provoked much controversy.  The British Mandate had stipulated 
the “dual obligation”; an undertaking to reconcile the conflicting demands of the Jewish and Arab 
populations of Palestine. The Mandate was phrased in such general terms that its primary intention 
should be investigated: 
Britain, as the Mandatory Power, was entrusted to administer Palestine and to put into effect 
the Balfour Declaration of 1917.758 The League of Nations gave Britain responsibility over the 
political, administrative and economic organs of the country to ensure the establishment of a Jewish 
National Home and the development of self-governing institutions.759 Article 6 of the Mandate 
provided a qualification which effectively charged Britain with facilitating the establishment of a 
Jewish National Home through immigration. However, UNSCOP criticised Britain for having (in 
1922) construed the meaning of Article 6 to imply that the number of Jewish settlers should be 
controlled according to the economic capacity of the country to absorb them. This interpretation was 
agreed at the time by the executive of the Zionist Organisation. Thus, in the opinion of UNSCOP, the 
above restriction on the terms of the article became established as fact.760 By 1947 a fully independent 
 
757 Bickerton, I.J and Klausner, C. L. (2007, 11) ‘History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ (7th Edition) 
758 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22. HM Stationary Office.  
759 British Palestine Mandate: Text of the Mandate (24th July 1922. Article 2) 
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Jewish entity was in the making, but even though it was still developing, a Jewish National Home 
remained well within Palestine’s economic capacity. But how then was the term ‘Home’ to be 
understood?  
The concept of ‘Home’ was first used in the 1897 Basle Programme761. Since then, much 
debate has been prompted over the precise meaning of a “legally assured home”, as this wording 
lacked legal precedent in international law. Later, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate adopted 
the term Jewish National ‘Home’. UNSCOP argued that the vagueness of the terminology was 
intentional. The wording ‘home’ rather than ‘state’ was employed by the drafters of both documents 
to mollify Arabs and elements of Jewish public opinion. 
UNSCOP’s argument was speculative for the word ‘Home’ did not preclude the establishment 
of a future Jewish ‘State’. There is little doubt that the intentions expressed in the Balfour Declaration 
are unclear and open to a variety of interpretations. Thus, on the 3rd June 1922, Britain moved to place 
a restrictive construction on the Balfour Declaration. In a statement issued by the Colonial Office. 
Britain recognised that Jews had an historical connection to Palestine and were there “as of right and 
not on sufferance”. The statement was intended to remove any lingering doubts about Britain’s 
intentions by implying that a Jewish National Home was to be established in a part of Palestine, not 
the whole. It was a significant if somewhat unclear point of clarification and the statement also 
extended and reinforced the Balfour reference to non-Jews. Arab nationality, culture and language 
were not to be subordinated to Judaism.762 The Mandate itself was an international commitment. It 
committed Britain, as the Mandatory Power, to facilitate a Jewish ‘Home’ in Palestine. 
Notwithstanding that the Jewish Population at the time was just 80,000, it also appeared to be a firm 
commitment that any Jew in the world was free to immigrate and settle in Palestine. However, the 
Special Committee noted the impracticality of accommodating all Jews worldwide into a small and 
 
761 The Basle Programme emerged from the inaugural congress of the Zionist Organisation held in Basel (Basle) Switzerland (29th to 31st August 1897). 
Its goal was that those sympathetic to Zionism should aim at “establishing for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine”.   
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underdeveloped region. Authors of the Mandate would have been aware that compared with an 
overwhelming Arab population, Jews would have remained in permanent minority unless Jewish 
immigration was encouraged. As a minority, Jews would be susceptible to aggressive force, the 
prospect of which was neither intended nor implied in the terms of the Mandate. The Committee 
could only conclude that the League of Nations had assumed (rightly or wrongly) that the provisions 
contained in the Mandate relating to Arab concerns would eventually allay Arab fears. By the time 
UNSCOP arrived in 1947, fear had given way to outright hostility. This was perpetrated by Jewish 
proponents and Arab opponents of Jewish immigration, which was essential to the effective 
establishment of a secure Jewish Home/State. Even given the prospect of economic development, 
Arabs remained implacably opposed to Jewish immigration. Further, the Special Committee’s report 
sought to clarify the issue. It stated that it was unlikely that the League of Nations intended that Jewish 
immigration should be on such a scale that Jews comprised a majority across all of Mandatory 
Palestine. This would be ignoring the wishes of the present Arab majority and at worst it could raise 
the spectre of a violent struggle.763 
The Permanent Mandates Commission had accepted the general principle that under the terms 
of the Mandate, Britain was obliged to ensure that equal weight should be accorded to the wishes of 
both the Arab and Jewish populations. Also, in the preamble to its 1937 report, the Royal Commission 
was assured that a central feature of the Mandate was to “promote the establishment of a Jewish 
National Home”764. The phrase itself obliged the Royal Commission to devote an entire chapter to its 
meaning. The phrase “Jewish National Home” was an acknowledgement that Arabs too had their 
‘Home’ in Palestine. While Britain was empowered to facilitate the growth of a Jewish national 
‘Home’, it was not empowered to facilitate a Jewish ‘State’. The latter depended “mainly on the zeal 
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and enterprise of the Jews”. The Royal Commission reported that within twelve years the Jewish 
Home had evolved from “experiment [to] a going concern”.765 
In June 1922, Winston Churchill766 had denied “unauthorised statements” that HM 
Government intended a wholly Jewish Palestine. The terms of the Declaration did “not contemplate 
that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home 
should be founded in Palestine” (original emphasis).767 The Special Committee noted the Royal 
Commission’s argument that Churchill’s statement did not preclude a future Jewish state,768 one in 
which Jews would build a “common home”.769  
Quite what the authors of the Balfour Declaration actually intended for Palestine was merely 
“speculative”770 but whatever their motives, certainly by 1937, Jews had already established a 
common home; a quasi-state in which adult Jews, whatever their political viewpoint, could vote for 
an Elective Assembly.771 Tax revenues supported schools, public health and social services systems 
so that this “highly organised and close-knit society” merited its status as “a state within a state”.772 
Peel had concluded that although Britain may have helped establish a National Home this did not 
imply that it should remain “crystallised at its present size” nor should Britain shut the doors on 
Jewish immigrants.773 Nonetheless, UNSCOP members accepted Arab criticisms that Britain was 
remiss by not “accelerat[ing] the tempo of Arab development”.774  
The Home/State quandary has never been satisfactorily resolved but after the Holocaust, 
Zionists had taken matters into their own hands. It was inescapable that a Jewish 
Home/Homeland/Commonwealth/State actually existed, and, for that matter, its community 
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boundaries were fairly well defined. It was inevitable that, despite strong Arab opposition, time and 
again, UNSCOP pressed the need to formalise Partition as the only “workable basis for meeting in 
part the claims and aspirations of both parties”.775 It is almost inconceivable that the General 
Assembly would disregard UNSCOP’s recommendation.  
UNSCOP Members visit Post-War Europe 
Following a meeting with a representative of the Preparatory Commission of the International 
Refugee Organisation who reported “resettlement activities”, it was proposed that the Committee 
visit and interview Jews in Europe and “Jewish displaced persons in particular”. Some Committee 
members believed that the visit served no useful purpose, because it was already known that that 
“people in the camps wanted to go to Palestine”. Others thought it ill-advised to connect the Jewish 
refugee problem in Europe to the Palestine question. After an exchange of views, it was finally agreed 
to form a sub-committee of members willing to explore Jewish attitudes to “resettlement, repatriation 
or immigration into Palestine”. Thus, between 8th and the 14th August 1947, a delegation of members 
visited camps in Germany and Austria.776 777 
In a substantial appendix to the main report, Sub-Committee members described their visits 
to Assembly Centres in the US Zone of Germany, the US Sectors of Berlin and Vienna together with 
the British Zone in Germany. These Assembly Camps were, writes Chomsky, little different to “Nazi 
extermination camps except that there were no crematoria”.778 In private session, UNSCOP 
interviewed a representative sample of one hundred individuals out of many thousands of Jews still 
seeking some form of resolution.  Members gleaned that since the Anglo-American Committee’s visit 
in January 1946, the attitude of respondents appeared even more fixated on migrating to Palestine. A 
tiny minority of Jews felt sufficiently safe to return to their former homes but the large majority, faced 
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with continuing anti-Semitism and “haunted by memories of endured horrors” resisted attempts to 
repatriate them. Overwhelmingly, interviewees favoured Palestine over resettlement in a third 
country and were prepared to journey there illegally if necessary.779 During an informal meeting 
between Rabbi Bernstein and members of the Sub-Committee, Bernstein maintained that given a free 
choice, all Jewish displaced persons would leave for Palestine. If both Palestine and the United States 
were immediate options, then the split would be 75% and 25% respectively. However, if Palestine 
was not a legal option, and assuming the US would take them, then 50% would go to America and 
the remaining 50% would remain in Europe before travelling to Palestine legally or illegally if the 
legal route was barred. Committee Members confirmed that “there was a mass urge towards 
settlement in Palestine [and that] such a situation must be regarded as at least a component in the 
problem of Palestine”.780 Nonetheless, though the psychological climate was at an all-time low, 
morale improved whenever survivors dreamed with “fanatical urge” of Palestine. The urge was 
stoked by several contributing factors. Apart from the breakdown of trust in former neighbours and 
haunting memories of the Holocaust, there was an element of self-persuasion. According to UNSCOP 
this stemmed from a “Zionist background in eastern European Jewry”. Children were being taught 
Hebrew in preparation for a new life in Palestine. Posters extolled the advantages of Palestine, for 
example, ‘Palestine, a Jewish state for the Jewish People’. A range of Jewish organisations 
relentlessly promoted Palestine by a process of “general indoctrination” although UNSCOP members 
conceded though that they had no proof of organised propaganda.781 Nevertheless, the visit left a deep 
impression. Pappé contends that after the event, many UNSCOP members claimed to have been 
moved to associate “the fate of the Jews in Europe – demographically and arithmetically – with the 
fate of the Jews in Palestine [putting Palestinian Arabs] in a very weak position”. “Who are you 
[Palestinian Arabs] to be against our wish to solve the problem of Jews in Europe as a whole?”.782 
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Before leaving Europe, UNSCOP members had collected sufficient evidence to convince them that 
given the choice of resettlement, repatriation or immigration, immigration to Palestine was crucial 
for most survivors. 
Members of the Special Committee would soon be faced with choosing between one of three 
possible options.  The first of these was that Palestine should be a single state; a homeland for both 
Jews and Arabs living under one corporative Authority.  The second was that Palestine should be a 
federated state of separate Jewish and Arab cantons. The third option was that Palestine should be 
partitioned into two independent states with both Arabs and Jews reaping the mutual benefits of 
economic collaboration. However, as there was still no sense of compromise, partition was the only 
available option. While UNSCOP’s majority accepted this option, others had reservations. 
In a personal note included in an annex to UNSCOP’s main report, Sir Abdur Rahman (India) 
expressed his own views which mirrored those of Iran and Yugoslavia.783 Drawing from inferences 
contained in a wide range of pre and post-WWI documentation, Rahman argued that it was 
incontrovertible that Britain had pledged to liberate Palestinian Arabs; that promises had been made 
and broken; that in constructing the Balfour Declaration the Arab constituency had been ignored and 
the British Mandate was inconsistent with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
was therefore invalid and unworkable. Rahman inferred that there was documentary evidence 
showing that PM Lloyd George’s predecessor, Herbert Asquith, was not enthusiastic about the British 
annexation of Palestine and “plant[ing] in this not very promising territory about three or four million 
European Jews”.784 Since then, however, hundreds of thousands of European Jews had entered 
Palestine. Rahman proposed that those who had “been allowed to come [and] cannot be turned out 
[under present rules]”, should have the right to acquire Palestinian citizenship. He had nothing to say 
on Jews who had supposedly entered illegally. Rahman was not unsympathetic to the plight of Jewish 
survivors, but from the beginning of UNSCOP’s deliberations it was clear that he favoured a federated 
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state. John D.L. Hood (Australia) explained his reasons for choosing not to commit himself to either 
Partition or Federation. For Hood, both arguments were equally persuasive and both merited 
consideration. However, in his opinion there were features, including political factors, which were 
beyond the scope of the Special Committee. Therefore, Hood maintained, the General Assembly 
should decide.785 Garcia Granados (Guatemala) also had reservations, though not on whether Partition 
or Federation was best. His concern was in the wording of Recommendation XII (Chapter V) that it 
was “accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution 
of the Jewish problem in general".786 His objection centred on the phrase “Jewish problem in 
general”. Certainly, a comment following the recommendation appears to conflate the predicament 
facing Jewish survivors in Europe as though it was representative of world-wide Jewry. Granados 
argued that Jewish communities in many countries including the US, the Soviet Union, France, the 
Latin American Republics and others enjoyed protection under the law and equal rights with fellow 
citizens. Millions of Jews, therefore, must not be considered as part of a wider “Jewish problem”, 
when no such wider problem existed. It was unlikely that Jews would willingly choose to “leave the 
countries where they were born and leave their homes and interests”. The “Jewish problem” was 
confined only to those in assembly centres or elsewhere where the desire to leave was strongest. This 
amounted to some 1,500,000 people, anxious to be absorbed into “the proposed Jewish State”. 
Granados had signalled Guatemala’s intention to support Partition. 
Impasse - The Jewish Case 
Special Committee members considered the majority viewpoints of both Jewish Organisations and 
Arab states. Most Jewish organisations in Palestine and elsewhere accepted the Jewish Agency’s 
demand for a Jewish state in Palestine. Opinion was divided as to its form. Some called for a Jewish 
state in the entire region of Palestine. Others believed that partitioning Palestine was the way forward, 
provided that the territory allocated to Jews was sufficiently large to accommodate large numbers of 
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immigrants. The latter was formalised by the Zionist Organisation in Basle. It stated that Palestine 
should be a democratic Jewish Commonwealth with “the gates of Palestine open to Jewish 
immigration”, as long as the area allocated was sufficient to afford Jewish resettlement on a large 
scale leading, with minimal delay, to the “establishment of a Jewish State”.787 The instrumental case 
for defensible boundaries enclosing adequate territory in which Jews share the expressive goals of 
history, religion, language, culture and community was central. A Jewish state demanded likeminded 
Jews to share those goals. Thus, to Zionists and a large constituency of Jewish people, Jewish 
immigration and a Jewish state were inextricably interwoven. There could be no sovereign Jewish 
state if Jews constituted a minority. It follows that given the overall predominance of Arabs, a Jewish 
state covering the entire region of Palestine was unachievable. A workable Jewish state could only 
emerge out of a partitioned Palestine where Jews outnumbered Arabs and even in this scenario, Jews 
were likely to comprise only a slim majority. Further Jewish immigration could redress the balance, 
provided Palestine was adequately partitioned to provide scope for a majority Jewish state. The 
political case for immigration rested on the Mandate. The humanitarian case for refugees was clear. 
Political or humanitarian, the emphasis was on immigration and the expressive historical, cultural and 
religious right for Jews to return to the Promised Land.  
Impasse – The Arab Case 
The Arab case was based on observations presented by the Arab Higher League. It sought the 
immediate creation of a Palestinian state stretching from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean. For 
some years, it was evident that relations between the two sides had deteriorated. Discord was 
constantly intensified by streams of Jewish immigrants entering a hostile and disproportionately large 
Arab world with little in the way of common language, religion or culture. Arabs claimed an ancient 
‘natural right’ to the land and were prepared to defend it from “foreign intruders” and continue to 
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pursue their exclusive independent economic, political and cultural development. Palestinian Arabs, 
UNSCOP noted, claimed ancient ‘natural’ rights to a land that was not ‘sovereign’; a land that Jews 
too had inhabited for centuries. The Arab Higher League had argued that Britain was obliged to fulfil 
its WWI pledge to grant Palestinian Arabs the right to self-determination. That pledge, Arabs argued, 
was instrumental in motivating Arabs to join Britain during its war against the Ottomans. Britain 
contended that while the principle of self-determination applied to other class ‘A’ mandated territories 
the same did not apply to Palestine. Significantly, the Committee reasoned that the omission of 
Palestine was intentional, and that Britain had left open the possibility of a future Jewish National 
Home (State). For Arabs, the Balfour Declaration had no legal validity. In addition, Paragraph 4, 
Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter states that “the wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”. Arab states rightly argued that Palestinian 
Arabs had not been consulted and therefore the British Mandate was null and void. Arab states were 
not members of the League of Nations and refused to be bound by its edict.  Further, Arabs contended 
that while the Palestine Mandate was in force Jewish immigration was illegal.788  
As for the violation of Article 22, the Royal Commission of 1937 had confirmed that in 1918 
the Allied Powers had agreed that the Balfour Declaration was predicated on an understanding that 
Palestine would be “treated differently from Syria and Iraq” and that the League of Nations 
endorsement of the Palestine Mandate ratified that difference.789  
Arabs produced a set of proposals. These were articulated by Arab States delegates at a 
Palestine conference in London in 1946 and later in evidence presented to UNSCOP by Arab states. 
The proposals were diametrically opposed to the concept of a Jewish state. Under the Arab plan, 
during a short British-Mandatory transitionary period, a High Commissioner would establish a 
provisional government comprising seven Arab and three Jewish members, followed later by an 
elected sixty-member constituent assembly. Constitutionally, Palestine was to become an Arab-
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majority unitary state after the termination of the Mandate, but with a guarantee that all sections of 
the community would enjoy freedom of religious and cultural expression. Though democratic, Jewish 
representation on the legislative assembly was not permitted to exceed one-third. 790 Land transfer 
restrictions and anti-immigration policies would be applied. For the above reasons, Arabs contended 
that the Zionist case was invalid and that Arab proposals should be enacted with the minimum 
delay.791 
UNSCOP Members Make Their Decision 
During their final deliberations held in Geneva, it was clear from the early stages that there was little 
support among members of the Special Committee for a solution that would lead to domination by 
Arabs or by Jews in a single unitary state. Jews and Arabs had ancient historical and religious 
connections to the Holy Land, but while Arabs had numerical superiority and were naturally 
indigenous to the Middle East, one group’s claims should not be at the expense of creating a “gross 
injustice” to the claims of the other.792 
Zionist violence against the Administrative Authority had intensified since the war in Europe 
had ended. This factor, coupled with increasing strains on Arab/Jewish relations, made the business 
of finding a speedy solution more urgent. A glimmer of hope came when, because of the spiralling 
violence, Britain was finally forced to admit officially that its Mandate was unworkable and that the 
“obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable”.  
Both Arabs and Jews insisted on the termination of the Mandate and independence for 
Palestine.  The Committee were left in no doubt that both parties were at odds over the form this 
independence should take. Without internal contention, the Committee’s first recommendation was 
that the Mandate should be terminated.793 The Permanent Mandates Commission had been 
accountable to the League of Nations. However, like the League, it too was dissolved in April 1946. 
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As a starting point, Britain had announced its intention to surrender the Mandate to the United 
Nations. It was also generally agreed that one way or another Palestine should be granted 
independence. The United Nations would be the ultimate decision maker, but the task of preparing 
Palestine for self-government would fall on an Administrative Authority. 
In 1939, Britain had imposed savage restrictions on levels of immigration. In 1947 its official 
policy remained in force resulting in swathes of Holocaust survivors routinely crowded into assembly 
centres across Europe; most of whom clamoured to escape to Palestine. Now Committee members 
were faced with a dilemma. Though they recognised the “intense urge ... among the [Jewish] people 
themselves”, they also needed to allay Arab fears that Palestine and its immediate neighbours would 
be a region set aside for world-wide Jewish settlement. Committee members advised the General 
Assembly that it was an international problem; a problem of numbers to be solved by actions of a 
“general nature”. They argued that it was not within their remit to devote time to the issues 
surrounding displaced people. Even so, members felt obliged to recommend that as a vital prerequisite 
to the eventual settlement, all measures should be taken to ameliorate the conditions of the large 
Jewish subdivision of displaced people in Europe.794 Committee members were divided on the issue. 
Some believed that the solution lay in the hands of the wider international community and that 
Palestine should take its share of Jewish immigrants in proportion to its existing population and that 
other countries should do likewise.  
There was broad agreement on safeguarding the sanctity of the Holy Places to millions of 
Jews, Christians and Muslims and the population of Palestine as a whole. The Special Committee 
made the uncontroversial recommendation that whatever the outcome on independence, stipulations 
regarding the preservation of places of worship, their maintenance and rights of access should be 
enshrined into any new Constitution. 795 
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Special Committee members admitted that they were divided as to how best to organise 
Palestine. A minority tended towards a federal state, where Palestine would comprise a federation of 
all its inhabitants. The majority however, favoured that Palestine should be partitioned into two 
separate states. Hence, it was decided that UNSCOP members would separate into two working 
groups to consider each case on its merits.  
UNSCOP’s Minority Recommendation – Partition by Federation 
This option had the support of UNSCOP’s India, Iran and Yugoslavia members (Annex 10, 13). It 
was accepted that neither Partition nor Federation could solve the Jewish problem in its entirety. The 
‘federalists’ believed that Partition would create geographical and political disunity making social 
unity impossible in the long term. They argued that the greater interests of the Arab majority 
outweighed Zionist demands for a partitioned Jewish state. Given the right conditions and with 
international support, it was reasonable to suppose that semi-autonomous states could co-exist 
together in a wider Federal state. They argued that apart from the obvious democratic advantages, 
this satisfied both Jewish and Arab nationalistic aspirations and pointed the way towards unified 
loyalty to an independent Palestinian state. The federalists argued that Arabs were overwhelmingly 
opposed to Partition, as were a number of influential Zionists. It followed that a federal solution was 
neither anti-Jewish nor anti-Arab. The federalist group envisaged a future federal state where the 
difficulties associated with boundaries, economic unity, Jerusalem, human, religious and minority 
rights were largely absent. However, their solution regarding the central political question of Jewish 
immigration was less clear-cut. Federalists next addressed the issue of Palestine’s “absorptive 
capacity”. This term had been raised time and again over the preceding years. At best, any number 
attached to the term was subjective and, at worst, it was meaningless. Now, Federalists proposed that 
a representative nine-member international commission (three each from Jewish and Arab agencies 
and the United Nations) should be charged with estimating more objectively the absorptive capacity 
of a Jewish entity within a federal Palestinian state. Regarding the predicament facing the hundreds 
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of thousands of displaced European Jews, UNSCOP’s federalists argued that resolution of that issue 
demanded an international response. UN Member states, they reasoned, should each accommodate a 
defined share of Jewish immigrants. Palestine too must take its share. Palestine, they argued, was a 
country of limited resources. This and Arab opposition persuaded federalists to reject “Jewish 
immigration into Palestine [and not be] contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense 
as a means of solving world Jewry”.796 
UNSCOP’s Majority Recommendation – Partition with a Continuous Boundary  
This was based on the premise that since the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate, the claims 
submitted by both Arabs and Jews were incompatible. The conflict was “a clash of two intense 
nationalisms” with Jews in the region outnumbered two to one by Arabs. Strongly challenging the 
opinions of the federalists, the majority opinion of the Special Committee was that “Jewish 
immigration is the central issue [and the] one factor that, above all others, rules out the necessary 
co-operation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State”.797 The problem seemed 
insurmountable when UNSCOP attempted to draw acceptable lines of demarcation between the two 
states enough to satisfy the disparate demands of both parties. Arabs, they reported, were dispersed 
across the whole region, while Jews were mainly concentrated in the area around the Coastal Plain 
between Haifa and Tel Aviv. Both new states would require space for future land settlement and 
further development. Therefore, the land purchase restrictions imposed under Britain’s 1939 White 
Paper ruling should be rescinded. Committee members reasoned that any border-line drawn between 
the proposed new states left Jews with just a slim overall majority over Arabs in a Jewish state. On 
the other hand, Jews would constitute a virtually insignificant proportion in an Arab state. Leaving 
Jerusalem out of the equation, as it was to be divided roughly equally between Jews and Arabs and 
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was to be internationally administered, based on estimates conducted during the previous year (1946) 
the population figures were as follows:  
 Jews Arabs – and others Total 
Jewish state 498,000 407,000 905,000 
Arab state 10,000 725,000 735,000 
*  Statistics taken from A/364 UNSCOP Report 3 September 1947, Chapter VI, Subchapter 4 (Page 93) 
Special Committee members also noted that in addition to the 407,000 Arabs and others in the Jewish 
state, there were some 90,000 Bedouins in the region.798 Jews then would have constituted a just a 
tiny majority in what was to have been an independent Jewish state. As the natural population growth 
rate among Arabs exceeded that of Jews then, within a short measurable timeframe, the situation 
would be reversed. By contrast, the numbers indicate that unless there was an unlikely shift in the 
demographics of the Arab state, it would remain overwhelmingly Arabic. To partially correct the 
impending imbalance in the Jewish state, Special Committee members recommended that during a 
two-year transition period before Partition should come into effect Britain would remain as the 
Administrative Authority under the auspices of the United Nations, 150,000 immigrants would be 
admitted into the proposed Jewish state, made up of an initial 30,000 admitted on humanitarian 
grounds followed by a further 120,000 spread uniformly over the two years. The Jewish Agency 
would be responsible for their care and decide its own selection process799. Provided that the projected 
state met constitutional requirements, it would be free to apply for membership to the United Nations 
and set its own immigration criteria. The latter conditions also applied to a partitioned Arab state.  
Like Peel’s proposals of a decade before, the Special Committee accepted the inevitability of 
political separation – reinforcing the central argument of this thesis. However, unlike Peel’s 
population exchange proposal, UNSCOP proposed that Arabs and Jews should collaborate in an all-
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encompassing economic union. It was proposed that, under a Joint Economic Board, the two new 
states and Jerusalem should share a common currency, common infrastructure and development 
projects. Attention would be paid to irrigation, soil conservation and land reclamation. Three 
members drawn from each of the two states, together with three UN representatives would serve on 
the Board for an initial three-year period. UNSCOP acknowledged that while arbitration was 
normally an acceptable method of solving economic disputes, it was less useful in the fractious 
Palestinian political arena. The Committee expected that political differences would be resolved by 
the “necessities of the overriding interest of unity”. As a starting point, UNSCOP recommended that, 
for the first three years after Partition, outside arbitrators would help to resolve disputes.800  
Summary 
Two and a half months had elapsed since UNSCOP’s arrival in Palestine on the 15th June 1947. 
During this time UNSCOP delegates had travelled thousands of miles, received volumes of 
correspondence and spent five days gathering evidence from Arab statesmen in Lebanon and another 
day in Jordan. They had toured DP camps in Germany and Austria and held dozens of public, private, 
formal and informal meetings, many reported on by some two hundred international journalists. All 
eleven delegates had gathered in Geneva to carry out the final stages of their work. Members had 
explored the underlying reasons for the conflict and made recommendations to the General Assembly 
on how the Palestine question could be resolved. The report itself is meticulously detailed with all 
pertinent matters closely scrutinised. Members had dissected previous Plans and Proposals and 
concluded that, for one reason or another, all had been rejected by either Jewish or Arab leaders or 
by both.  
On the 3rd of September 1947, UNSCOP concluded that the British Mandate should be 
terminated. The majority also reached the predictable conclusion that Palestine should be partitioned 
into two independent states. In the medium term, each state would set its own immigration policy, 
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but both should collaborate in a system of economic unity. Moreover, due to its sensitive religious 
significance, the Committee recommended that Jerusalem should have special administrative status 
exercised under the authority of the UN.  
Having decided on the matter of political separation, the matter of economic viability was 
considered. While the scale of economic development in Jewish regions was impressive UNSCOP’s 
secretariat had doubts about the economic viability of an Arab state. UNSCOP’s majority responded 
that viability depended on an appropriate distribution of customs revenues.801 Against reservations 
expressed by a minority of UNSCOP members, the prospect for prosperity, the report reads, had all 
the advantages of Jewish dynamism and scientific endeavour and an Arab “intuitive understanding 
of life” such that “In each State, the native genius [should] evolve into its highest cultural forms”.802  
Finally, on the 31st August 1947, a weighty report of eight chapters containing verbatim and 
other evidence gathered from British, Arab and Jewish representatives, an appendix, annexes and 
UNSCOP’s recommendations was officially approved, signed and dispatched to individual UN 
Member States and the UN Secretary General803 sparking in the event, as Tal argues, “[t]he real 
Jewish-Arab intercommunal war”804. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Introduction 
Previous chapters argue that after the Balfour Declaration was ratified in the League of Nation’s 
Mandate, there was no turning back. After the Holocaust, Jewish survivors were drawn towards a 
secure Jewish state while the West’s closed-door policy effectively left them with little choice. 
Having analysed the work of previous investigative committees, UNSCOP agreed with Peel’s main 
conclusion: As neither Zionists nor Arabs would budge, particularly over the issue of Jewish 
immigration, and although both parties had presented persuasive cases, the impartial solution 
demanded that each should share part of the whole.  Jews and Arabs were already separated 
(partitioned) along community lines so that future state borders could be readily formalised. Partition 
seemed certain.  
A two-thirds majority of the then fifty-six Member states was required to ratify a proposal. 
Truman was caught in the middle between anti-Zionists, Arab states and his State Department on the 
one hand and pro-Zionists, supportive White House officials and Jewish friends on the other.805 He 
finally came down in favour of Partition. Stalin, via his UN representative Andrei Gromyko, relished 
the opportunity to denounce Britain’s handling of the Mandate and criticise its imperialist past. With 
post-war Britain’s grip on the Middle East weakening, a Jewish state presented itself as a would-be 
socialist ally. In his speech to the General Assembly earlier that year Gromyko had spoken in favour 
of a bi-national state, but if Arabs and Jews failed to agree, Partition was the Soviet Union’s next best 
option. Against heated Arab protests, the UN General Assembly approved UNSCOP’s majority 
recommendation that Palestine should be partitioned into two independent states with shared 
economic unity. Jerusalem would be administered by International authority.806 
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On the 14th of May 1948, Ben-Gurion declared the founding of the independent State of Israel. 
It was free to determine its own immigration and land policy issues. There can be little doubt that 
under President Truman, the United States had played the key role. In a congratulatory letter to mark 
the former president’s 80th birthday (8th May 1964) Ben-Gurion fondly recalled Truman’s “moral 
courage and wise statesmanship”. He continued, “In the annals of our people you will always be 
remembered as the man who ensured the inclusion of the desolate and empty Negev in the State of 
Israel for the absorption of the remnants of the Nazi holocaust … none of us will ever forget your 
momentous gesture in recognising renascent Israel two hours after I was privileged to proclaim its 
resurgence”.807 
Ben-Gurion’s proclamation of the state of Israel set the stage for war. On the 15th May 1948, 
combined Arab forces launched an attack on the new Israeli state808determined to fulfil Iraq’s Prime 
Minister’s prophesy to “obliterate every place the Jews seek to shelter”.809   
The UNGA Debate Partition 
On the 26th November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly convened to debate Resolution 
181 (III) [Plan of Partition].810 Adoption of this resolution required an absolute two-thirds majority 
of the then fifty-six-member states. UN Delegates may have weighed their decision against the post-
war partitions across Europe and of the carnage unleashed when the Indian sub-continent was 
partitioned. Now, although on a smaller scale, the Palestine problem was exacerbated by the UK’s 
announcement that it intended to relinquish its Mandate and withdraw its armed forces. The latter 
also announced its intention to abstain on any resolution it believed was unacceptable to either Jews, 
Arabs or both.  
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The White House came under intense pressure from a powerful Jewish lobby and from fellow 
politicians. These politicians were fearful that voting against Partition would cost them the Jewish 
vote and, in some cases, essential re-election campaign funding. With feeling running high, Truman 
complained of “unwarranted interference”.811 Cohen explains that when Truman finally announced 
that the US intended to support the Resolution, Jews could be under no illusion that they had won 
Truman’s support primarily because of the “sheer pressure of political logistics that was applied by 
the Jewish leadership on the United States”. Pressure was mounting both from inside and outside the 
UN. On the 21st of November 1947, just eight days before the crucial vote, influential protestant 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and six other signatories wrote to the New York Times. “We would like 
to see the lands of the Middle East practice democracy as we do here …Jewish Palestine is the only 
vanguard of progress and modernisation in the Middle East”.812 Writing in 1992, Edward Said argued 
that the pronoun “we”, (that is, sensibly minded Christian-Americans), felt at liberty to speak on 
behalf of tens of millions of Muslim Arabs whose “want[s] and wish[es] are of little interest. 
[Western enlightened] wishes ought to override their wishes”. Niebuhr’s remarks, protests an 
exasperated Said, “are nothing short of violent”.813 
Inside the United Nations building, Cohen maintains, rumours abounded that wavering 
countries had been bribed or threatened with economic sanctions if they failed to support Partition.814 
Historian, Peter Hahn provides compelling evidence showing that later investigations conducted by 
the US State Department confirmed that Zionists had pressurised delegates from Cuba, Honduras, 
Haiti, Ethiopia, Liberia, the Philippines and even Permanent-Five-member, China. Countries were 
cajoled with cash if they supported or threatened with financial sanctions if they refused.815 “Nothing 
was left to chance”.816 Hahn cites the cases of New York Democratic Representative, Sol Bloom, 
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telephoning to pressurise the Liberian delegate and thirty-one other senators cabling the Greek 
legation. Truman was apparently unaware of the extent of the lobbying, though he was accused of 
behind-the-scenes persuasion. Ultimately, Zionists gained time to organise themselves when to, 
“intensified … Arab anger”, the White House ordered a four-day delay in the vote.817 Weir confirms 
that before the vote itself, the Philippines’ delegate spoke passionately against Partition although, 
after receiving threats that beneficial Congressional bills would be withheld, their delegate voted in 
the Zionists favour.818 The Saudi Foreign Minister charged that the lobbying made a mockery of the 
United Nations; “I was there myself and saw the change in attitude of delegates before and after the 
pressure was applied”.819 Morris confirms that Arab nations were passionately opposed to Partition 
and pledged support for the Palestinian cause with, Morris relates, “men, money and arms”. He 
describes an instance when Iraq’s Prime Minister threatened that Iraq would “smash the country with 
our guns … obliterate every place the Jews seek to shelter”820 and warned that “severe measures 
should be taken against all Jews in Arab countries”.821 This was no idle threat, since after the 
resolution was passed an estimated 800,000 Jewish people either left of their own accord or were 
expelled from Arab countries.  
Once home to some three and a half million of their number, Poland’s Jewish population had 
been decimated. Now, its UN representative Oskar Lange, expressed Poland’s special interest in the 
fate of those who remained. After all, Lange continued, Poland had been home to a major part of 
world Jewry and both State and survivors maintained good relations. He was proud that Jewish 
achievements in Palestine owed much to their Polish origins. He reminded Assembly members of the 
suffering Jews had experienced and recalled their heroic struggle against Nazi oppressors’ in the 
Warsaw Ghetto. Lange stated that Poland intended to support Partition because it ensured that both 
Jews and Arabs gained independence. The Palestinian problem, Lange argued, was frequently 
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characterised as a problem between Jews and Arabs whereas both groups were fighting to free 
themselves from a British “police state”.822 “Arab colleagues should not block a solution [as it is the 
only way to ensure] political independence to the Arab people of Palestine”.823 
Amir Faisal Al Saud representing Saudi Arabia opposed Poland’s position. He claimed that 
support for the “aggressor”, conflicted with the spirit of the UN Charter just to “please the Zionist 
Gang and politically self-seeking accomplices.824 Had the motives been humanitarian then Saudi 
Arabia, like all Arab states, would have helped rescue Jewish refugees. Connecting the European 
refugee crisis with Palestine was none other than an imperialist plot.825  
Syria’s representative, Amir Arslan, alleged that the Partition plan had been sold by Zionists 
to the public as a humanitarian gesture rather than “the greatest political scandal of all time” and 
contrary to the principles of natural justice. Support for a Jewish state in Palestine was, Arslan 
accused, a ploy by Poland to rid itself of its Jews. 826 
Lebanon’s representative Camille Chamoun questioned the democratic principles of the UN. 
He stated that judging from press reports, delegates had been bribed, threatened with economic 
sanctions and waylaid in bedrooms and corridors in a concerted effort to gain support for Partition. 
He criticised the US for having consistently preached the principles of justice and liberty and had 
donned, “the fatal shirt of Nessus”. Chamoun recalled that the Soviet Union had contended that a 
state’s future should be determined by all its citizens. In a thought-provoking contribution, he argued 
that if there was to be a minority of Arabs in a Jewish marginal-majority state then it would follow 
that Arabs could justifiably claim an Arab sub-division of that Jewish state. Following his logic 
further, he continued that if there was a minority Jewish population in that subdivided Arab state, 
then Jews would be entitled to a Jewish only subdivision of that Arab sub-state. This would mean 
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subdividing ad infinitum though he conceded that his argument conflicted with “the actual state of 
world affairs”.827 Nevertheless, Chamoun’s speech did illustrate the likely impact on Palestine if a 
Jewish state was to be unjustly imposed on an Arab region.  
From his early days in Palestine, it was clear that Professor E. R. Fabregat, UNSCOP’s 
Uruguayan member, would support Partition.828 Now, Rodriguez Fabregat, Uruguay’s UN 
representative reinforced the professor’s reasoning. Establishment of a Jewish state, he argued, was 
the only way discrimination against Jews could be eliminated. For two years, Holocaust survivors 
had waited while the international community chose whether to finally fulfil the League of Nations 
“promise” to help create a Homeland where any numbers of Jewish immigrants would be free to 
determine their own destiny. Fabregat prophesised that while the UN vacillated, and for so long as 
anti-Semitism existed, Jews could face some future incarnation of the Holocaust. Uruguay’s support 
for Partition, he stated, was not just for a Jewish state, but to ensure that Arabs too reaped the benefits 
of an independent state.829 
Speaking for the Netherlands, E. M. J. Sessen explained that on balance, while Arabs had 
presented a strong case, his country supported Partition over a unitary state because the Jewish 
argument was the stronger of the two. He criticised Arabs for their lack of cooperation because had 
they adopted a different attitude they might have “influence[d] the course of events”. Sessen 
sympathised with the humanitarian aspect of the Jewish case, noting that it had received strong 
support from other receptive UN Member states.830 Sessen had criticised Arabs for their non-
cooperative spirit. However, he neglected to remind UN colleagues that while Palestinian Arabs had 
boycotted or been pressurised by the Mufti of Jerusalem into boycotting UNSCOP’s investigations, 
the Arab case had been thoroughly aired during UNSCOP’s cooperative meetings with Arab states in 
Beirut. 
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Against the advice of his State Department, it was an open secret that Truman had decided 
that the United States would support the Zionist position. To add to his problems, less than two years 
previously (5 March 1946), Churchill had delivered his legendary ‘Iron Curtain’ speech.831 With the 
Cold War brewing, the US State Department feared the prospect of Arab realignment from the West 
towards the Soviet Bloc. Overruling his State Department’s objections but perhaps sensing that Stalin 
too saw Partition as a sooner-or-later fait accompli, Truman’s spokesman prepared to deliver the 
President’s verdict. During his speech, Herschel V. Johnson (US Deputy Representative to the United 
Nations) pointedly suggested that collective agreement on some fundamental issues had helped to 
counterbalance the differences that divided Members. Johnson confirmed that UN representatives 
were united in their beliefs that the Mandate should be terminated; that Palestine should be 
independent, that the Holy Places should be protected, that the fundamental principles of human and 
minority rights should be guaranteed and finally, that economic unity should be preserved. If 
agreement could be reached in the economic field then who “can now tell whether … in the 
foreseeable future … common action in the political, social and educational fields [are not equally 
achievable]”. The city of Jerusalem, as the “inevitable metropolitan [as well as the] joint spiritual, 
social and cultural [and] educational centre” might prove to be the catalyst in joining the two sides. 
After all, experience had shown that no previous plan had been acceptable to both parties and though 
imperfect, the partition proposal offered the tantalising prospect of peace.832 
Now that Herschel Johnson had spoken for the US, it was the turn of the latter’s cold-war 
enemy to support or reject the US decision. All attention now turned to USSR Representative, Andrei 
Gromyko as he prepared to state Moscow’s final position. Previously, Gromyko had ridiculed the UK 
over its handling of the Palestine Mandate and been heavily critical of the West’s failure to offer 
protection to an entire race of people. Gromyko had previously revealed that if UNSCOP decided that 
the divide between Arabs and Jews was unbridgeable then, as a last resort, the Soviet Union must 
 
831 Winston Churchill, Iron Curtain Speech, 5 March 1946 
832 A/PV.124 26 November 1947, Pages 14-17 
217 
 
consider Partition. In his opening remarks to the General Assembly, Gromyko claimed (arguably to 
a sceptical audience) that the USSR “has no direct material or other interests in Palestine”, but as a 
great Power it bore special responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. He restated the USSR’s 
former position that if a unified state proved unworkable, then separating Palestine into two 
independent states was its favoured option. This was in line with UNSCOP’s majority; an option 
shared, he predicted, by most UN Member states.833 Gromyko rejected Lebanon’s claim that the 
“single united family” of the USSR had ulterior motives in voting for Partition, but he had no doubt 
that Arab countries would look again to Moscow in their struggle against the last remnants of foreign 
imperialism.834 As before, Gromyko seized the opportunity to savage the UK for its failure to properly 
implement its Mandate and for imposing contradictory conditions. On the one hand, Sir Alexander 
Cadogan had pledged that the UK would help implement whatever decision the General Assembly 
might make and yet, on the other hand, UK support was conditional only on the unrealisable 
stipulation that Arabs and Jews agreed. This showed that “the United Kingdom has no real desire ... 
to cooperate fully with the United Nations in solving this problem ... tantamount to burying this 
decision even before the General Assembly has taken it”.835 
UNSCOP member for Guatemala, Jorge Garcia-Granados, actively participated in events 
during the final days before the crucial vote. In his memoirs of the time he denies the existence of the 
so-called “powerful Latin-American bloc”, since these countries were a mix of liberal and dictatorial 
states and overall agreement was unusual.836 Also, Granados was convinced that by insisting that both 
Arab and Jews must agree to an implementation plan, Britain was prepared to “sabotage … 
partition”837 and treat the process with the same “cavalier distain” directed at UNSCOP during its 
investigation in Palestine.  
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Nevertheless, US Deputy Representative to the UN, Herschel V. Johnson stubbornly clung to 
the notion that Britain would eventually relent and implement the proposal rather than obstruct it. A 
UN Palestine Commission was to be established to oversee the implementation process, but Britain 
decided that it alone would judge when the Mandate should end. It would hand over authority to the 
Commission only “when the time came”. Granados argued that this was an example of Britain having 
adopted “artful and devious means [to] destroy the entire partition plan”.838 Arabs argued that 
disproportionate pressure had been exerted on anti-partitionists to persuade Governments to change 
their positions. The Haiti delegate, for example, having first intended to support Partition, changed 
tack following Government instructions then reverted to its original decision.839 Yugoslavia, with its 
large Moslem population, had intended to reject Partition, but in the end, it abstained. Greece was 
expected to abstain, but finally voted against Partition. The Philippines delegate implied that his 
country would vote ‘against’, before reversing his position and voting ‘for’. Paraguay changed its 
doubtful stance to one of support. Friedman confirms that the Arab bloc could be counted on to vote 
against Partition and without exception they did. Other Muslim states (Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey) 
and states with significant Muslim minorities (India and Greece) followed suit.840  
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South 
Africa, Soviet Union, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela voted for Partition. 
Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey and Yemen voted against while Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia abstained. 
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Of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the US, the Soviet Union and France 
had voted ‘for’ Partition while China and the UK abstained. The voting pattern shows that, very 
broadly, North America and European countries were supportive, as were Latin American, Caribbean 
and African countries by a majority of approximately 2:1.841  
Bercuson seeks to explode the myth that Western leaders supported Zionists out of “Western 
civilisations guilt over the age-old anti-Semitism which had culminated in genocide” or, for that 
matter, that Israel’s success was partially by way of outside moral and material support. He argues 
that Canada supported Partition out of national self-interest trapped in the practicalities of 
Anglo/British/US foreign policy objectives rather than what policy-makers believed to be “right or 
wrong”.842 Friedman argues that the US, Western European and Latin American countries voted for 
Partition largely because of a powerful “domestic Jewish influence”. Stalin’s reasons for supporting 
Partition are less clear cut, but his backing was crucial for Zionists. His order in support of Partition 
was an inescapable signal to Czechoslovakia and Ukraine to follow the Soviet Union’s lead.843 
Granados describes a climate of promise, discord, indecisiveness and anxious waiting for 
Government instructions.844 Deals were done in the delegates’ lounge - “that fascinating centre of 
international gossip and intrigue”.845 Lobbyists on both sides had attempted to swing the vote in their 
favour. Member states had had their final say. After final attempts by opposition forces to defer the 
question, or refer it to the International Court of Justice, the Resolution was put to the General 
Assembly. Finally, on the 29th November 1947 Resolution 181 (III) was adopted by a majority with 
33 countries in favour, most of whom agreed that Partition was the only credible option. Of the 
remainder, 13 voted against, 10 abstained with Thailand absent for the final vote. Immediately after 
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Resolution 181(III) was carried by two votes more than the required two-thirds majority, the Arab 
representatives walked out of the Chamber.846 
Other than a few Zionist doubters, the ‘Partition Plan with Economic Union’ (Annex 11, 12) 
was accepted by the Jewish Agency and greeted with euphoria.847 While Jews celebrated, Arab 
governments rejected the outcome. Buehrig portrays the passage of Resolution 181 at the General 
Assembly as one of the “most ambitious attempts in the history of international organisation to 
change the status quo by formal enactment”.848 
The Aftermath 
On 30th November 1947, the day after the Resolution was adopted, sporadic civil war broke out. 
Volunteers from neighbouring Arab countries joined local units of the Arab Liberation Army and 
attacked Jewish settlements. Jewish armed forces immediately fought back. Matters quickly 
descended into chaos. Then, on the 14th May 1948, Ben-Gurion formally declared the independent 
Jewish State of Israel.849 This was the point of no return. That evening, full scale hostilities erupted 
when military units from neighbouring Arab countries launched an attack against the nascent state.850 
Ultimately, Israel gained the upper hand. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs 
were displaced from their homes with some having been physically expelled (al Nakba). The latter 
was authorised by the Haganah leadership under Plan D. Tessler writes that Plan D’s “character and 
significance … are disputed by many Israeli sources”. He contends that violence was “tolerated” 
provided it furthered some political objective. Whether it was “premeditated or not, [it] created a 
climate of fear in which it was possible to employ other methods to stimulate … the exodus”.851 Benny 
Morris, who has conducted systematic research into Israel’s role in the Arab exodus, explains that 
plan D was a blueprint drawn up by Haganah leaders whose objective was to secure the emergent 
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Jewish State. Under the plan, military commanders were empowered to conduct “operations which 
are in the rear of, within or near our defence lines, with the aim of preventing their use as bases for 
an active armed force”. Morris writes that Plan D “was neither used by nor regarded by the senior 
Haganah field officers as a blanket instruction for the expulsion of the country’s civilian 
population”.852 853 From the beginning, Palestinian society was “fragmented and factional … 
unprepared [for war] by almost every criterion … [a war] that many [Palestinians] did not want”.854 
855 The lesson was clear. A military conquest of Israel, Halliday warns, “is simply a fantasy … [It] is 
not … a remotely feasible alternative. Nor will it ever be.”856 
Reflecting later, Ben-Gurion commented to Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish 
Congress, that “If I was an Arab leader, I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we 
have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is 
not theirs. We come from Israel, it’s true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? 
There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see 
one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?”.857 
Summary 
After a vigorous debate between pro and anti-Partitionists, the General Assembly ruled that the British 
Mandate should be terminated, and that Palestine should be partitioned. Although, supposedly, all 
Member states had an independent say, the two principal Powers had stamped their authority over 
proceedings. Undoubtably, a few wavering states accepted the unavoidability of Partition now that 
the two Cold War rivals had spoken with one voice. 
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Before and during the main debate, Britain’s alleged mishandling of the Mandate had been 
ridiculed. Palestine had descended into conflict and many lives had been lost. Britain’s response was 
to abstain from the final vote and turn its back. Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration had started a 
train of events that led directly to Partition.  
Whether Partition was imposed on Palestinian Arabs or was the result of the independent will 
of individual UN Member states is questionable. Nevertheless, research in this thesis supports the 
hypothesis that in the thirty years from Balfour in 1917 until 1947, Partition was unavoidable.  While 
the Jewish Agency agreed to the state on offer, Palestinian Arabs refused to accept. When on the 14th 
May 1948, the State of Israel came into official being, war broke out between Israel and surrounding 
Arab states. Israel won their war for independence and gained additional land at the long-term cost 
of an independent Palestinian state.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
“At Basle I founded the Jewish State … if I said this out loud today; I would be answered by universal 
laughter. Perhaps in five years and certainly in 50 everyone will know it”.858 
The Balfour Declaration was issued in November 1917. When Lloyd George spoke about this twenty 
years later, he noted how its issue corresponded with a gruelling period during WWI, at a time when 
continuing French and Italian support was weakest and when Russian anti-Tsarists had other 
preoccupations. Crucially, he cited that it was also at a moment when, although having officially 
declared war on the 6th April 1917, the US was in the relatively early stages of preparedness. It was 
vital that America deploy its considerable force without which the outcome of war looked bleak. 
Already, President Woodrow Wilson was under pressure from many US citizens who favoured 
neutrality over involvement in a foreign war.  Nevertheless, UK wartime decision-makers were 
optimistic. They were confident that influential Jewish insiders, sympathetic US press barons, the 
Jewish electorate and Zionists on both sides of the Atlantic would persuade wartime allies to remain 
militarily engaged. It was particularly essential to the combined war effort for the President to fully 
commit to supporting the Allies. Therefore, 1917 was an opportune year for Britain to promote Jewish 
collaboration by declaring its support for Zionism. 
The first versions of the Balfour Declaration proposed that Palestine should be “reconstituted” 
as a Jewish homeland. However, by the time it left the Cabinet Office the wording had been amended 
to read that Britain would use its “best endeavours” to establish a Jewish home in Palestine. The final 
version of the Balfour Declaration emerged after a series of compromises. While the majority of 
Lloyd George’s wartime cabinet accepted the need to make a commitment to Zionists by earmarking 
Palestine as a place for a permanent Jewish homeland, others were opposed to the concept and a few 
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remained sceptical. Bickerton and Klausner argue that the Balfour Declaration is a vaguely worded 
document.859 There is ample evidence confirming that while the civil and religious rights of the 
majority Arab population were to be protected, Arabs were not consulted and had not agreed to the 
contents. In a memorandum written by Lord Balfour less than two years after the Declaration, he 
wrote “in Palestine we [the UK Cabinet] do not propose even to go through the form of consulting 
the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country … right or wrong, good or bad … [the future of 
Zionism] is of far profounder import than the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now 
inhabit this ancient land”.860 After President Wilson had given his qualified blessing, the completed 
version was approved in November 1917 and incorporated into the Palestine Mandate in 1922. This 
was the first in a series of steps that would lead to Partition.   
On the 24th of July 1922, the League of Nations entrusted the Mandate for Palestine to Britain. 
The Mandate itself was a Class-A Mandate under which "Certain communities formerly belonging to 
the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations 
can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by 
a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." However, the Mandate continues “the 
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”.861 
In the event, Arab public opinion favoured the United States as overseers of the Mandate. Britain 
accepted only after the latter had declined.  
In 1922, the total landmass of Mandatory Palestine covered an area of approximately 24,500 
square miles with a predominantly Arab population of some 1.3 million. Around the same time the 
area east of the River Jordan became Transjordan, leaving Palestine much reduced to an area of a 
little over 9,000 square miles, but with a much-increased population density. Transjordan was nearly 
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three times larger than Palestine and sparsely populated by comparison.862 Britain’s exclusion of the 
larger part of Mandatory Palestine (classed as a British Protectorate and permitted under Article 25 
of the Palestine Mandate) left Palestinian Arabs and Jews in dispute over a reduced fraction of original 
Palestine. Although technically both areas east and west of the River Jordan comprised a single 
Mandate, they were viewed as separate entities. Initially, Transjordan’s first Emir, Abdullah bin-al-
Hussein, made a commitment forbidding Jews to settle. However, in 1937 he adopted a more 
conciliatory approach. He reported to the Royal Commission that Jews could remain provided they 
did not exceed 35% of the total population. At a stroke, mandatory Palestine was now confined to an 
area west of the Jordan and reduced to around one-third of its former size. Moreover, 300,000 East-
Bank residents were transformed from Palestinians into Palestinian-Transjordanians. This left their 
remaining 1,000,000 West-Bank fellow-Palestinians in dispute with Jews over a share of the residual 
land. With no prospect of Arab/Jewish reconciliation in sight, Partition became increasingly 
inevitable.863 
After the Ottoman Empire surrendered, Karsh et al question why it was that Transjordan and 
Palestine took separate paths. “Whether [that was] because of [Transjordan’s] unimposing 
geographic attributes and its socio-economic underdevelopment compared with Palestine, or 
because of their reluctance to open it to Jewish immigration and settlement required by the Palestine 
Mandate [are questionable reasons for British surrender of Transjordan]”.864 What is certain is that 
Britain’s effective partitioning of Mandatory Palestine into now present-day Jordan meant that the 
problem was irreversibly magnified. It compelled Arabs and Jews to compete for land amounting to 
one-third of what was once considered as Palestine.   
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From 1917 until 1947 there was a near blizzard of Commissions, Committees, UK White 
Papers and proposals, which were all aimed at resolving the Palestinian question. Britain’s policy 
towards Palestine was erratic and unpredictable. It had twisted and turned as world events changed. 
It was pro-Zionist and anti-Arab, then pro-Arab and anti-Zionist depending on the political 
atmosphere. One proposal (the Royal Commission of 1937) was accepted by Zionists as a starting 
point to negotiations. Conversely, Arabs were insisting that nothing short of a proportionally 
representative majority Palestinian-Arab state, including a blanket ban on Jewish immigration, was 
worthy of consideration. 
In 1937, ten years before UNSCOP arrived to carry out its survey, the Royal Commission 
(Peel) had come closest to proposing a workable solution. During its time in the region, the Royal 
Commission had conducted a scrupulous step-by-step examination of the Jewish-Arab question. First, 
they explored it in its historical context: the early relationship between Judaism and Islam in Palestine. 
They tested the inherent ambiguity contained in the Balfour Declaration and its close coupling to the 
British Mandate. They explored in some depth Zionist calls for, and Arab rejection of, a Jewish 
Home/State. The Commissioners plotted the course of the disturbances during the 1920s and 30s 
which led to the near-uncontainable Arab Revolt that erupted in 1936 and continued until 1939. They 
concluded that the Balfour Declaration was ambiguous, and that certain Articles contained in the 
British Mandate were irreconcilable. Peel’s Commission turned its attention to the rise of Palestinian 
Nationalism. It considered Arab and Jewish proposals and their respective attitudes towards a Jewish 
National Home, with particular reference to the Arab/Jewish impasse over Jewish immigration. They 
examined the contentious questions of land, irrigation, agriculture, forestation, development 
opportunities and the likelihood of co-operation on any number of these issues. The Commissioners 
addressed the situation in the Holy Places and the impact of any one solution on the inhabitants. Time 
and again, they were met with the obstacle of Jewish immigration until it became a major 
preoccupation. Peel’s report also addressed Arab fears of Jewish dominance - the ‘raison d'être’ of 
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the disturbances. Finally, after travelling the region, taking numerous statements and balancing the 
weight of evidence on both sides, the Royal Commissioners favoured Partition. Though there was 
evidence of some degree of co-operation between the two conflicting parties, it was insufficient to 
guarantee that Jews and Arabs could live together in permanent peace. Amongst several “Separation 
[and] Co-operation” clauses intended to “play an important part after partition in helping to bring 
about an ultimate reconciliation of the two races” the Commissioners recommended that with little 
prospect of peaceful coexistence, neither Jews nor Arabs should be permitted to purchase property 
from each other.865 On the question of the economic sustainability of a future Jewish homeland, Peel 
recommended that it was for Jewish leaders to determine the extent of their own “economic absorptive 
capacity”. In their concluding remarks, the Royal Commissioners argued that while neither side 
would get all it wanted, “half a loaf was better than no bread [at all]”.866 Under Partition, the Royal 
Commissioners envisaged that Palestinian Arabs would be on an equal footing with their Arab-State 
neighbours. They would be freed from the fear of subjection to Jewish rule and strengthened by the 
knowledge that the Holy Places would be internationally protected. Additionally, Arabs should 
receive a subvention from the Jewish state and in view of the poverty of Transjordan, a sizable British 
grant towards land improvements. For Jews, the prize was beguiling. While Peel’s proposals only 
went part way to satisfying their demands, they met the primary principles of Zionism. Jews would 
have the freedom to build an independent Jewish state in a manner they saw fit. The Royal 
Commissioners had addressed the main themes: Arab demands for an independent Palestinian state 
and their “hatred and fear” of the consequences of mass Jewish immigration into an independent 
Jewish homeland or Jewish state. However, there were other factors at play. These were Jewish 
reservations regarding “the advance of Arab nationalism”, Arab concerns over “Jewish [influence 
over British] public opinion”, “Arab distrust in the sincerity of the British Government [and] alarm 
 
865 Palestine Royal Commission: (Cmd. 5479, 1937, Page 393) 
866 (Ibid, 394) 
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at … Jewish purchase of land” and suspicions over Britain’s “ultimate intentions”.867 While many of 
the Royal Commission’s recommendations were echoed in UNSCOP’s report ten years later, the 
Commission went a step too far which contributed to the report’s downfall. The Commission 
concluded that in its opinion, as that neither side could peacefully co-exist over the issue of 
immigration, there should be a wholesale population exchange. The Commissioners reasoned that 
“the existence of minorities constitutes to the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful 
operation of Partition”.868 
Predictably, after the report was published, it was roundly rejected by the Arab Higher 
Committee. Raider and Sarna confirm that unlike the outright denunciation of Peel’s proposals by 
Arabs, Ben-Gurion’s Zionist Congress faced down dissenters and accepted Peel’s proposal as a 
starting point towards future negotiations.869 Palestinian Arabs were inflamed by Peel’s proposal for 
a population exchange, given the negative impact it would have on large swathes of Arabs against a 
relative handful of Jews.  
A year later Britain dispatched yet another Commission (the Woodhead Commission) to 
review the situation. Woodhead’s Commissioners unanimously ruled out a population exchange. 
They devised three Partition plans, each of which was met with opposition by one or more of the 
Commissioners. In the end, the majority decided reluctantly that Partition Plan C was the least 
implausible.870 Like the other plans, it too was dismissed by both sides in the dispute. HM 
Government were minded to endorse and then decided against the Royal Commissions proposals. In 
November 1938 it announced that Woodhead’s would suffer the same fate. Nevertheless, through 
Peel and Woodhead, ‘Partition’ was firmly planted into official language. This was a major step 
towards it being adopted as a solution.  
 
867 (Ibid, Part 1, Chapters III & IV) 
868 (Ibid, Chapter XXII, Pages 389-383) 
869 Raider, A. Sarna, J. Zweig (Ed) (1977, 33-45), Abba Hillel Silver and American Zionism (an essay by Shapira, A, A Comparative Study of Zionist 
leadership 
870 Palestine Royal Commission: (Cmd. 5479, 1937, Appendix 9) 
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In May 1939 both the House of Commons and House of Lords debated the UK Government’s 
now infamous White Paper. At a time of most need, Jews were to be condemned to remain within the 
clutches of their Nazi persecutors. HM Government acceded to Arab demands and imposed savage 
restrictions on Jewish immigration. In the face of raging opposition to its latest policy twist, the 
Conservative Government finally won the day. With WWII just months away, all pretence that Britain 
would help Zionists establish a Jewish state was quashed. Within five years, millions of Jewish people 
were murdered. Britain’s White Paper had left Zionists’ ambitions for a Jewish state temporarily 
paralysed.  
On the 1st of September 1939 the Third Reich invaded Poland and two days later, Britain and 
France declared war against Germany. The Soviet Union invaded Poland from the East on the 17th of 
September. Britain, preoccupied with war, turned its back on the Balfour promise. With means of 
escape barred, only the most prophetic could have imagined that for European Jews, there was worse 
to come. The industrial elimination of Jews gathered pace over several years and was nearing its full 
throes by the time Jewish representatives convened at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May 1942. 
Although Britain’s 1939 White Paper was a setback, committed Zionists were determined to find a 
way forward. While Weizmann remained optimistic that Britain would fulfil its promise, the resolute 
Ben-Gurion was convinced that it was vital to garner United States support. Opinions were mixed, 
but Ben-Gurion argued that while a gradualist approach towards Statehood may have been 
appropriate pre-war, the present suffering of European Jews demanded a radical solution. Unless 
Jewish immigration levels into Palestine drastically increased, the whole concept of Zionism was 
pointless. Other than revisionists who claimed that all of Palestine was rightfully Jewish, the majority 
accepted Ben-Gurion’s view that Partition was a realistic starting point. A secure Jewish state offered 
protection from the persecution that Jews had suffered for centuries with the Holocaust representing 
the most extreme manifestation of anti-Semitism. Peel’s ‘step too far’ was that the impasse between 
Arabs and Jews necessitated a population exchange. Indeed, there is evidence that, were it not for the 
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immigration issue, it was not unusual to find ordinary Jewish and Palestinian-Arab people 
cooperating on every-day issues. Ben-Gurion looked ahead to a Jewish state where up to a million 
Arabs lived alongside Jews and shared civil, political and religious equality but he acknowledged the 
depth of Arab resentment. In an address to the Jewish Agency in 1936, Ben-Gurion proposed that 
Zionists should “see things with Arab eyes … they see emigration on a giant scale … they see the 
lands passing into our hands. They see England identifying with Zionism”.871 Nonetheless while bi-
nationalism had advantages, Ben-Gurion dismissed the notion because Arabs were overwhelmingly 
and unrelentingly opposed to Jewish immigration. Immigration, he urged, was “the only way of 
salvation and survival”.  Although there were rifts in the ranks of the attendees, Conference resolved 
that “Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth”.872 At Biltmore it was Ben-Gurion, the 
younger statesman, who emerged as the preferred leader rather than Weizmann. Again, it was Ben-
Gurion at his most persuasive who seized the moment and gained the support of Conference. He 
correctly predicted that, post-war, the United States would replace Britain as the final decider over 
the Palestine question.  
Jewish ‘Home/Homeland and Commonwealth’ were always metaphors for Jewish ‘State’. 
The charade ended in May 1945 when the Jewish Agency presented its full set of demands to the 
British Government. “Palestine”, the document reads, “[would be established] as a full Jewish 
State”, free to set its own settlement policy. The document was issued in the same month that the war 
in Europe finally ended.873 After WWII, Zionist resolve had hardened. To Zionists, the Balfour 
Declaration was interpreted as implying that Britain and the League of Nations, by way of the British 
Mandate, officially recognised the Jewish historical and religious connection to Palestine. To 
Zionists, this represented an unequivocal commitment to world Jewry. They were on a mission to 
 
871 Shlomo Ben-Ami (2006, 1): Scars of War, Wounds of Peace – The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. 
872 Stein, K (2011): ‘The Biltmore Program, David Ben-Gurion. See also, Brady, Colleen, 2010: American Zionism and the Biltmore Conference: 
Readings on the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Prof. R. Hudson.  
873 On the 8th May 1945 Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Western Allies and on the following day (9th May) Germany also surrendered to 
the Soviet Union. The war in the East continued until 14th August 1945 when Japan surrendered unconditionally.  
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encourage any number of Jewish immigrants to migrate to a Jewish State in all or part of Palestine. 
It was the unknown dimension of immigration that Arabs resisted. 
WWII had left Europe devastated. Cities lay in ruins. Food was scarce. Family members by 
the million were dead or displaced. Hundreds of thousands of refugees roamed across Europe. Jewish 
people had been decimated. Holocaust survivors languished in holding camps often within touching 
distance of the homes of former enemies. A state in Palestine offered Jewish men, women and 
children the one avenue of salvation. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, was caught in this 
whirlwind of change. He was reluctant to agree with Truman’s willingness to accept the need for 
increased Jewish immigration into Palestine. He was inclined to share the US State Department’s 
fears over the likely negative Arab reaction and its conjecture that this would lead to Soviet influence 
creeping ever deeper into Middle East affairs. Any sympathy Bevin had for Holocaust survivors 
quickly evaporated when he was confronted by the large number of British casualties at the hands of 
Jewish radical groups. He refused to submit to the Jewish Agency’s appeal that the sheer scale of the 
refugee crisis demanded an immediate abandonment of the immigration quotas. The different 
approaches adopted by the British and US Governments fostered chilled relations between Bevin and 
Truman. The State of Israel became a reality largely due to Truman’s resolve to see its establishment 
through to the end.  
On 2nd April 1947, after thirty years of unsuccessful struggle over the Palestine Mandate, 
Britain finally accepted defeat and surrendered its bleak task to the United Nations. In turn, the latter 
established an eleven-member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to visit 
the region, seek answers and recommend a plausible solution. From the start, Zionist leaders had the 
advantage. They demonstrated a willingness to co-operate and presented a cogent argument. 
Conversely, the severe disservice Palestinian leaders did their constituents by boycotting proceedings 
was only partially rectified by statesmen from Palestine’s Arab neighbours presenting their case to 
UNSCOP.   
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Armed with evidence gathered from interested parties, UNSCOP members journeyed to 
Geneva to consider their decision. Up to this point, a bi-national state had been effectively ruled out. 
A mixed federal state with disgruntled Arabs in close proximity to equally resistant Jews would be 
equally unsatisfactory. Now that Mandatory Palestine excluded Transjordan, an all-encompassing 
Jewish State extending over the remaining area would deprive Palestinian Arabs of a state of their 
own. This was an intolerable situation to Palestinian Arabs and was quickly ruled out. Thus, it 
remained, from Balfour onwards, that the separation of two conflicted parties was the only credible 
option. Consequently, on the 3rd September 1947, by a majority of its eleven members, UNSCOP 
recommended to the General Assembly that Palestine should be partitioned into two independent 
states. Both would cooperate in a jointly exercised economic union. Additionally, due to its sensitive 
religious significance, the Committee recommended that Jerusalem should have administrative status 
implemented under the authority on the United Nations. 
Later, on the 29th of November 1947 and following an energetic debate, the General Assembly 
approved a slightly modified version of UNSCOP’s majority recommendations.874 Supporters of 
Partition accepted the Zionist contention that the establishment of a Jewish State and unrestricted 
immigration were inextricably interwoven. With some reservations over demarcation lines and 
partially unresolved immigration concerns, Zionists were overjoyed. By contrast, Palestinian Arabs 
refused to bow to the inevitability of Partition and accept the fully independent Palestinian State on 
offer.  
Taking a step back, the research has shown that Arab and Jewish interests were so 
diametrically opposed, particularly on the issue of Jewish immigration and the accompanying land 
sales, that from Balfour in 1917, Partition was always the only realistic option.875 Although couched 
in terms intended to assuage both sides, the wording of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine 
 
874 UNSCOP’s report was referred to an Ad Hoc Committee on the United Nations before being considered by the General Assembly. 
875 Lord Balfour reportedly said that development should be gradual but an “independent Jewish State” lay somewhere in the future (War Cabinet 
Paper 261, CAB 23/24, 5).  [see this thesis, Chapter 1] 
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Mandate evidently implies that Britain foresaw the establishment of a Jewish ‘state’. Although 
Britain’s Royal Commission anticipated that Partition would lead to peace, its recommendation for a 
wholesale population transfer stirred an already volatile mix. Peel’s proposal was based on the 
supposition that Jewish immigration on any scale was intolerable to Arabs. He went even further, 
deducing that on balance, it was unlikely that Arabs could co-exist with Jews. However, as the 
evidence presented in this thesis shows, while it is unquestionably true that the deadlock over Partition 
was intimately connected to the question of Jewish immigration, there is no convincing evidence to 
indicate that Partition demanded a total separation of all Jews from all Arabs. The latter is particularly 
noteworthy given that the UN resolved to partition Palestine into two separate states provided that 
Jews and Arabs agreed to cooperate in the best interests of the overall economy. 
The Arab/Israeli dispute over immigration is a recurring theme throughout the thesis. Above 
all, it was the resolutely immovable stance adopted by both sides on this single issue that persuaded 
the GA to endorse, with little enthusiasm, UNSCOP’s recommendation for a two-state solution.876 
The thesis has consistently argued that the Partition of Palestine was the only realistic option, but the 
question remains as to why this was the case: 
The final version of the Balfour Declaration can be interpreted as an assurance to Zionists 
that, one way or another, Britain would “endeavour” to facilitate a Jewish Home in Palestine. This 
pledge was later crystallised in the British Mandate. The League of Nations recognised that a Jewish 
historical connection with the Holy land was “grounds for reconstituting their national home in 
[Palestine]”,877 but the League of Nations went further. Not only was Britain bound to “secure the 
establishment of the Jewish national home”,878 but in cooperation with Zionists, it was also to 
“facilitate Jewish immigration [so as to encourage] close settlement on the land including State lands 
and waste lands”.879 Clearly, according to the League of Nations, Jews were expected to immigrate 
 
876 It should be noted that, unlike the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, although it conveys considerable authority, is empowered only to 
make recommendations - that is, they are not legally binding.   
877 British Palestine Mandate: Text of the Mandate (24th July 1922, Para 2) 
878 (Ibid, Article 2) 
879 (Ibid, Article 6) 
234 
 
into and develop a Jewish national entity in Palestine. Later, though Britain obfuscated the Balfour 
Declaration’s intentions, there is no evidence that it or any number of Commissions or Committees 
argued for its abandonment. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
reawakening of Arab nationalism, Britain sought to appease Arab resistance to the Declaration. For 
the next thirty years, there were stumbling blocks along the way. 
First and most important, was the increasing pace of Jewish immigration. A range of 
Committees and Commissions struggled over the issue, with neither Zionists nor Arabs prepared to 
give way. Zionists argued that both Britain and particularly the International authority vested in the 
League of Nations had not only pledged to “facilitate Jewish immigration”, but they had also been 
given the authority to settle and develop the land. On the other hand, Arabs argued that even though 
they were in the majority, they had been side-lined when the decision to reorganise Palestine in favour 
of Zionists had been made. Although both sides of this argument are undeniably true, in the context 
of the time in which they were framed, the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations 
Mandate were politically irreversible with or without the drive to resolve the post-Holocaust 
immigration crisis.  
The second stumbling block was the perceived lack of land in which to build a viable Jewish 
state. By 1947, Jews had already established settlements. These were mainly centred around the 
coastal plain and in the northern regions that were being intensively cultivated by successive waves 
of Jewish immigrants. Despite the UK Government’s restrictive immigration policy of 1939, there is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that whether by legal or illegal means, vigorous efforts by the Palestine 
Authority to stem the flow of Jewish settlers beyond these limits failed. The influx was particularly 
evident after the Holocaust. The Mandate stipulated that the “waste lands” could be settled. As the 
Negev fell into that category, it too offered scope for further development.880 
 
880 (Ibid, Article 6) 
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Third, Britain and others argued that immigration levels should not exceed Palestine’s 
“absorptive capacity”. The thesis argues that the term is meaningless. The absorptive capacity of a 
state is in constant flux and a man-made creation. Arable acre for arable acre, smaller states than 
Palestine provide adequate living conditions for considerably larger populations. Conversely, many 
larger states have small populations. The thesis argues that the term ‘absorptive capacity’ was nothing 
more than a cynical ploy by Britain to partially satisfy Arab demands for a complete stoppage of 
Jewish immigration. Again, if irrigated, the Negev desert region presented the possibility of creating 
ever more absorptive economic capacity.  
The fourth barrier was that Zionists had considerable economic and political influence. They 
deployed this to positive effect both within the embryonic Jewish state and in the corridors of power. 
Zionist influence (or, as Schneer argues, the “stereotypical thinking about [the exaggerated role of 
Jewish influence]”881) was shrewdly employed in the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration and, later, 
within US President Truman’s Administration. Zionists not only used their economic leverage to help 
fund the Jewish state, but they also used it to promote a successful propaganda campaign and could 
count on sympathetic press and media barons. In contrast, Arabs could not compete on the same terms 
so that their message failed to resonate within Western government circles.  
The fifth obstacle was that while both sides were willing to compromise on several issues, 
Jewish immigration was flatly and uncompromisingly non-negotiable by both sides. Given a 
majority-Arab bi-national state, Arabs were prepared to allow ‘legal’ immigrants to remain and 
participate in a proportionally representative government. As Palestinian citizens, Jews would have 
the same status as their fellow Palestinians. However, the fate of ‘illegal’ immigrants was less clear 
cut. According to the evidence gathered in this thesis, it is likely that illegal immigrants would be 
expelled, and any further immigration banned. With a one-state solution ruled out, Partition was 
unavoidable. 
 
881 Schneer, J. (2010, 344): The Balfour Declaration – the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
236 
 
The sixth issue was the fact that, generally, the General Assembly was frustrated by 
Palestinian Arabs’ apparent snub to the Special Committee. This offered Zionists considerable 
freedom to influence proceedings. However, this omission was partially mitigated by measured 
evidence from Arab neighbours. 
Finally, from the onset it was clear to Commissions, Committees and to UNSCOP that the 
issues of Jewish immigration and land sales were unchallengeable. The Royal Commission went 
further. Peel maintained that the economic, social, religious and cultural differences between Jews 
and Arabs were so deeply entrenched, that Arabs and Jews should lead separate lives. He proposed 
that under a two-state solution, there should be a mass exchange of populations such that Jews and 
Arabs would be partitioned into two distinct Jewish and Arab national states. While Peel had 
established the necessity for Partition, unsurprisingly, population exchange was roundly rejected.   
While this researcher acknowledges that on immigration the differences were intractable, the 
divide was centred on Arab fears that Jewish immigration threatened Palestine’s and the wider Middle 
East’s demographic balance, rather than a belief that Jews and Arab could not co-exist at any level. 
Conversely, the evidence presented here confirms that given economic parity, Jews and Arabs could 
co-operate on every-day life issues.  Menachem Klein writes that although Jewish-Arab identity “was 
full of spurs and bumps” it was “a fact of life, something encountered daily by the country’s 
natives”.882 Bickerton and Klausner agree that, especially during the times when Jewish immigration 
levels dropped, “[p]ersonal relations between Arab and Jews could be friendly”.883 Karsh cites many 
instances of peaceful coexistence over matters as far ranging as joint Arab-Jewish projects over 
schools, trade unions and “on non-political matters, such as taxation, agriculture. etc., [where Jews 
and Arabs] speak with the same voice”.884 As far back as 1924, Palestinian Administrators reported 
that Arab and Jewish villages had actively collaborated in such matters of anti-malarial drainage and 
 
882 Klein, Menachem (2014, 19) Lives in Common, Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron, 
883 Bickerton, I.J and Klausner, C. L. (2007, 50) ‘History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ (7th Edition) 
884 Karsh, Efraim (2011, 14-15): Palestine Betrayed 
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water installation schemes.885 In May 1936, shortly after taking office as President of the Jewish 
Agency, Chaim Weizmann addressed the English Zionist Federation: Despite “venomous Arab 
propaganda” directed at Jews, Arabs had gained from the Jewish presence on many measures. 
Zionists “have no quarrel with the Arab people … We have lived with them in peace. We have 
stretched out our hands repeatedly [to understand and remedy their grievances]”.886 Similarly, in 
their evidence to the Royal Commission in 1937 and to UNSCOP in July 1947, Arab statesmen 
confirmed that they too enjoyed peaceful relations with Jews and that cordiality would continue, were 
it not for the irreparable divide over expanding Jewish settlements. After the Holocaust, Arabs 
protested that “they, the one race with no anti-Semitic tradition, should [be singled out] to bear the 
sins of Christian Europe”.887 Again, the deadlock over Jewish immigration was the main obstacle to 
a peaceful solution. It was this one factor above all others that persuaded the GA that it had no 
alternative but to divide Palestine into two separate states with the proviso that Jerusalem should 
become a separate UN administered capital.888 To bring the two sides into closer alignment, the GA 
accepted UNSCOP’s supposition that a system of economic unity would prove to be mutually 
beneficial.889  
The General Assembly carried a considerable responsibility and was faced with a number of 
distinct options: It had the option of establishing an International Trusteeship System under the 
Administrative Authority of the UN imagining that, in time, the Palestine question would be settled 
peacefully or, failing that, militarily enforced by the UN Security Council. However, this option 
would not have resolved the contentious immigration issue. Instead, Holocaust survivors would be 
condemned to remain indefinitely in European refugee camps from where, after legal limits had been 
reached, many thousands more would have felt compelled to journey to Palestine illegally. The 
 
885 Report by HM Government of the Administration under Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1924 
886 Letters and papers of Chaim Weizmann, Volume II, Series B, Editor: Barnet Litvinoff, (December 1931 – April 1952), Pages 93-98.   
887 Ovendale, Ritchie (2004, 105): The Origins of the Arab Israeli Wars 
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889 (Ibid, 13-17) 
238 
 
likelihood of increased violence between Jews, Arabs and an Administrative Authority ruled this 
option out. 
The GA could have prevailed on members of the International Community to accept a share 
of Jewish immigrants on humanitarian grounds. However, although country after country expressed 
sympathy, most refused to assist. A few offered sanctuaries, but to a relatively small number of 
displaced Jews. Countries were struggling to rebuild after WWII. Some alleged that refugees would 
upset an existing delicate demographic balance. Others claimed to have already arrived at saturation 
point. In any event, Jewish refugees had their minds fixed on a partitioned Palestine. Again, 
resettlement was not an option. 
The UN could have replaced the Mandate by a UN administered Trusteeship. While it was 
possible to enforce this arrangement after WWII, in the specific case of Palestine (other than 
Jerusalem), the UN was unlikely to follow that path given that the British Mandate was already a 
proven failure.  The UK Government was intending to surrender its Mandate otherwise sporadic 
violence threatened to explode into full-blown conflict. Yet again, this was not an option. 
A one-state solution implied an Arab-imposed blanket ban on Jewish immigration. ‘Illegal’ 
immigrants were likely to be expelled, land sales banned, and Jews fated to live under the jurisdiction 
of an Arab-majority state. This raised the spectre of Palestine spiralling into civil war and was not 
considered as a credible option.  
Under the Bevin Plan, separation of Arabs from Jews would have been brought about via a 
system of Cantons. Partition, unlike Cantons, had the advantage of providing for a defensible critical 
mass. That aside, Bevin’s plan was rejected by both parties.   
While alternative solutions have been explored, all are secondary to Zionists’ resolve that the 
future of Judaism itself depended on Jewish immigration into the perceived security of a self-
governing Jewish state. The above reinforces the hypothesis that the UN had no viable alternative 
other than to accept Partition.  
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It is arguable whether world-wide revulsion over the Holocaust put the final seal on Partition, 
and whether a Jewish State (in the faraway Middle East) was none other than a cynical measure to 
rid Europe of its Jewish refugee ‘problem’. In an interview in the Times of Israel, Shalom Wald 
contends that had the Holocaust not happened then “there would be no state of Israel, only a strong 
Jewish community in the land of Israel”. Wald asks, what-if, at key moments in the run-up to, and 
during the course of WWII, events had played out in some other way, then, he conjectures, the 
Holocaust may not have happened.890 Of course it could equally be imagined that what-if there had 
not been a war in the first place with its consequential Holocaust then the State of Israel may have 
come to fruition sooner rather than later after Peel’s Commission made its two-state proposal. Also, 
had there not been a run-up to war then there would have been no strategic advantage for Britain to 
issue its 1939 White Paper favouring Arab states over Zionists. In his ‘Holocaust Averted’, Gurock 
addresses in part the issue of counterfactual history, a speculative exploration of what-ifs.891 
“Alternative scenarios of events”, he suggests, “have their spokespeople who believe that it is not 
only a way of understanding the intricacies of past decisions, but also of comprehending what those 
‘roads not taken’ mean for contemporary conditions”.892 MacRaild and Black argue that 
counterfactual history “is at the very root … of conjecturing on what did not happen, or might have 
happened, in order to understand what did”.893 Be that as it may, this thesis is not a counterfactual 
journey. It is not a speculative exploration of what-ifs. The tragedy of the Holocaust happened, as did 
a series of other events, most particularly Balfour’s pledge to Zionists, it’s acceptance by the League 
of Nations and pre and post WWII commissions that found no feasible alternatives to Partition.  
Again, for years before formal Partition in 1947, Jewish immigrants had poured into Palestine 
and before long comprised a critical mass within definable notional borders. By the time Peel’s Royal 
Commission proposed Partition in 1937, the Yishuv had acquired all of the trappings of a fully 
 
890 Times of Israel (2 June 2015) Article on Counter Factualism and Jewish History by Renee Ghert-Zand 
891 Gurock, J. S. (2015) The Holocaust Averted, An Alternative History of American Jewry 1938 – 1967 
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functioning state. A de facto Jewish state existed but, (it must be emphasised), alongside an Arab 
state-in-waiting which, as Halliday asserts, should comprise half of historic Palestine. Using the 
examples of India in regard to Pakistan or Pakistan vis-à-vis Bangladesh, he writes, “[t]here exists a 
standard solution [to irreconcilable national conflict] namely Partition”. So why, Halliday questions, 
is Palestine viewed so differently when ‘state’ itself is a manmade creation and applies to virtually 
all states? Answering his own central question, Halliday writes that those claiming that “Israelis do 
not have the right to nationhood … is so fundamental … that it is rarely argued for; it is simply 
assumed”.894  
This thesis has argued that from Balfour until Partition thirty years later, Palestinian Arabs 
were engaged in an unwinnable struggle against Zionists’ resolve to set in stone a permanent Jewish 
state in the Holy Land. Soon after returning from Palestine, UNSCOP member, Garcia-Granados, 
went further: “Partition was not a capricious invention of UNSCOP. It already existed in Palestine 
when we came here, we found it there; history, not UNSCOP, had begun the partition of Palestine”.895  
 
894 Fred Halliday’s words taken from: Linfield, Susie (2019, 209-210) The Lion’s Den – Zionism and the Left from Hannah Arendt to Noam Chomsky 
895 Garcia-Granados, J. (1948, 272-273): The Birth of Israel – The Drama as I saw it 
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Annex 1. Draft 1: Lord Rothschild Draft of the Declaration - 18th July 1917 
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Annex 2. Draft 2: Arthur Balfour Draft of the Declaration – 2nd August 1917 
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Annex 3. Draft 3: Milner Draft of the Declaration – 4th August 1917 
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Annex 4. Draft 4: Milner-Amery Draft of the Declaration – 4th October 1917 
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Annex 5. Draft 5: (Final Draft) - Balfour Declaration – 2nd November 1917 
 
(Above five image versions of the Balfour Declaration by courtesy of Balfour 100 
(www.balfour100.com/declaration)) 
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Annex 6. Palestine Royal Commission – Plan of Partition 
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Annex 7. Woodhead Partition – Plan A. 
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Annex 8. Woodhead Partition – Plan B. 
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Annex 9. Woodhead Partition – Plan C. 
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Annex 10. UNSCOP Minority Plan – Federation of Arab and Jewish States 
 
               (Above Maps (6-10) by courtesy of the Jewish Virtual Library)  
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Annex 11. UN General Assembly Plan of Partition 
 
             (Map by courtesy of Koret Communications LTD)  
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Annex 12. The Majority Proposal: Partition with Economic Union       
“Partition and independence—Palestine within its present borders, following a transitional period of 
two years from 1 September 1947, shall be constituted into an independent Arab State, an 
independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem... “Independence shall be granted to each State 
upon its request only after it has adopted a constitution ... has made to the United Nations a 
declaration containing certain guarantees, and has signed a treaty creating the Economic Union of 
Palestine and establishing a system of collaboration between the two States and the City of 
Jerusalem. “Citizenship—Palestinian citizens, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian 
citizenship, reside in Palestine, shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the 
State in which they are resident ... “Economic union—A treaty shall be entered into between the two 
States. ... The treaty shall be binding at once without ratification. It shall contain provisions to 
establish the Economic Union of Palestine... “Population — The figures given for the distribution of 
the settled population in the two proposed States — are approximately as follows:  
 Jews Arabs and others Total 
 Jewish State 498,000 407,000 905,000 
Arab State   10,000 725,000 735,000 
Jerusalem  100,000 105,000 205,000 
“In addition, there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 (Arab) Bedouins … “(Jerusalem)—The 
City of Jerusalem shall be placed under an International Trusteeship System by means of a 
Trusteeship Agreement which shall designate the United Nations as the Administering Authority.” 
(The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917-1988, UN, 1990, 115) 
 
 
  
253 
 
Annex 13. The Minority Proposal: A federal State of Palestine 
“The independent State of Palestine—the peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their 
right to independence, and an independent federal State of Palestine shall be created following a 
transitional period not exceeding three years... “The independent federal State of Palestine shall 
comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State. “During the transitional period, a constituent assembly 
shall be elected by the population of Palestine and shall formulate the constitution of the independent 
federal State of Palestine... “The attainment of independence by the independent federal State of 
Palestine shall be declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations as soon as the authority 
administering the territory shall have certified to the General Assembly that the constituent assembly 
referred to in the precedent paragraph has adopted a constitution... “There shall be a single 
Palestinian nationality and citizenship, which shall be granted to Arabs, Jews and others. 
“Jerusalem, which shall be the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine, shall comprise, 
for purposes of local administration, two separate municipalities, one of which shall include the Arab 
sections of the city, including that part of the city within the walls, and the other the areas which are 
predominantly Jewish.” 
(The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917-1988, United Nations, 1990, 115) 
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